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Abstract 
An Evaluation of Targeted Security Awareness for End Users 
Najem Ahmmed Ahmmed Mahmoud 
Users are frequently cited as being the weakest link in the information security chain. 
However, in many cases they are ill-positioned to follow good practice and make the 
necessary decisions. Part of the reason here is that even if security awareness, training 
and/or education have been provided, some of the key points may have been forgotten 
by the time that users find themselves facing security-related decisions. 
There are several scenarios in which users find themselves facing security-related 
decisions. However, while in such situations, many do not have an adequate 
understanding of security and do not receive the appropriate advice to make the 
necessary decisions they are required to make. One possible solution to this situation 
is to ensure that security guidance and feedback are available when necessary, and to 
provide effective information that can help the user make informed decisions at the 
right time to avoid security risks. Such targeted security awareness-raising has the 
potential to provide support to users at the point of need, in order to take the necessary 
security precautions and make informed decisions. 
To examine the approach of targeted security awareness-raising, an experimental 
study was conducted to test the effectiveness of this approach and presents the results 
of the study. This experiment was based around the scenario of connecting to Wi-Fi 
networks, and determining whether participants could make informed and correct 
decisions about which networks were safe to connect to. Four alternative interfaces 
were tested (ranging from a version that mimicked the standard Windows Wi-Fi 
network selection interface, through to versions with security ratings and additional 
guidance). The aim of the experiment was to determine the extent to which providing 
such information could affect user decisions when presented with a range of networks 
to connect to, and help to move them more effectively in the direction of security. The 
findings revealed that, users always tended to connect to the known names first in the 
absence of security information and very prone to connecting to names that look like a 
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known name. In addition, claimed signal strength is also found to be a persuading 
factor. Results have also revealed that users can be influenced positively, if suitably 
visible feedback and guidance is given at the task in hand. 
While users did not exhibit perfect behaviour in terms of selecting more secure 
networks in preference to less protected ones, there was a tangible improvement 
amongst the users that had been exposed to the selection interfaces offering and 
promoting more security-related information. In common with findings from other 
security contexts, these results suggest that users’ security behaviours can be 
positively influenced purely through the provision of additional information, enabling 
them to make better choices even if the system does not provide any further means of 
enforcement. 
This research also has led to introduce a series of related design principles and 
guidelines that have been identified from the experimental study. To study the 
effectiveness of the proposed design principles and guidelines, existing applications 
have been examined in order to evaluate their consistency with these 
recommendations and have identified scope for improvement, which would in turn 
assist user awareness via a more targeted approach. This is illustrated through an 
example where the design principles and guidelines are applied to the appearance of 
email notifications that aim to assist users in spotting phishing threats. 
In addition to the aforementioned results of the experimental work, the findings 
demonstrate that the abstraction of design principles and guidelines allows the lessons 
to be transferred to other contexts. Furthermore, following and applying the guidelines 
enables subtle but relevant refinements to the user interface. Considering the 
application of this security lesson more broadly, guidance and feedback/nudges should 
be provided by default in other security contexts.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Modern organisations are now characterized by their primary reliance on information 
systems. This makes it intuitive to rely on cybersecurity to ensure that related systems 
and data are available when needed, and protected from damage (Furnell et al., 2019). 
Over the past few years, the importance of information security has become clearer for 
individuals and organisations. Many of the witnessed security breaches indicate that 
protecting IT systems becomes a prominent concern and is no longer an optional duty 
(Crossler et al., 2013; Furnell et al., 2018). This is true, not only for companies offering 
their services through IT systems, but also for personal computer users (Korovessis et 
al., 2017). Unsurprisingly, the World Economic Forum (WEF, 2017) rated the large-
scale breach of cybersecurity associated with data fraud or theft as one of the five most 
serious threats facing the world today. 
According to the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA, 
2010), that analyses the state-of-the-art in cyber threats, the number of people and 
businesses most likely to suffer from security breaches is also increasing. Reasons 
depend on many factors, including vulnerabilities in the new and the existing 
technologies, along with device integration, the notable increase in the 'always on' 
connections and the continuous significant increase in the number of users within the 
European Union (EU). ENISA also stated that awareness of the risks along with the 
available safeguards is the first line of defence for security of information systems and 
networks. 
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The most serious security breaches are due to several failures from people, processes, 
and technology. However, the human factor is a fundamental issue. The report from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2012) found that the main cause is often a lack of 
investment in staff security education. It is worrying that only 20% of surveyed 
employees had attended any form of cyber security training. This highlights the 
importance of staff awareness and vigilance, in addition to technical security solutions, 
that will effectively contribute to the protection of the organisation IT systems (DCMS, 
2017). 
In the information security chain, despite the advances in security technology, end-
users are often perceived as the weakest link. In fact, even the strongest technical 
protection systems can be bypassed if an attacker successfully deceives the user to 
reveal a password, open a malicious email attachment, or visit a compromised Website 
(Heartfield and Loukas, 2018). There has been an increasing focus on the importance 
of information security awareness (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Banerjee and 
Pandey, 2010; Drevin et al., 2007; Hinson, 2014); with the aim of reducing human error, 
theft, fraud, and misuse of computer assets (Drevin et al., 2006). 
One of the main challenges facing organisations is to ensure that their employees 
behave appropriately by increasing the awareness of IT security to avoid security 
breaches. Organisations have significantly improved information security awareness 
programmes to deal with the rapidly increasing threat. Furthermore, they have taken 
steps such as adding new features to their information security systems, setting new 
strategies, placing new information security task components and adding more people 
(Ernst and Young, 2016). In addition, the latest security solutions are implemented to 
ensure long-term asset protection and security. However, if the employees are 
unaware of the security threats and the importance of the organisation's IT assets, and 
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if they are prone to be manipulated, there will be no security tool or solution that would 
prevent such assets from being compromised (Švehla et al., 2016). 
There is no doubt that the abovementioned steps and amendments would contribute 
to enhance information security capabilities. However, employees are continuing to be 
one of the most critical factors in terms of ensuring the security of IT systems and the 
information they deal with. In many cases, IT security incidents are the result of 
employees’ activities made from distraction and lack of awareness of IT security 
policies and procedures. For example, according to Ernst and Young Global 
Information Security Survey (EY’s GISS) (2017), careless or unaware employees 
continue to be perceived as an increasing risk. Participants in the same survey stated 
that careless employee behaviours represent a significant point of weakness for most 
organisations, as 77% of the respondents stated that they are worried about poor user 
awareness and behaviour and consider careless staff as the most potential source of 
attacks. Similarly, Ponemon Institute 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study revealed that 28% 
of organisations reported a human error or employee negligence as the primary root 
cause of data breaches (Ponemon Institute, 2017). Likewise, the DCMS Cyber security 
breaches survey 2017 indicated that 72% of reported security breaches occur after a 
staff member receives a fraudulent email (DCMS, 2017). 
Recently, according to Ernst and Young report (2018), a significant number of 
organisations consider themselves to be more at risk compared to a year ago. For 
example, careless or unaware employees are seen by 34% of organisations as the 
vulnerability that has most increased their risk exposure over the past 12 months. 
Unsurprisingly, this is due to the fact that cyber attackers are becoming more 
sophisticated, while organisations are becoming increasingly connected and reliant 
more on the emergence of new technology that creates opportunities and risks. This 
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enormous development of connectivity driven by the growth of the Internet of Things 
(IoT) in many organisations has introduced new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
attackers (Ernst and Young, 2017). 
There is growing recognition that all staff need some level of understanding of the part 
they can play in maintaining the security of organisation's data and systems. Many 
organisations offer security awareness training, yet there is real concern about their 
effectiveness. In fact, a recent study by Axelos (a joint venture of the UK Government 
and UK firm Capita) found that professionals responsible for security awareness 
training reported that the training was largely ineffective. All employees need some 
level of understanding on their role in preserving the security of the organisation's data 
and systems. However, a significant number of companies never provide training to 
help employees identify email-based cyberattacks, and many others do so only once, 
when the employee joins them (Caldwell, 2016). 
One of the key reasons these systems are not always sufficiently secured resides in 
the users’ issues related to understanding how to use technology security. Moreover, 
one of the long-term challenges associated with security technology is to ensure that it 
is available and consistent in a manner that can be used without causing confusion. 
Unfortunately, this theory has often failed to prove successful with how security is 
presented in practice, creating difficulties to the users when it comes to understanding 
security features. This often leads to mistakes and reluctances toward the use of 
security technology measures (Furnell, 2016). 
Many issues still need to be solved, including finding a way to target the right users at 
the right time. Extensive training and security awareness programmes are designed to 
be delivered either as an introduction before the new staff start their job, after a breach 
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occurred or as a preventive line against a new threat. This can lead to users forgetting 
some key points when they face security-related decisions despite being exposed to 
security awareness, training, and/or education. In fact, some security issues need to 
be timely solved requiring users to be made aware and informed, in a timelier manner. 
In order to reinforce the human factor, it would also be desirable to deliver targeted 
security awareness to avoid the problem of overloading the end users with information 
about security issues, which may confuse or distract them. 
Targeted security awareness raising is an emerging and promising approach that has 
the potential to be effective in raising the security awareness of the users by providing 
guidance and nudges during the task in hand. The use of the targeted security 
awareness raising approach has become more imperative than ever before. It is an 
emerging domain that has the potential to be considered as a valuable method for 
raising the security awareness of end-users by ensuring that security guidance and 
feedback is available at the point of need. This provides effective information to help 
the users to make the right timely decision to avoid security risks. 
The information presented and the provided security guidance and feedback should 
serve, help, and be useful for skilled and non-skilled users. This includes staff, students, 
and personal users to understand the security issue. Targeted security awareness 
approach is intended to serve all categories of users who are using today's IT devices. 
It is imperative that the interface design and the provided information should assist non-
skilled users to understand the security issue they are facing in order to help them to 
make informed decision, as such users have limited computer skills and are 
representing the largest population of computer users, while skilled users should have 
the additional supportive security features and information to access if they need 
further details to better understand the security issue. 
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It is worth noting that, the term ‘end-user’ referred to in this research comprises all user 
categories. This includes skilled and non-skilled IT users, and applies irrespective of 
whether they are employees, school or university students, or where they are using 
their technology (e.g. home, workplace, or public spaces). 
1.2 Aims & Objectives 
The main aim of this project is to study targeted security awareness raising approaches 
and investigate the possibility for new opportunities in which this approach could be 
useful and successful in terms of raising the security awareness for end users in timely 
manner. This aim is planned to be achieved through the following objectives: 
 This project seeks to study potential opportunities where targeted security 
awareness raising approach can help end users in identifying potential threats 
inherent in IT systems before using them. 
 Investigates opportunities where users can have support in real-time by providing 
adequate security information and appropriate recommendations to raise security 
awareness before they make their decisions, so that they will have a chance to 
understand the risk before they take an action that may endanger their system. 
 Investigates the feasibility of the targeted security awareness by conducting 
experimental study to evaluate this approach. 
 Develop mock-up interfaces for a security scenario that can offer best advice and 
recommendations to users by increasing their security awareness to avoid the 
potential security risks in the chosen scenarios. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure  
The remainder of the thesis comprises the following chapters in order to addresses the 
aforementioned objectives. 
Chapter 2 mainly presents a literature review of information security awareness. It also 
provides the evidence of problems due to lack of staff awareness and highlighted that 
a significant number of end-users are unaware of their exposure to security risks which 
leading to reduce the strength of the first line of defence. Moreover, it gives an overview 
to Information technology security learning continuum as well as presenting different 
definitions and perceptions of information security awareness in addition to present 
definitions and perceptions for neighbouring areas, which are security training and 
education. Furthermore, the chapter also discusses facts behind the increased need 
and importance of information security awareness through giving an overview of the 
increased need for security awareness, discussing the fast evolving threats, the key 
obstacles to information security effectiveness and ends with an extensive discussion 
about the current used methods to raise security awareness. 
Chapter 3 discusses and reviews opportunities to increase awareness based on the 
principles of targeted security awareness. The chapter begins to discuss the 
shortcomings of the current security warnings and provides a conceptual background 
for a targeted security awareness-raising approach. Furthermore, it explores some 
examples of the targeted security awareness-raising approach. This chapter ends with 
a deep discussion of the opportunities to increase security awareness for end users by 
utilizing the targeted security awareness that can be used to conduct experiments for 
this project. 
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Chapter 4 examines the issue of targeted security awareness raising, and presents the 
results of an experimental study conducted to test the effectiveness of the approach. 
The aim of the experiment is to determine the extent to which providing security 
guidance and feedback could affect user decisions when presented with a range of 
networks to connect to, and help to move them more effectively in the direction of 
security. 
Chapter 5 presents a series of related design principles and guidelines that have been 
identified from the experimental work. Seven valuable security design principles were 
identified that could be used by software developers as guidance to include improved 
security features in their software to help to make users fully aware of the security 
threats they may encounter. 
Chapter 6 surveyed email applications in order to evaluate their consistency with the 
identified design principles and guidelines and has identified scope for improvement, 
which would in turn assist user awareness via a more targeted approach. This is 
illustrated through an example where the design principles and guidelines are applied 
to the appearance of email notifications that aim to assist users in spotting phishing 
threats. 
Chapter 7 offers the conclusions arises as a result of this research. Moreover, this 
chapter highlights the key contributions and achievements, the limitations of the 
research, and the opportunities for future work that can be undertaken. It then ends 
with a summary of the future of cyber security awareness.
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Chapter 2 
Information Security Awareness 
2.1 Introduction 
In today's world, organisations have become digital by default. Although not every 
organisation offers its products and services through digital systems, they all run their 
business with the technology and processes of the Internet era. In addition, in the 
connected world brought by the Internet of Things (IoT), the digital landscape is 
growing rapidly, with each device owned or used by the organisation, representing 
another node in the network (Ernst and Young, 2017). 
In regards to the online exposure, according to DCMS (2018), all the surveyed UK 
businesses stated that they rely on some form of digital communication or services. 
For example, 98% of UK businesses mentioned that they are dependent on online 
services, and similarly, 93% of charities stating the same. Furthermore, 52% of all UK 
businesses and 48% of charities consider online services as a core component of the 
goods and services they provide (DCMS, 2018). 
Furthermore, the emergence of new technologies requiring Internet access led to a 
significant increase in the number of connected devices. According to Statista (2018), 
the number of connected devices (Internet of Things; IoT) worldwide is predicted to 
grow almost to 31B by 2020 (Statista, 2018). 
In the meantime, executives worldwide recognise the increased high risks of cyber 
insecurity. For example, in the Global State of Information Security Survey (GSISS) 
2018, leaders of organisations that use automation or robotics point out their 
Chapter 2 — Information Security Awareness 
10 | P a g e  
 
awareness of the potentially significant consequence of cyber-attacks. Yet, despite this 
awareness, many companies at risk of cyber-attacks remain unprepared to deal with 
them, with 48% of the surveyed companies stated they do not have an employee 
security awareness training programme in place (PwC, 2018). 
As such, where the vast majority of operations are conducted and empowered through 
technology, information security has become a well-established component as 
business increasingly appreciate its value. It has been recognised that the human 
element plays an important role in information security. Therefore, any organisation 
that pursues to protect its IT systems and minimizes security risks should ensure that 
its employees have an adequate security awareness of the underlying security threats 
(Korovessis et al., 2017). 
All of the aforementioned factors and figures have made the protection of the IT 
systems paramount to ensure business continuity and reliable connection. The IT 
security systems consist of hardware and software as well as users who operate and 
deal with these systems. Users are a key factor in ensuring the IT security, and they 
are perceived to be the first line of defence if they act appropriately. Thus, their security 
awareness regarding the emerging threats is vital to contribute protecting these 
systems. 
This chapter discusses the trends and the current situation of the security awareness 
of end users, and highlights the problems related to lack of staff awareness. Moreover, 
it gives an overview of Information technology security learning continuum. It also 
presents definitions and perceptions for neighbouring areas including security training 
and education. Furthermore, the chapter discusses facts behind the increased need 
and importance of information security awareness, discussing the fast evolving threats, 
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the key obstacles to information security effectiveness as well as the currently used 
methods to raise security awareness. 
2.2 Evidence of Problems Due to Lack of Awareness 
While the technical faults are also a key element in the security accidents, deliberate 
or accidental human error is also considered as a key contributing factor in the 
occurrence of security breaches (PwC, 2015). 
In terms of security breaches experienced in 2018, these results are similar to the 
number of security breaches witnessed in 2017, where 43% of businesses faced some 
kind of security breach over the Internet in the past 12 months (DCMS, 2018). 
Over the last few years, staff often compromise the IT security of their organisations 
unintentionally. For example, as shown in Figure 1, the DCMS Cyber security breaches 
survey 2018 revealed that 75% of businesses reported cyber security breaches that 
take place after a staff member receives a fraudulent email (DCMS, 2018). 
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Figure 1: Attacks or breaches experienced in the last 12 months (DCMS, 2018) 
Moreover, the results in Figure 2 indicate that the top four breaches that caused the 
most disruption to the businesses were related to exploiting staff unawareness. For 
instance 48% of the incidents were related to the staff being sent fraudulent emails or 
websites which were most commonly identified as the most single disruptive breach, 
13% related to malware, 10% impersonating organisation in emails or online and 7% 
related to the ransomware. These results are similar to the findings of the 2017 survey 
(DCMS, 2018). This type of breaches or attacks is the most experienced by businesses 
compared to other types of attacks. As for technology related breaches, these were 
relatively minimal. 
 
 
75%
28%
24%
15%
15%
12%
8%
7%
5%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent
websites
Others impersonating organisation in emails or online
Viruses, spyware or malware
Ransomware
Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by
outsiders
Denial-of-service attacks
Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts
Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by
staff
Any other breaches or attacks
Businesses
Chapter 2 — Information Security Awareness 
13 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 2: Attacks or breaches causing the most disruption (DCMS, 2018) 
Although the vast majority of organisations still consider security as a high priority, as 
74% of businesses considering cyber security a high priority for their senior managers, 
this is not in line with the other findings presented in this report. For example, with 
regard to adopting and providing security training, only 20% of businesses overall have 
had staff that attended any form of internal or external cyber security training in the 
past 12 months, which is similar to what is seen in the previous years. The overall figure 
consists of 12% of businesses providing internal training, 7% providing external training, 
and 10% of staff attending seminars or conferences. Large firms seem to have the 
greatest inclination to provide training for their staff by 65%, whereas only 26% of small 
firms are doing so. 
Moreover, most businesses tend to provide training to directors or senior managers. 
For example the DCMS cyber security breaches survey (2018) showed that 76% of 
businesses provide it senior level staff, whereas only 30% provide it to IT staff, 26% 
provide it to staff members whose job role includes information security, and only 25% 
provide it for staff who are not security or IT related. 
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It is worth mentioning that businesses reporting cyber skills gaps are less likely to train 
their staff on cyber security. For example, 12% of businesses that reported a lack of 
skills had done so, compared to 20% overall. This suggests that organisations that 
have identified the problem of skills gaps have not necessarily taken the required steps 
to address this issue by providing staff training. The survey presented an explanation 
of this situation, where several barriers to training were raised in interviews. 
Barriers to training 
The survey raised many barriers to training, including cost, format, regularity, and lack 
of visibility of the need for training: 
 It was perceived that induction training, irregular training, or non-mandatory training 
could easily be forgotten. There have been various examples of good practices to 
address this issue. For instance, one small organisation conducted individual 
sessions with each staff member, while another approached this by adopting a 
more targeted training, asking staff to do training sessions only after failing on an 
internal penetration test. Another organisation adopted another approach by asking 
all their staff to complete an annual online cyber security module, without which 
they will not be eligible for their annual bonus. 
 The face-to-face training sessions were perceived to be difficult to accomplish due 
to the cost and logistics. Therefore, some organisations have already sought or 
adopted online video training courses or seminars. 
 Those who took cyber security issue seriously sometimes have not realised the 
value that training will add to what they already felt they knew. 
The report concluded that awareness raising and involvement among wider staff is vital. 
The most destructive breaches are most commonly spotted by individual staff rather 
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than automatically captured by anti-malware solutions, and this is similar to what has 
been reported in 2017. Organisations also realised the value and the good impact of 
regular and targeted training to all staff. However, in reality, staff training remains rare 
as mentioned earlier. Moreover, it is unlikely that businesses in the last survey have 
responded to breaches with additional staff training compared to 2017. 
2.2.1 End-Users Still Unaware of Security Risks 
Despite the availability of a wide range of security protection tools such as anti-virus 
scanners, firewalls and other security solutions, risky behaviour revealed by the end 
user has the potential to make devices vulnerable to compromise (Shepherd et al., 
2013). Recent stories have highlighted that a significant number of end-users are 
unaware of their exposure to security risks. Due to the high level of breaches witnessed 
in recent times, it is more important than ever to raise the security awareness within 
organisations by making users the first line of defence. In this respect, all industry 
sectors have witnessed staff-related breaches, however, the technology companies in 
this regard has seen a better performance in comparison to other sectors (ENISA, 
2010). Reasons behind the serious security breaches are associated with multiple 
failures in technology, processes, and people. It is not surprising that staff is one of the 
main underlying causes behind many of these breaches (PwC, 2013). 
According to Crowd Research Partners 'Insider Threat" Report (2018), people often 
associate the term "Insider Threats" in cyber security with malicious staff who intend to 
deliberately damage the company either through theft or sabotage. In fact, negligent 
staff or contractors are equally causing a large number of security breaches and leaks 
unintentionally. The most damaging security threats today do not arise from malicious 
outsiders or malware but from trusted insiders, whether malicious or negligent insiders. 
For example, 90% of the surveyed organisations said they felt vulnerable to insider 
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attacks. Furthermore, 51% of the surveyed companies stated that they are worried 
about accidental/unintentional data breaches through user carelessness, negligence 
or compromised credentials and 47% stated that they are worried about the same 
breaches but from deliberate malicious insiders. 
Practically, security professionals have a prominent responsibility in detecting, 
countering, and responding to cyber-attacks. However, this task becomes more difficult 
when threats come from inside the organisation from trusted and authorised users. It 
is often difficult to determine when users are simply doing their job or something illegal 
or unethical. The study conducted by the Crowd Research Partners (2018) indicated 
that 56% of regular staff and 55% of privileged or admin IT users pose the biggest 
insider security threat to organisations, followed by contractors with 42%. 
In terms of the biggest enabler of accidental insider threats, the Crowd Research 
Partners (2018) revealed that incidental exposure by staff is perceived to be the most 
common enabler of accidental insider threat. For example, 67% of cyber security 
experts consider phishing attempts as the biggest vulnerability for accidental insider 
threats. Phishing attacks are used to deceive staff into sharing sensitive company 
information by providing phishing attempts as a legitimate business or a trusted contact, 
which often contain malicious attachments or hyperlinks to compromised websites. 
This is followed by 56% of the respondents who perceive weak or reused passwords 
as an enabler of accidental insider threat, 44% of the respondents referred to unlocked 
devices, the same percentage referred to bad password sharing practice, and 32% of 
the respondents mentioned unsecured Wi-Fi networks. 
Moreover, regarding the enabling risk factors, 37% of the respondents in the same 
survey said that the key enabling risk factors were related to the very large number of 
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users with excessive access privileges, 36% said this was related to an increasing 
number of devices with access to sensitive data, and 35% said it was related to the 
increasing complexity of information technology. Noticeably, the human factor is also 
still playing a key role in this regard as 31% of the respondents considered the lack of 
staff training or awareness as an enabling risk factor. In addition, 53% of the surveyed 
organisations have reported insider attacks against their organisation in the last 12 
months, 46% said insider attacks were the same as seen a year ago and 27% said the 
insider attacks are becoming more frequent. These results indicate that staff still play 
a key role in the security breaches. 
The following are examples are also representing staff related breaches which have 
been reported in information security breaches survey conducted by PwC in 2013: 
 Regarding the use of social networks, a Staff member at a large insurer in the 
South-West has misused Facebook as well as internal email systems. Fortunately, 
a routine security monitoring picked up this breach and it was quickly solved few 
days after it occurs. 
 Regarding using email services, in a large government body there was an employee 
using their email service to send sensitive emails from his work email account to 
his personal email account. This breach was only discovered by accident. Because 
of the sensitive nature of the information used, it’s was hard to put a value on the 
lost data. After this breach, the government body took legal action against the 
employee, and further, they improved processes and conduct additional staff 
training to avoid such breaches. 
 With regards to the infection by viruses and malicious software, at a small Yorkshire 
charity there was a volunteer who received an email containing a link, the volunteer 
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clicked on the link inadvertently as result of this action the computer was infected 
with a blackmail virus. This virus was quickly removed using anti-virus software. 
Another story with regard to the infection of viruses and malicious software is seen 
in a large bank, where an employee has plugged an USB device which was not 
authorised into an unpatched computer inadvertently as a result this action 
introduced the Conficker worm into the network of the bank. This action caused for 
several days very serious business disruption. In terms of financial loss, this breach 
cost several hundred thousand pounds for cleaning up the infection and took many 
man-months of effort. After this breach, the employee was disciplined as a 
responsible by the bank. The bank took further action by conducting extra training 
for its staff on security risks. Moreover, the bank took further actions by enhancing 
the technical systems configuration, and introduced a real-time monitoring system 
to avoid such breaches in the future. 
 In correlation to systems failure and data corruption, a combination of a lack of staff 
awareness, poorly designed configuration and process failures, allowed a staff 
member at medium sized technology company to delete sensitive data from a 
critical system. This mistake took about a month of work to restore the system and 
to solve the problem. After this problem, the company took action by changing its 
procedures, configuration of its systems and its backup in addition to its contingency 
plans. 
 Another story involves outsiders in which these criminals targeted staff members 
working at a very large financial services provider. The criminals were sending 
emails to the staff members which appearing like from people they knew but 
containing links two malicious software. While this ‘spear phishing’ attack did not 
cause that much financial or reputational loss, it highlighted that staff members were 
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not aware of security risks. To avoid future similar incidents, staff received 
additional training. 
Likewise, other examples of staff related breaches have also been reported in the 
information security breaches survey conducted by PwC in 2014 that include the 
following: 
 A member of staff at an educational institution in London overlooked standard data 
handling procedure and this led to confidential information being leaked online. This 
incident was brought to light after a third party spotted the data and contacted the 
institute. The incident caused serious reputational damage and resulted in 
organisational restructuring, retraining and disciplinary action. 
 An employee from a large UK consultancy firm accidentally sent an email 
containing sensitive personal information to the wrong client. They were only made 
aware of this error after the unintended recipient responded to the email by a formal 
complaint. This caused reputational embarrassment to the business and led to a 
full investigation. 
 Similarly, an employee of a large services company in Wales caused unauthorised 
disclosure of information and breach of the Data Protection Act. This information 
breach resulted in a week of work and over £50,000 of recovery costs. Additional 
staff training was provided and amendments were made to security processes and 
procedures afterwards. 
The aforementioned examples were mentioned in the 2013 and 2014 PwC information 
security breaches survey. Similarly, the next examples have also been reported in the 
PwC (2015) information security breaches survey: 
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 With regards to unauthorised access and use of data, a staff member in a large 
consultancy company obtained sensitive customer data and used it for business 
development purposes without obtaining the required permission. As a result of this 
breach, the company's reputation was damaged, resulting in the involvement of the 
legal adviser and a loss of more than £ 500,000. After the breach, the company 
provided targeted security training for its staff. 
 Regarding the malware infection due to downloading files from untrusted sources, 
a staff member in a medium sized technology company caused a malware infection 
after downloading files from a peer-to-peer file-sharing website on a company 
laptop. This breach had a serious impact on business processes and took more 
than a week to recover. Moreover, it caused a loss of more than £100,000 as a 
result of this incident and more than £250,000 was also spent on addressing the 
breach. 
 In connection with the theft of confidential information, a staff member of an IT from 
a large utilities company stole confidential information valued at more than 
£500,000. This breach has seriously affected business operations and has 
damaged the reputation of the company. The incident took between a week and a 
month to restore business operations, costing £100,000 to £24,999 to respond to 
the incident, and resulted in a loss of revenue between £100,000 and £249,999. 
 With regards to the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information, improper 
staff behaviour at a large financial services company caused disclosure of 
confidential information without authorisation. This breach took more than 5 weeks 
to resolve the incident and return the operations to normal. After the breach, the 
company carried out additional staff training to address the security issues identified. 
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The aforementioned security breaches are among traditional issues that have long 
been known. However, with the development of technology and the changing nature 
of the threats such as Ransomware, new types of security breaches caused by staff 
are emerging. This is due to the lack of security awareness regarding evolving security 
threats. 
An example of these security breaches is illustrated below which have been reported 
in the DCMS (2017) Cyber security breaches survey: 
 In a large civil engineering company, the IT department issued advice to warn staff 
not to map network drives to their local laptops. One of the heads of departments 
and another senior manager ignored this advice and later unintentionally 
downloaded a ransomware virus to a local laptop with the mapped network drive. 
The attack was not aimed to obtain any specific data, but was just to extract money 
from the company. The mapping allowed the virus to spread across the entire 
server, rather than simply isolating it into a single device. 
2.2.2 Humans Are the Weakest Link in Information Security Chain 
While information systems are considered recently as a key to all organisations in order 
to survive, because these systems are mainly used to hold the value of organisational 
data resources (Ifinedo, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). At the same time, the security landscape 
associated with the use of these systems is also changing continuously. With the 
movement and the increasing number of security threats, the information security 
solutions of today would be unable to solve the problems of tomorrow (ENISA, 2010). 
In order to safeguard these valuable assets, organisations employ a wide variety of 
tools and measures including anti-virus software, installing firewalls, using back-up 
systems, tightening control to access information using data encryption technologies, 
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and using monitoring systems (Ryan, 2004; Workman et al., 2008; Ifinedo, 2012). 
However, all these mentioned tools and measures are only covering the technical part 
of the problem and often not adequate in terms of providing a total protection to the 
information systems of the organisation (Sasse et al., 2001; Stanton et al., 2005; 
Herath and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). 
A number of researchers including (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al., 2005); 
(Pahnila et al., 2007; Ifinedo, 2012), accentuated that organisations that take care of 
every aspect of technical and non-technical domains to protect  its assets are more 
probably to be successful in terms of their efforts to protect their main assets. Thus, 
the onus is on organisations to take advantage of multi-perspective approach to 
safeguard their information systems assets and resources. In addition, a number of 
other researchers including (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al., 2005; Pahnila 
et al., 2007; Ifinedo, 2012; Bulgurcu et al., 2010) have made clear that the social 
organisational imperatives are considered equally important for organisations with their 
needs to protect their assets and resources of information systems. 
The human factor in any information security framework is the weakest link and the 
lack of awareness among staff reduces the strength of the first line of defence. 
Moreover, reducing the number of information security breaches effectively can be 
achieved by increasing the user awareness or organisational culture (ENISA, 2010). 
Therefore awareness and behaviour among all types of users are needful and 
important parts of information security performance of any organisation   (Albrechtsen 
and Hovden, 2010). 
It has been reported that one of the key elements that contribute to security incidents 
and breaches occurring continuously, is that the staff of the organisations are the 
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weakest link in ensuring security and also the root cause of problems in some of the 
most sophisticated technological implementations due to the lack of awareness and 
experience; they also pose a threat to their organisations from inside, and this is in 
addition to the vulnerabilities of people that can be exploited by the considerable 
outside threats (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al., 2005; Wulgaert, 2005; 
Ifinedo, 2012; Voss, 2001; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Shaw et al., 2009). For example, a 
study conducted to evaluate the trade-offs between computer security protection and 
accessibility concluded that employees are more likely to bypass security measures in 
order to complete a task (Ifinedo, 2012). Considering this conclusion, it would be very 
useful for organisations to focus on the intentions and behaviours of their employees. 
Today, information security responsibility is an issue belonging to everyone and not 
only task management or information security department. Therefore, any information 
security framework needs to be a very important part of the business. All staff, functions 
and businesses projects, and relevant elements have a role to play (Ernst and Young, 
2012). 
2.3 Security Awareness, Training and Education 
In order for an IT security program to be successful, it must contain the following 
elements: 
 Development of information technology security policy based on business needs 
with an emphasis that this security policy can deal with known risks. 
 Informing users of their security responsibilities in the use of IT systems as outlined 
in the agency security policy and procedures. 
 Establishing a practice method to monitor and review the programme as a whole. 
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Security awareness and training should be focused on the user population of the entire 
organisation. Management should determine proper frameworks for the 
implementation of IT security within the organisation. An awareness programme should 
attempt from the start to raise staff awareness that can be deployed and implemented 
in wide range of ways and it should be targeted at all levels of the organisation and not 
exclude top management. The effectiveness of this effort will usually lead the way in 
making IT security and training programmes effective and is crucial to its long-term 
success. 
An awareness and training programme is crucial, as it is the bridge to deliver 
information that is needed by both users and managers, in order to perform their jobs.  
In the case of an IT security programme, security awareness and training is the bridge 
used to communicate security requirements across the enterprise. 
The key element to make IT security awareness and training programme effective is 
that it should clearly explain the proper rules of behaviour for the use of information 
and the IT systems of the agency. Moreover, the programme should communicate IT 
security policies and procedures that should be followed. This must be before placing 
any sanctions imposed as a result of non-compliance with security rules as users 
should be knowledgeable of the expectations. Accountability must be accounted based 
upon the fact that the workforce is fully informed, well-trained, and aware. The following 
part describes the relationship between awareness, training, and education – the 
awareness-training-education continuum (Wilson and Hash, 2003). 
2.3.1 Information Technology Security Learning Continuum  
It is well known that learning is a continuum, and therefore it begins with awareness, 
builds up to training, and develops to education. The continuum shown in Figure 3 is 
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clearly showing the conceptual relationship between awareness, training, and 
education as defined in NIST Special Publication 800-16 and the aim is to establish 
clear boundaries between the three approaches of learning. 
There is no doubt that the main element that plays key role to make an effective IT 
security awareness and training program successful is to build it based on the agency 
IT security policy and IT issue-specific policies. When policies are written clearly and 
concisely, the awareness and training material will be built on a solid foundation. 
 
Figure 3: IT security learning continuum (Wilson and Hash, 2003) 
The model illustrated in Figure 3 is based on the principle that learning is a continuum. 
Precisely, learning in this context starts with awareness, builds to training, and evolves 
into education. 
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This model is role-based and outlines the IT security learning required by a user within 
an organisation with different responsibilities with respect to IT systems. The model is 
also used to determine the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for a user in order 
to perform the responsibilities of IT security specified to the user roles in the 
organisation. 
The type of learning that staff needs becomes more comprehensive and detailed in the 
upper part of the continuum. Accordingly, starting from the bottom, all staff need 
awareness. Whereas Training (represented by two layers namely "Security Basics and 
Literacy" and "Roles and responsibilities relative to IT systems") is necessary for staff 
that have a role in the organisation, it refers to the need for special knowledge of 
security threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards. The "education and experience" layer 
relates mainly to staff that have made the IT security their line of work. 
The model explains the following concepts: 
  "Security awareness" is undoubtedly desired for all staff members, while the 
"security basics and literacy" is mandatory for all staff members, including 
contractor staff, who are involved in any way with IT systems. This typically means 
all staff within the organisation. 
 The "Security Basics and Literacy" set is a transitional stage between the 
"awareness" and "training”. This stage delivers the basis knowledge for the 
following training by providing a comprehensive base of the key terms and concepts 
of the security field. 
 Focus on training comes after the previous stage, where the training stage is to 
deliver knowledge, skills, and abilities specific to a user's “Roles and 
Responsibilities Relative to IT Systems”. Within the training stage, the levels of 
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beginner, intermediate and advanced skill requirements can be determined in 
addition to the differences between these levels. 
 The top level is "Education and Experience” which is directed to develop the 
capability and the vision of the user to carry out complex multi-disciplinary and the 
skills required to promote the IT security profession and to keep up with threat and 
technology changes. 
As explained previously, learning is a continuum in terms of the levels of knowledge, 
however gaining or delivering of needed knowledge is not necessary to be followed in 
sequence. Due to limited resources, organisations need to assess against the 
continuum of both the range of their IT security training needs and effectiveness of the 
delivered training. This will enable the organisations to allocate resources for future 
training to gain a greater value or return on investment (Wilson and Hash, 2003). 
2.3.2 Distinction of Awareness, Education and Training 
One of the key challenges of examining the information security awareness issue is 
the spread and the use of different definitions, and perceptions of information security 
awareness. In this respect, more attention should be paid on how information security 
awareness is perceived with relation to the neighbouring areas, which are, security 
training, and education. Despite the fact that a great number of researchers agree on 
distinguishing between information security awareness, training, and education, a 
mixture of the terms used still exists. Most of existing definitions conform that the 
information security awareness is the bottom base of a security-learning pyramid. The 
goal of information security awareness is to draw attention of all users of information 
systems to the security message, helping them to understand the importance of 
information security and the security obligations related to their work, whereas the goal 
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of training is to build desired knowledge and development required skills and 
competencies, while the goal of education is creating expertise (Wilson and Hash, 
2003; Peltier, 2005; Katsikas, 2000; Tsohou et al., 2008). 
2.3.2.1 Awareness 
Awareness is the 'what' component of the education strategy of an organisation that is 
trying to change the behaviour and patterns in how to targeted users are using 
technology and the Internet and it is a distinct element from training. It consists of a 
variety of activities that make the users to be the first line of defence of an organisation. 
This is why awareness-raising activities occur on a continuous basis, using a variety of 
ways to increase awareness and less formal and shorter than training (ENISA, 2010). 
Awareness has been defined in many ways as presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Different Definitions for Security Awareness 
Source Definitions 
(Wilson and 
Hash, 2003) 
Awareness is not training. The purpose of awareness presentations 
is simply to focus attention on security. Awareness presentations are 
intended to allow individuals to recognize IT security concerns and 
respond accordingly. In awareness activities, the learner is the 
recipient of information, whereas the learner in a training 
environment has a more active role. Awareness relies on reaching 
broad audiences with attractive packaging techniques. Training is 
more formal, having a goal of building knowledge and skills to 
facilitate the job performance. 
(ENISA, 2010) Awareness is an on-going process of learning that is meaningful to 
recipients, and delivers measurable benefits to the organisation from 
lasting behavioural change. 
 (ISF, 2011) 
 
Security awareness is the extent to which staff understands the 
importance of information security, the level of security required by 
the organisation and their individual security responsibilities. 
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(Siponen, 
2000) 
 
The term information security awareness is used to refer to a state 
where users in an organisation are aware of –ideally committed to - 
their security mission (often expressed in end-user security 
guidelines). 
(Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010) 
Information security awareness (ISA) is defined as an employee’s 
general knowledge about information security and his cognizance of 
the ISP of his organisation. 
(Peltier, 2005) Awareness, which is used to stimulate, motivate, and remind the 
audience what is expected of them. 
2.3.2.2 Training 
Training is one of the 'how' components to implement security. A training program 
should be designed and developed based on the learning objectives set by the 
organisation. Therefore, the training aims to teach skills that allow a user to accomplish 
a specific task or function, whereas awareness aims to focus the attention of the 
individual on an issue or set of issues. The skills gained during training are built upon 
the awareness foundation, in particular upon the security basics (ENISA, 2010). 
Training has been defined in many ways as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Different Definitions for Training 
Source Definitions 
(Wilson and 
Hash, 2003) 
The ‘Training’ level of the learning continuum strives to produce 
relevant and needed security skills and competencies by 
practitioners of functional specialties other than IT security (e.g., 
management, systems design and development, acquisition, 
auditing). 
(ENISA, 2010) Training is one of the 'how' components to implement security. A 
training program should be designed and developed based on the 
learning objectives set by the organisation. Therefore, the training 
aims to teach skills that allow a user to accomplish a specific task 
or function, whereas awareness aims to focus the attention of the 
individual on an issue or set of issues. The skills gained during 
training are built upon the awareness foundation, in particular 
upon the security basics. 
(Peltier, 2005) Training, the process that teaches a skill or the use of a required 
tool. 
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2.3.2.3 Education 
Education is top level of knowledge and skills which is directed to develop the capability 
and the vision of users to carry out complex multi-disciplinary and the skills required to 
promote the IT security profession and to keep up with threat and technology changes 
(Wilson and Hash, 2003). Education has been defined in many ways as presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Different Definitions for Education 
Source Definitions 
(Wilson and 
Hash, 2003) 
The ‘Education’ level integrates all of the security skills and 
competencies of the various functional specialties into a 
common body of knowledge, adds a multidisciplinary study of 
concepts, issues, and principles (technological and social), and 
strives to produce IT security specialists and professionals 
capable of vision and pro-active response. 
(Peltier, 2005) Education is the specialized, in-depth schooling required to 
support the tools or as a career development process. 
2.4 Importance of Information Security Awareness 
Organisations, whether private or public store information and are making more 
information available electronically, the trend is on the rise. There is a large increase 
in terms of dependency on information technology systems. This is connected with a 
remarkable increase in the use of Internet services. This has become an increasingly 
important part of doing business all over the world. The absence of the internet can be 
detrimental to an organisation’s business objectives. 
The wide and increased use of information technology systems for storing, exchanging, 
and processing information has made the security and safety of these systems more 
important and more challenging than ever before. One of the key undertakings for any 
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organisation is to ensure that its staff acts in an appropriate manner by increasing their 
IT security awareness to avoid security breaches (Kessel, 2012). 
The information security awareness is a key element within industry good practice for 
security. Some of the distinct international standards including BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013, 
BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013 refer to this as a key requirement. 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)  has pointed out in 
its report 2007 some of key factors contribute to increased focus on information security 
awareness which including the following factors (ENISA, 2007): 
 Business requirements are changing, as the use of technology is continuously 
evolving; 
 For the regulatory aspect, there are foreign regulators such as the United States 
and Singapore which expecting staff to receive awareness training; 
 Focus on the security from regulatory bodies within the Member States of the 
European Union is on the rise. For instance, the Information Commissioner's 
comments to UK Chief Executive Officers on “unacceptable privacy breaches”; 
 The threats from organized crime are on the increase. A recently released report 
on Internet security pointed out those high levels of malicious activity online, with 
increases in phishing, spam, networks "bots", Trojans, and zero-day threats. In the 
past, these were usually well known threats and can be processed separately. 
Attackers are now using more sophisticated methods, so the attacks tend to involve 
several vectors. They are also promoting their assets to create global networks that 
support coordinated criminal activity; 
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 Customers are more sensitive to security issues than they were in the past. For 
instance, a reputation of an organisation can be significantly impacted by adverse 
press coverage; 
 Identity theft is a security issue becoming more common. Organisations that deal 
with storing information and managing personal identity must take care to ensure 
the confidentiality and integrity of these data. Any compromise leads to personal 
identity data leakage can cause loss of public confidence, legal liability, and / or 
costly litigation. 
 Given these motivations, it is not a surprise that four-fifths of respondents have 
rated information security as a high or very high priority for senior management. 
This is comparable to the rate observed in other security surveys recently. 
 
Figure 4: The importance of ensuring staff security awareness (ENISA, 2007) 
From Figure 4, in overall, the majority of respondents agree that the four issues are 
very important for staff to understand: 
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 Email and electronic communications; 
 Physical security/access to buildings; 
 Passwords; 
 Internet security. 
For each of these issues, more than half of the respondents rated them as very 
important; almost nine-tenths rated them as very important or important. 
2.4.1 The Increased Need for Security Awareness 
Users must have some level of security awareness and ability to protect themselves, 
as there is a large number of threats which make it harder for technology to give a 
complete answer and threats exist are differ in many contexts to be able to rely upon a 
system administrator. However, recently, many users find themselves not quite well 
equipped to operate. 
Moreover, as technology advances, there has been a significant and continuing shift in 
terms of responsibility and duty. This has made the need for acquiring security 
awareness an imperative matter in order to increase the security of the whole system. 
Unfortunately, more attention has been paid towards different types of security controls 
such as firewalls, IDS or other types of security controls that represent the technology-
oriented safeguards comparing to awareness and training of users. It is not 
questionable that these investments are important, however, such investments are 
representing a part of the picture, but these investments are often easier to justify, 
based on targeting a defined threat whose impact can be measured easily. Users must 
have some level of security awareness and ability to protect themselves as there is a 
large number of threats making it harder for technology to give a complete answer. 
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There are still many users who have a lack of understanding about the technology and 
therefore find it harder to ascertain the associated threats (Furnell and Clarke, 2012). 
Additionally, Ernst & Young’s survey in 2012 indicated that there are some key trends 
in terms of speed and complexity of change that are occurring too quickly of which 
contribute to increase the need for security awareness because of the following 
reasons: 
 Virtualization, cloud computing, social media, mobile, and other new and evolving 
technologies open the door to a wide number of internal and external threats. 
 Emerging markets, the continued economic change and increasing regulatory 
requirements are all contribute to add more complexity to the information security 
environment that already is complicated. 
 Organisations have made great strides in improving their information security 
capabilities. However, for as many steps as they have taken, they continue to fall 
behind, creating an information security gap that grows ever larger. 
Despite the fact that there are many steps have been taken by organisations in terms 
of improving their information security capabilities, they continue to fall behind, which 
contributed to increase an information security gap, which grows larger than ever (Ernst 
and Young, 2012). 
2.4.2 The Fast Evolving Threats 
Although organisations are making improvements to foster their information security 
systems, however, the changing speed and the challenge in this field are also growing. 
In this regard, in 2009, 41% of respondents realised that the number of external attacks 
has increased. Within the year 2011, the number of respondents who realised the 
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occurrence of the external attacks jumped to 72%. In the year 2012, the number of 
respondents who indicated that these attacks will be increased has again risen to 77%. 
Examples of such external threats include hacking, state-sponsored espionage, 
organised crime, and terrorism. 
In the same period of time, organisations have realised an increase in the number of 
internal vulnerabilities. In the Ernst and Young (2012), the Global Information Security 
Survey, 46% of respondents said that they have realised an increase. 37% of 
respondents ranked unaware or careless staff as the threat that has increased the most 
during the past 12 months. Interestingly, this number is not much less than that referred 
to in the year 2008, relatively, where 50% of respondents in 2008 cited that awareness 
within the organisation is the most challenging issue to deliver information security 
initiatives successfully. 
2.4.3 Key Obstacles to Information Security Effectiveness 
There is no single issue responsible for creating a gap between where information 
security currently is and where it needs to be. The gap exists because of a result of a 
wide range of issues related to people, process, and technology. Over the years, Ernst 
& Young's surveys GISS have consistently sought to recall key obstacles to information 
security effectiveness. The obstacles discussed below were cited in Ernst & Young's 
2012 and 2017 surveys and are considered to be important up to the present time to 
explore as the following: 
2.4.3.1 Lack of Resources and Skills 
This could be understandable, especially in today's era of economic changes and 
spending controls. Where there is a lot of tasks required achievement and resources 
available are not sufficient. However, the lack of resources explains only part of the 
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picture. Information security needs many requirements that do not include only more 
resources, but indeed needs other requirements, including people with good skills and 
good training to meet the rapidly evolving changes in the information security 
landscape. 
2.4.3.2 Resource Constraints 
With regards to this issue, Ernst & Young’s survey 2012 indicated that only 22% of 
respondents said that they are planning to increase spending in this area during the 
next 12 months. When organisations were asked about the main barriers and obstacles 
that challenge the ability and function to deliver information security, 43% of 
respondents claimed a lack of skilled resources. There is no doubt that this figure is 
linked to the only factor which relates to spending constraints. 
According to Ernst and Young (2016), resource constraints are consistently perceived 
as one of the main obstacles or reasons that challenge the Information Security 
contribution to organisations. Although recent years, between 2013 and 2016, have 
witnessed an increase in the budget. For example, in 2016, 53% of respondents stated 
an increase in their budget over the last 12 months, compared with 43% in 2013. 
Likewise, 55% of respondents in 2016 expected an increase over the next 12 months, 
compared with 50% in 2013. However, organisations reported that more funding is 
needed, with 61% of respondents stating that the budget constraints is a challenge, 
while 69% of respondents stated they need an additional budget of up to 50%. While 
the additional budget may help to mitigate the effects of the skills shortage, it is not just 
an additional budget that is required, but also, more importantly, the executives support 
on this issue. According to the Ernst & Young Survey (2016), 32% of respondents 
believed that there is a lack of executive awareness and support challenging the 
effectiveness of cybersecurity. Figure 5 presents the main obstacles or reasons that 
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challenge the Information Security contribution and value to the organisations (Ernst 
and Young, 2016). 
 
Figure 5:  Main obstacles to Information Security (Ernst & Young, 2016) 
2.4.3.3 Limited Security Awareness Training 
Organisations need to train staff outside of the information security function on the role 
that staff must play in keeping the organisation's information safe. Finding the right 
skilled resources in information security is only one part of the picture. Due to the fast 
change of external threats, as well as the spread use of mobile devices and networks 
that are used for both work and play, organisations need also to allocate the resources 
and money to train staff from outside of the information security function on the role 
that they must play in keeping the information of their organisation safe (Ernst and 
Young, 2012). 
With regards to the limited security awareness issue, the Ernst & Young (2016) survey 
reported that neglected or unaware employees are still posing increasing risks. For 
example, 73% of the respondents are concerned about the lack of user awareness and 
behaviour associated with the growing use of mobile devices. This exposes them to 
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risks associated with the loss of such device, the potential loss of information and the 
potential of identity breach. Figure 6 presents the main risks associated with the 
growing use of mobile devices for organisations (Ernst and Young, 2016). 
 
Figure 6: Main risks of growing use of mobile devices (Ernst & Young, 2016) 
Based on the figures mentioned above, it is not surprising that the surveyed 
organisations are planning to spend more on security awareness and training. This is 
somewhat reflected in the spending budgetary priorities of the organisations. For 
example, with regards to the areas where organisations chose to put their budgets, 
according to the Ernst and Young (2016), 49% of these organisations stated that they 
were planning to spend more on security awareness and training, while 43% declared 
they would spend the same. 
This is probably due to increased awareness among organisations regarding the 
importance of the security awareness and training which should be perceived as 
important as other security components of the IT system. This should contribute to 
address the continued issue of the lack of security awareness and training, reduce the 
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risks associated with the poor user awareness and behaviour and enhance the entire 
security of the IT system. 
2.5 Current Methods of Security Awareness Raising 
A formal security policy is the basis for any framework for information security 
awareness. Enforcing a good behaviour is very difficult without existence of a clear 
idea about the 'law' covering the use of information and systems. 
The existence of good practice standards can position a strong emphasis on the 
existence of a security policy across an organisation. For instance, BS ISO/IEC 
27002:2013 referrers to implementing training and awareness programmes within the 
organisations. There is a requirement of management to ensure that the people who 
are working for them are implementing and applying security with accordance to 
security policies. To accomplish this, they are required to provide training in proper 
awareness training and regular updates in organisational policies and procedures, 
related to the job function for all staff in the organisation and where appropriate 
contractors and third party users. 
Additionally, BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013 standards refers and suggest that the company's 
security policy could be communicated to employees and relevant external parties in a 
form that is relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended reader, for 
instance in the context of an information security awareness, education and training 
programme (BSI, 2013). 
A main element of any policy and information security awareness training is to look at 
the threats and risks facing the business. This analysis should be paid to areas that the 
policy and training need to cover. 
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Organisations are facing big challenges in terms of the changing environments, threats, 
and risks. In order to be effective, awareness-raising initiatives need to be supported 
by the senior management of the organisation. Ideally, this should be supported by the 
board or executive-level, in order to promote the importance of the issue with the staff. 
If senior management does not treat security awareness as an important and key issue 
in terms of protecting and safeguarding the organisations assets, it is unlikely that the 
training will be successful. 
Most of the well-known standards including BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013, BS ISO/IEC 
27001:2013, and the 2011 Standard of Good Practice for Information Security 
recommend that there is a need for a formal approach to information security 
awareness. This need to be achieved through three procedures including: 
 Requirements Analysis: Management need to determine what topics staff needs to 
understand. Users should be aware of the parts of the security policy that is relevant 
to the nature of their work. Several standards including BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013, 
BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013 pointed out to look at issues such as spyware, virus, and 
choosing strong passwords. 
 Orienting Training Based on The Role: Contractors and staff are both should to be 
trained, appropriately oriented towards the roles that they play in their working 
environment to help them achieve their work appropriately. Additionally, they 
should also be updated regularly with any relevant changes to security policies or 
procedures. Training needs to address how staff can implement security 
procedures in their day-to-day duties this has been referred by standards including 
BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013, BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013 and the 2011 Standard of Good 
Practice for Information Security. 
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 On-Going Review: The content of awareness programmes should be reconsidered 
and reviewed on periodic basis. The awareness programme on the intended 
participants should be reviewed regularly in terms of its effectiveness. And any 
suitable changes that take place in the original security policy should also be taking 
a place in corresponding information security awareness training programmes this 
has been referred by standards such as BS ISO/IEC 27002:2013 and the 2011 
Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (ISF, 2011). 
Based on the results obtained from information security breaches survey ENISA 
pointed out that: 
 The vast majority of companies have taken some steps to make staff aware of their 
security responsibilities. Companies also make greater efforts to educate its staff 
than it was in the past. Most of the large companies included security 
responsibilities in their staff handbook and training new staff in the field of security; 
 Almost every company that has a security policy has taken steps to educate staff 
about their security responsibilities; 
 There is a strong correlation between the priority that given to information security 
by the senior management and the possibility that the staff will be trained, where 
the high priority is given to the importance of information security by senior 
management, the more likely is that the company to take steps to educate its staff. 
An example is that for those seen security as is not a priority at all, only half of them 
have taken steps to raise awareness. 
The study conducted by PwC 2007 survey shows a steady trend. All the respondents 
use some techniques to make their staff aware of their security responsibilities. 
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As with much else in business, the presence of an approved budget is a main key to 
achieve effective awareness programme. It needed both time from staff and money to 
build appropriate materials. This is an investment in the future of business, and should 
be approved by senior management. 
Although the security has been given a high priority, many respondents find it difficult 
to justify spending significantly on awareness programmes. There were only a third of 
respondents built a formal business case in order to justify this expenditure, and only 
half of these attempted to measure the benefits that their awareness programmes will 
achieve and there were very few of them assessed the return on investment. Only 15% 
of respondents have measured the benefits of their programme even though they do 
not prepare a formal business case. 
 
Figure 7: Justifications of the cost of awareness programmes (ENISA, 2007) 
As presented in Figure 7, most respondents are seeing that the training in security 
awareness is something that they just have to do, i.e. it is only as a response to 
compliance. Based on that, it is dealing with security awareness in their budget as an 
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issue of overhead rather than as an investment. This is interesting, since the 
regulations in most of the Member States of the European Union do not require special 
training to information security. It appears that data protection laws in the European 
Union are driving the increase in awareness training. 
About two-fifths of the respondents justify the programme by comparing the levels of 
awareness about information security before and after the program. The vast majority 
of respondents conclude that the benefits of improved security awareness are often 
not noticeable and measurable. People have difficulty in terms of defining good metrics 
for behaviours. Without reliable metrics to measure the change, the effort to work out 
the return on investment outweighs the benefits. On the other side, though, as metrics 
improve more organisations should take into account to prepare formal business cases. 
Once the extent of information security awareness programme has been determined, 
the next step is to develop a communications plan. This requires analysis of the 
audience and determining which techniques are the most suitable to use. Slightly less 
than half of the respondents done this in a formal way and most just get on with the 
task at hand. 
There are wide ranges available of awareness raising techniques. Most of the 
respondents use multiple techniques. Companies that give low priority to the security 
of information take the least number of steps to make staff aware of the security issues. 
Their desire is strong to reduce the costs to a minimum. 
There seems to be some of the specific basic controls that should be existed in every 
organisation. The vast majority of respondent identified security policies as shown in 
Figure 8, both in staff handbook or a separate security policy. There were 85% of 
respondents have established an intranet site that provides guidance to staff on 
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information security issues. These techniques are low-cost, so this encourages 
organisations to use them. 
However, many of the respondents believe that techniques, including policies, 
handbooks, and guidance alone are not an effective way to improve awareness as 
shown in Figure 9. It is simply unrealistic to expect most of the staff to read and 
understand all the information addressed to them with regard to information security. 
These techniques play a useful role in terms of supporting and promoting awareness 
activities. However, they are not alone the only effective way to change the behaviour 
of the staff. 
Respondents found that the training in the classroom is the most effective technique 
with respect to changing the way how people behave. There was a number of 72% of 
those surveyed that have used security messages in induction training for new staff. 
This ensures delivery of the message to the highest risk people (staff newly joined the 
organisation) and relatively low cost, where security aspects can be combined in the 
existing events. 
While classroom training is believed to be highly effective, relatively small number of 
respondents conducts continuous training for existing staff. This could be due to the 
associated cost to arrange and run these courses. Moreover, it appears that the time 
to cover training in a continuous manner is also another fact affecting the lack of 
conducting continuous training. It seems to be the most effective awareness 
programmes are those that fit the perceived budget for classroom training target those 
amongst the organisation staff who are having lack in terms of security awareness level 
and hence may jeopardize the organisation. It seems that the blanket classroom 
training is unlikely to be cost-effective. 
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Instead, half of respondents have used CBT (Computer Based Training), and two thirds 
of these have conducted CBT for all staff. It is agreed that the CBT is a cost effective 
in terms of investment, the reason beyond this is perhaps that the CBT when it started 
running the delivery costs are very low. Therefore, it assists well in terms of continuing 
training to a large number of existing users. In terms of consistency of delivery, the 
large classroom training programmes are usually better. The main benefit of using the 
CBT is that is also allow building tests into it in order to be used as a measure of how 
well recipients have understood and get benefits of the training process. 
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Figure 8: Techniques to raise staff security awareness (ENISA, 2007) 
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Formal communication plan (i.e. how you will communicate
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Figure 9: The effectiveness of techniques to raise security awareness (ENISA, 2007) 
The main key to run an effective programme is to deliver the right messages to the right 
people. This includes understanding the current information security issues of each 
group and the degree to which they are aware. Unexpectedly, only 36% of respondents 
have a formal mechanism to do so. This happens more often in financial services than 
in other sectors. Many financial service providers learned that it is possible to spend 
large amounts of money on random awareness activities without having a significant 
impact on the overall risk. They now use a combination of blanket coverage of the basic 
disciplines and additional activity targeting areas of greatest risk that they may face. 
Poster campaigns, promotional items (such as pens) and blanket e-mail messages are 
all used by a large number of participants. There were many respondents using these 
techniques in the past but now disused or reduced their use. They have a relatively 
short shelf life and can be expensive to distribute throughout the organisation. There 
are also limits to the amount of information that can be transmitted to the reader, and 
many people simply ignore them completely. 
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There is no doubt that there is a real need to increase the security awareness for the 
users; however, passive promotion, such as using posters up around the office or 
PowerPoint slides, do little to capture the interest of the users (Randell, 2013). The 
biggest threats to information security in any organisation is often not related to the 
presence of weakness in the technology control environment, and it is more related to 
the action or inaction by employees which can often lead to security incidents (PCI, 
2014). 
One out of every five respondents uses surveys and quizzes to foster interest and 
increase awareness. Of those that have tried them in the past, more respondents found 
that using these techniques is actually more effective than not using them at all. The 
appropriate use of these methods can increase the level of awareness and can actually 
get people to think about their actions and behaviours. 
The implementation of the security awareness program successfully can be a hard task. 
It is likely that there will be some large difficult barriers to overcome along the way. 
What is most functional in the long term is to be able to recognize any restrictions hinder 
efforts, such as the lack of motivation of senior management with respect to the issue 
of information security interest or the existence of cultural resistance within the 
organisation. Identifying potential obstacles in advance is a key to the potential success 
of the plans that are developed to overcome these obstacles (ENISA, 2007). 
2.6 Conclusions 
While the security landscape is changing continuously, the complexity and the nature 
of the security threats are also changing. Although organisations employ a wide variety 
of technical tools and measures to safeguard their valuable IT assets, these solutions 
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are only covering the technical part of the problem and often cannot provide a complete 
protection, since IT assets are ultimately managed and operated by the human. 
Due to the large number of recent security breaches experienced by organisations and 
caused by their staff either intentionally or unintentionally, it is paramount that users 
should have an appropriate level of security awareness and ability to protect 
themselves and their organisations’ IT assets. Due to the large number and the 
changing nature of threats, it becomes difficult for technology solutions alone to provide 
a complete protection. 
Although recent figures indicate that the vast majority of the senior managers recognise 
the increased high risks of cyber insecurity and consider security as a high priority, 
reflecting an increased need for security awareness, organisations are still not 
addressing the security threats appropriately. For instance, the root cause of the most 
disruptive security breaches were staff related incidents. However, organisations 
instead of addressing this problem by providing training to the widest category of the 
organisation workforce, i.e. staff who are not cyber security or IT specialists, they 
provide training to the smallest workforce category which are directors or senior 
management staff. The persistence of this approach will increase the complexity of 
combating threats in general and more specifically the insider threats posed by trusted 
insider users. 
With the presence of obstacles to information security effectiveness and the use of 
current methods of security awareness raising, in addition to the barriers to training 
such as, irregular training or non-mandatory training which could easily be forgotten, 
costly and logistically complex face-to-face training sessions and the inability of some 
users to realise the value of training, the adoption of more targeted security awareness 
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approach to address these issues become imperative. Targeted security awareness 
raising is considered to be the most suitable candidate to address these concerns by 
providing guidance and nudges during the task in hand.
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Chapter 3 
Review of Targeted Security Awareness Opportunities 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, users are often referred to as the weakest link 
in the information security chain. This is mainly driven by the key factor that has 
significant influence, which is the lack of security awareness among users regarding 
emerging and evolving security threats. Recent stories and case studies as reported in 
the previous chapter and cited from the most well-known information security breaches 
surveys, have revealed that users are still unaware of the security threats. The 
aforementioned staff-related security breaches were among traditional security issues 
that have been known for a long time as mentioned in the previous chapter. For 
instance, related to the improper use of email services, visiting fraudulent websites, 
unauthorised access and disclosure of confidential information and breach of data, 
malware infection due to downloading files and attachments from untrusted sources, 
theft of confidential information, and mapping network drives to unprotected local 
laptops. 
As an example, the most recent Ernst and Young security survey (2017) revealed that 
respondents acknowledged that careless employee behaviours pose a considerable 
point of weakness for most organisations. The report also underlined that addressing 
this weakness is indispensable for organisations to stay safe (Ernst and Young, 2017). 
As such, unaware users can pose additional and considerable risks to their 
organisations’ IT security and can potentially cause security breaches. For example, 
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this can occur by staff responding to phishing emails, visiting malware infected 
websites, writing their passwords down or sharing them with others. 
In the light of these facts, and in order to transform the weakest link into a crucial 
frontline defence against cybersecurity threats, and to reinforce them in an information 
security perspective, many organisations employ IT security awareness programmes. 
This in turn aims to raise the IT security awareness of their staff to reduce end-users’ 
errors. However, providing awareness is one of the challenges facing many 
organisations, and one of the most important barriers is that users could easily forget 
what they have trained for. 
Furthermore, there are further and diverse methods employed to support users during 
daily dealing with IT systems. These include the use of security warnings, passive 
interventions (such as the green URL bar in the case of active SSL certificates), and 
active warnings (such as those in the case of self-signed certificates). However, 
according to Zaaba et al. (2014) and Volkamer et al. (2013), these methods have 
drawbacks and are perceived to be ineffective in protecting end-users. This was due 
to many factors, including providing inadequate security guidance and information to 
users or providing information that is on a very technical level, which is not accessible 
to novice IT users. As a consequence, novice users may ignore these interventions 
and may act inappropriately, as well as not being able to recognise the consequences 
of ignoring these interventions. Furthermore, users learned through their dealings with 
many low-risk cases in their daily dealings with IT systems that nothing will harm their 
IT systems if they ignore these warnings (Volkamer et al., 2013). All of the 
aforementioned factors and figures have made introducing an innovative method to 
raise the security awareness for the end users an imperative issue. 
Chapter 3 — Review of Targeted Security Awareness Opportunities  
53 | P a g e  
 
This chapter primarily discusses and explores the opportunities and potential 
application of a targeted security awareness-raising approach. It begins with a detailed 
discussion on the shortcomings in existing security warnings and provides a 
conceptual background for the targeted security awareness-raising approach. 
Furthermore, it provides definitions to the neighbouring areas such as context-sensitive 
security awareness and security nudges to eliminate confusion and differentiate 
between these concepts. Moreover, this chapter explores various examples of the 
targeted security awareness approach that is currently being used in a number of well-
known applications from prominent software developers. It then provides a broad 
discussion of the opportunities to increase the security awareness of end-users by 
taking advantage of targeted awareness-raising opportunities. 
3.2 The Shortcomings of Present Security Warnings 
One of the recognisable means to make the users aware of any security risks in their 
daily activities when interacting with IT systems is the use of security warnings. The 
security warning is used to warn the user about the potential security risks. However, 
the current security warnings do not seem to be effective and have flaws. Zaaba et al. 
(2014) identified six common problems related to security warnings including attention 
towards warnings, understanding of warnings, the use of technical wordings, and 
evaluation of risk from warnings, user's motivation towards heeding warnings, and 
user's assessment of implication of warnings. Moreover, regardless of the fact that 
there are wide varieties of technical countermeasures to mitigate security risks such as 
malware-related risks, users are in fact the last line of defence against security 
incidents and indeed users represent the last gate in the decision-making process (Silic 
and Back, 2017). 
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Moreover, many user studies and statistics on successful attacks against end-users 
present that neither passive interventions (such as green URL bar in the case of active 
SSL certificate) nor active warnings (such as those in the case of self-signed 
certificates) are effective in protecting end-users. There are several key elements 
identified by researchers behind this drawback. The key element is that existing 
interventions do not sufficiently take into account that security is their main objective 
and instead focus on the user task. The knowledge level of users about IT security is 
quite often incomplete. For example, many users believe that they are personally not 
being targeted by security attacks. Studies also show that people tend to make 
decisions about using a web page based on its design and not on the underlying 
reliability in terms of security. Broadly, it was observed that these passive security 
interventions currently used are not observable by most users. Active security 
interventions interrupt users to perform the task during their work, and therefore cannot 
be ignored. However, active warnings also may have not been successful for many 
reasons. One of the problems is that the information provided on the situation and the 
reason for this intervention is currently on a very technical level. Thus, users are not 
able to understand the risks and the consequences of ignoring this intervention based 
on the information provided. One of the most obvious examples that reflect this trend 
is that many currently used browsers provide the same security interventions in high 
and in low risk situations. Users learned through their dealings with many low risk cases 
in their daily lives that nothing "bad" happens if they ignore these interventions. 
Similarly, because of habitual effects, it would not be surprising that users will also 
ignore such interventions in high-risk situations (Volkamer et al., 2013). 
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3.3 Context Awareness and Information Security 
Context is the circumstance within which something exists or happens that primarily 
helps explain and understand it. Context-based computing uses additional contextual 
information to improve the computing experience at the point of consumption. Applying 
this to information security frameworks, context-based security is the use of additional 
information to improve security decisions at the time such decisions are made. 
Rapidly changing businesses and threat environments, as well as user demands are 
stressing static security policy enforcement models. Information security infrastructure 
must become adaptive by incorporating additional context at the point when a security 
decision is made. There are already some signs that highlight this transformation. 
Network security solutions are evolving to incorporate "application awareness" and 
"identity awareness" into their offerings. Information protection solutions are evolving 
to deliver "content awareness". 
Application, identity, and content awareness are all part of the same underlying shift to 
incorporate more contextual information at the point when a security policy 
enforcement decision is made. To enable faster and more-accurate assessments of 
whether a given action should be allowed or denied, a solution where a real-time 
context based information at the point when a decision is made, needs to be 
incorporated (MacDonald, 2010). 
3.4 Approaches for Raising Context-Sensitive Awareness 
The future of information security is shifting towards being context aware. Today the 
greatest use of security infrastructure is built upon static-enforcing policies which are 
defined in advance in an environment where the infrastructures for both IT 
infrastructure and business relationships are relatively static. This is multi sourced and 
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virtualized, and where consumer-oriented IT is increasingly used instead of enterprise-
owned and provisioned systems (MacDonald, 2010). 
As per the findings of (MacDonald, 2010): 
 Context aware security is the use of additional information to improve security 
decision at a time when security decision is made resulting in more accurate 
security decisions capable of supporting more dynamic business and IT 
environments. 
 Context information that will be relevant to security decisions is not limited to 
environmental context and will include context information from multiple sources. 
 Application awareness and awareness of identity and awareness of the content are 
all examples of a wider transition to context aware and adaptive security 
infrastructure. 
 Context-aware security will be the only way to securely support the dynamic 
business and IT infrastructures emerging during the next 10 years. 
3.5 Targeted Security Awareness, Context Sensitive Security Awareness and 
Security Nudges 
One of the key challenges of information security is the various different definitions and 
perceptions of terms used to describe it. In this respect, more attention should be paid 
to how targeted security awareness is perceived in relation to related areas, namely, 
context-sensitive security awareness and security nudges. It is clear that the three 
concepts have similar interests. However, there is a lack of obvious definitions or 
comparisons of the three terms in the literature. The next section will present definitions 
of the three concepts. 
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3.5.1 Targeted Security Awareness 
Targeted security awareness involves making people aware about something they 
need to know about rather than other superfluous information. It mainly focuses on 
making users aware of the security risk they are facing and before they take any action 
that could lead to compromising their IT systems. The targeted security awareness 
approach employs a wide variety of existing security tools and features to support users 
and help them understand the security risk and take proper actions to safeguard their 
IT systems when needed without overwhelming them. 
3.5.2 Context Sensitive Security Awareness 
Context sensitive security awareness, in simple terms, means that the user will get 
security advice at a time when it is relevant. In this approach, users get advice that is 
relevant to the task in hand. One of the most obvious examples of the context sensitive 
security awareness approach is the use of password meters in which users will be 
warned about the strength of their password whilst attempting to create one. 
3.5.3 Security Nudges 
It is mainly the impact that the security tools on the users to push them towards making 
better selection or action. For example, what the security meter does to nudge the user 
towards making a better password selection. 
3.6 Examples for Targeted Security Awareness Raising Approaches 
There are some good illustrative examples for targeted security awareness 
approaches such as the increasing popularity of password strength meters on websites 
and in operating systems, which provide guidance to users directly at the point when 
they need it. 
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Despite the fact that there are some existing examples of the use of targeted security 
awareness approaches like the use of password strength meters, file download 
security-warnings, and security warnings when inserting removable devices, the 
popularization and proliferation of these types of security interventions, which warn and 
alerts users before making their decisions about security risks are still limited. Some of 
the apparent and currently used examples of targeted security awareness approach 
are presented in Figures 10, 11 and 12. 
 
Figure 10: Example for targeted security awareness raising approach 
 
Figure 11: Example for targeted security awareness raising approach 
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Figure 12: Example for targeted security awareness raising approach 
One of the most apparent examples is the use of the security-warning message and 
trusting a PDF file in Adobe Acrobat and Reader. The screenshot shown in Figure 13 
shows a warning message that pops up when a user tries to access a Web site via a 
link in a PDF file. This is a very apparent example of how to adopt a targeted security 
awareness-raising approach. In this example, the application warns the user before 
accessing the site by providing a simple warning message that can be easily 
understood and does not contain complex technological information that the utmost of 
non-technical users may not comprehend. The application also provides a Help 
function with this warning message to access additional information that provides 
interpretation and an additional explanation. The user will be directed to access a web 
page after clicking the Help button, the web page contains a full and detailed 
explanation of the potential threats of visiting sites via links found in PDF files. The link 
below leads to a page with additional information that a user can access when they 
click the HELP button: 
https://helpx.adobe.com/acrobat/kb/security-warning-trusting-pdf-acrobat.html  
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This example demonstrates how effective it is to provide security information, 
recommendations, and explanation to the user about the potential security risk before 
the user takes any actions that may result in a security breach and consequently 
compromising the users’ device, stolen or damage to their data. This provided feature 
will potentially be turning a possible victim into an educated user. 
 
Figure 13: Security warning when the user clicks a link provided in a PDF file 
While this example shows that some developers such as Adobe have taken 
encouraging and concrete steps towards making users aware of the potential security 
threats before taking any actions that could damage their IT systems, other leading 
software developers of well-known and widely used applications have not taken similar 
steps in this direction and failed to provide the same solutions for similar scenarios. For 
example, when using Microsoft Word (MS Word), users may experience the same 
scenario exactly when trying to access a website via a link provided in an MS Word file, 
it will show the user a warning message as shown per screenshot in Figure 14 similar 
to the warning message provided by the Adobe Acrobat and Reader. However, 
although the warning message provided by MS Word has provided security information 
stating that some files can contain viruses and may be harmful to the user’s computer 
and that it is important to be certain that the intended file is from a trustworthy source, 
this information may confuse the user, because the user may be trying to access a 
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websites via links provided in MS Word and is not trying to open a file. Furthermore, it 
also does not provide the user with any possibility of obtaining additional security 
information or any recommendations or explanations regarding the potential threat. 
The warning message titled “Microsoft office” which is not reflecting the content of the 
message as it is a security alert or security message. The title of the pop-up windows 
in this situation should clearly indicate that this is a security-warning message. Perhaps 
this inconsistency would also cause confusion to the user. Moreover, this security 
message is not also using any security signs to attract the attention and make of the 
user aware of the security threat that the user may encounter because of this action. 
 
Figure 14: Security warning when the user clicks a link provided in a MS Word file 
Also, this is a clear example that while some leading developers seek to adhere to 
known design principles to deliver applications that reduce security risks by providing 
security features that help users understand the potential threats before taking any 
actions that could damage their systems, other dealing developers who are developing 
well-known and widespread applications have failed to adhere to some basic design 
principles. 
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Another apparent example of adopting the targeted security awareness approach is 
illustrated in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: The message informing the user that data sent is encrypted 
The screenshots shows the application of WhatsApp. The application provides a clear 
and simple initial message to inform the user that the data sent through this application 
/connection is secure and encrypted between the two ends of the connection and 
cannot be seen by any other parties. If the user does not understand the initial message, 
the user can then click on the initial message for more explanation as shown per 
screenshot in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: More information provided to the user by WhatsApp application 
If the user is still in doubt and needs to acquire additional information, the user can then 
click the Learn More button and then access the page in the link below: 
https://www.whatsapp.com/security/?lg=en&lc=GB 
The page provides additional and clear information to clarify the security feature of the 
application where the application provides privacy and security and data protection 
when transferring data between the two ends of the connection through the provision 
of encryption between the two ends of the connection to ensure that no other parties 
can access to this data when transferring between the ends of the connection. 
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3.7 Opportunities for Targeted Security Awareness 
There is a wide variety of scenarios and opportunities in which targeted security 
awareness raising could be an effective method in raising the security awareness of 
the users. This can be achieved by providing guidance and nudges during the time 
when dealing with the IT systems and supporting the users in making more informed 
security decisions when a potential risk arises. The following section will explore and 
discuss in more details these scenarios and opportunities. 
3.7.1 Poor Password Selection 
Despite countless efforts to displace passwords, passwords are more extensively used 
and rooted than ever (Herley and Van Oorschot, 2012). Password authentication 
continues to be the main method of user authentication for online systems. 
Unfortunately, users repeatedly still create passwords that are easy for them to 
remember but also easy to guess (Furnell, 2005), regardless of their deep-rooted and 
widespread use, the underlying password choices made by end-users continue to 
demonstrate a wide range of weaknesses. For example a survey conducted by Furnell 
and Bär in 2013, revealed that about one third of users chose weak passwords, 
including personal information or dictionary words (Furnell and Bär, 2013). Similarly, 
SplashData has published its annual list of the 25 most common passwords found on 
the Internet. The first communal used password was “123456” and the second was 
“password” (SplashData, 2014). Table 4 is presenting the annual list of the 25 worst 
passwords of 2013 and which found to be most common passwords on the Internet as 
SplashData has announced in 2014. 
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Table 4: The annual worst passwords list for 2013 announced by SplashData 
Rank Password 
Change from 
2012 
Rank Password 
Change from 
2012 
1.  123456 Up 1 2.  password Down 1 
3.  12345678 Unchanged 4.  qwerty Up 1 
5.  abc123 Down 1 6.  123456789 New 
7.  111111 Up 2 8.  1234567 Up 5 
9.  iloveyou Up 2 10.  adobe123 New 
11.  123123 Up 5 12.  admin New 
13.  1234567890 New 14.  letmein Down 7 
15.  photoshop New 16.  1234 New 
17.  monkey Down 11 18.  shadow Unchanged 
19.  sunshine Down 5 20.  12345 New 
21.  password1 Up 4 22.  princess New 
23.  azerty New 24.  trustno1 Down 12 
25.  000000 New    
In a similar study carried out by SplashData in 2014, the company released its annual 
list of the worst passwords of 2014, where the situation has not changed very much 
over the past year. The most common password is still the same as seen last year 
"123456", which has replaced the one in the head of the list for a long time "password". 
Other passwords that are selected based on the sequence of the keyboard are 
including "12345678", "QWERTY keys", "monkey", in addition to new passwords as 
shown Table 5. According to Burnett Forums security expert, the top 25 (below) 
represent 2.2 percent of all simple passwords vulnerable. Table 5 is presenting the 
annual list of the 25 worst passwords of 2014 and which found to be most common 
passwords on the Internet as SplashData has announced in 2015 (SplashData, 2015). 
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Table 5: The annual worst passwords list for 2014 announced by SplashData 
Rank Password 
Change from 
2012 
Rank Password 
Change from 
2012 
1.  123456 Unchanged 2.  password Unchanged 
3.  12345 Up 17 4.  12345678 Down 1 
5.  qwerty Down 1 6.  123456789 Unchanged 
7.  1234 Up 9 8.  baseball New 
9.  dragon New 10.  football New 
11.  1234567 Down 4 12.  monkey Up 5 
13.  letmein Up 1 14.  Abc123 Down 9 
15.  111111 Down 8 16.  mustang New 
17.  access New 18.  shadow Unchanged 
19.  master New 20.  michael New 
21.  superman New 22.  696969 New 
23.  123123 Down 12 24.  batman New 
25.  trustno1 Down 1    
The situation has not shown any signs of improvement over the past few years, as in 
2017 the problem persisted, as per results released by SplashData in its annual list of 
the worst 100 passwords of 2017. Table 6 presenting only the first 26 worst passwords 
in the list (SplashData, 2017). 
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Table 6: The annual worst passwords list for 2017 announced by Splashdata 
Rank Password Rank Password 
1.  123456 2.  password 
3.  12345678 4.  qwerty 
5.  12345 6.  123456789 
7.  letmein 8.  1234567 
9.  football 10.  iloveyou 
11.  admin 12.  welcome 
13.  monkey 14.  login 
15.  abc123 16.  starwars 
17.  123123 18.  dragon 
19.  passw0rd 20.  master 
21.  hello 22.  freedom 
23.  whatever 24.  qazwsx 
25.  trustno1 26.  654321 
In order to encourage and help users to choose an acceptable password in terms of its 
strength, numerous of websites have set up a password metre approach which gives 
the user visual feedback and indications to advise the user on the strength of the 
chosen password. Despite the widespread use of password meters, the effects of using 
these metres on security and their usability have not been well-investigated (Ur et al., 
2012). 
In order to change this behaviour, system administrators have introduced a number of 
methods, including the passwords that are created by the system with strict 
composition policies. The passwords set by system are difficult to guess, but users find 
often these passwords difficult for them to remember. Password composition policies, 
used to set requirements that each password on the system must meet and make them 
hard to guess. Furthermore, it also can lead to the user been frustrated and hence 
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users may make their effort only to meet the system requirements in simple ways that 
can be predictable. 
Additional noticeable method used to encourage users to create strong passwords is 
to use password meters. A password meters is a visual illustration of the strength of 
the chosen password, which shown as colourful bar on-screen. Password meters 
employ suggestions to help users create strong passwords. Currently, many popular 
websites uses password meters to help users chose stronger passwords (Ur et al., 
2012). Some of these websites offer a link of a list of tips and guidelines about 
password selection and why the user should do it in a certain way. Some examples are 
presented in Figures 17 and 18. 
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Figure 17: Example for the use of password meters (Apple ID) 
 
Figure 18: Example for the use of password meters (Google) 
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There are many password meters which guide the user to choose a password, but 
these password meters do not strictly require the user to choose a strong and complex 
password. An example of this type is shown in Figure 19. This approach reflects the 
concept of behavioural economics to gently prod or of soft control. This is done by 
stimulating and helping users through known behavioural patterns and biases, 
companies, governments and some of the other entities presented a variety of 
approaches for behaviour change. 
Most users have a tendency to create simple passwords when there is no intervention 
(Florencio and Herley, 2007). Recently there are many organisations use password 
policies configured to force users to choose more complex passwords to increase the 
strength of users' passwords. However, users are expected to act in accordance with 
these policies in ways that can be predicted which potentially lead to reduce the 
strength of the password. Although previous work has shown that password-
Figure 19: Example of password meters not requiring strong password choices 
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composition policies require more characters or more character classes can improve 
resistance to automated guessing attacks, many of the passwords that meet the 
common policies are still weak. In addition, the stringent policies may cause to bother 
users, and which leads to prevent their productivity, and ultimately may lead them to 
write their passwords down or somewhere that anyone can access. 
Figure 20 below illustrates the wide variety of types of password meters currently used 
by various companies. Some of these companies use the same type of password 
meters for the all sites that they owned such as Google and in other companies such 
as eBay use different types of password meters for their owned websites, for example 
ebay.de website uses a password meter that differs from that used by ebay.com (Ur et 
al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first and largest investigative study of its kind conducted by (Ur et al., 2012) on 
the use of passwords-strength meter found that the password-strength meter influence 
the user in terms of changing the behaviour and the security. Password-strength 
meters guide the user to make longer passwords. However, this study found that 
Figure 20: Examples of password indicators (Ur et al., 2012) 
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unless the meters scored passwords stringently, the chosen passwords were only 
slightly more resistant to password cracking attacks. 
Password meters that rated passwords stringently directed users to choose passwords 
significantly longer that contains a combination of more digits, symbols, and uppercase 
letters, and at the same time these passwords were not noticed to be hard to remember 
or unusable, yet these passwords cracked at lower rate by simulated adversaries. The 
most stringent meter that bothered users yet did not provide greater security benefits 
compared to those provided by slightly less stringent meters. A combination of visual 
and text indicators exceeded in excellence of performance. However, the appearance 
of visual indicators did not appear to have a significant impact. 
Despite the fact that these more stringent meters contribute in adding more strength, it 
has been noticed the widespread use of more lenient meters. Similar research findings 
suggest that, as long as these metres are not perceived to be very difficult, the adoption 
of more stringent metres would increase security (Ur et al., 2012). 
3.7.2 Connecting to Unknown Wi-Fi Networks  
An alarming fact observed from research performed by Kaspersky Lab in partnership 
with Harris Interactive in 2012 is that 70% of tablet owners and 53% of 
smartphone/mobile phone users use free public Wi-Fi hotspots, meaning it is one of 
the most popular ways to go online. This means that mobile devices are become even 
more vulnerable, taking into account the well-known security problems associated with 
this type of unsecure connection, especially because most of these devices are not 
equipped with security software. Most users of mobile devices are exposed to data 
theft because there is considerable potential to intercept data transmitted over public 
Wi-Fi. Another surprising result of the survey is that although tablets are mobile devices, 
Chapter 3 — Review of Targeted Security Awareness Opportunities  
73 | P a g e  
 
they mostly connect at home. The survey found that Wi-Fi hotspots represent a real 
danger to the users of mobile devices as they are the most popular way used of the 
Internet connection for these devices although security almost non-existent. Figure 21 
illustrating types of Internet connection used for mobile devices as found by Kaspersky 
Lab (2012). 
 
Figure 21: Types of internet connection for mobile devices (Kaspersky Lab, 2012) 
The Europol has supported a comprehensive investigation of the Wi-Fi technology, the 
results of this investigations highlighted serious concern about the security of 
communications. An independent investigation was conducted by the Cyber Security 
Research Institute and the German penetration testing company SySS on behalf of 
ethical computer security company F-Secure. It found hundreds of people regularly 
logging onto "trojanized ' free Wi-Fi hotspot service that was created purposely to carry 
out their experiment (F-Secure, 2014). 
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The research into the Wi-Fi technology, which is used by more than 73% of households 
in the United Kingdom and 25% of households all over the world, found that users are 
impetuous about security risks related to the use of Wi-Fi, with more than 250 people 
having logged onto their Trojan hotspot in a period of 30 minutes. 
The research also revealed the presence of significant weaknesses in the Wi-Fi system 
which allows the usernames and passwords for users who use email accounts on the 
POP3 protocol, which is widely used to be easily discovered when users send emails 
through Wi-Fi hotspots. This vulnerability can be exploited by any criminal who is 
offering and controlling a Wi-Fi hotspot to gather account information that would allow 
them to impersonate the user through their email account. 
The experiment has confirmed and clearly highlighted that people pay no attention to 
computer security when they are on the move, a result confirmed by a recent survey 
from the broadcasting watchdog Ofcom, which found that more than 77% of the people 
were not concerned about the security risks linked with using public Wi-Fi. 
This practically means that anyone can replace a current used hotspot by sending a 
stronger signal, catching the traffic, and then directing it to where it is desired. In 
addition, security experts have also raised other concerns by using the same Wi-Fi 
access point name, and blocking out the legitimate point by using a stronger signal and 
then allowing the computers using that access point to reconnect without having to sign 
in. 
Other techniques currently being used by criminals include simply making available of 
access points that have a similar name to the organisation but disguised in the form of 
a guest or free account, all potential dangers that most people do not think of when 
looking for access to the Internet. 
Chapter 3 — Review of Targeted Security Awareness Opportunities  
75 | P a g e  
 
The investigation was carried out to test and examine the trust that misplaced by using 
a portable hotspot device built by experts from the German penetration testing 
company SySS at a cost of less than 160 pounds using a Raspberry Pi mini-computer 
system, an extended battery pack with a life of around two days and a Wi-Fi UTMS 
aerial, in addition to a USB port. The final product system is highly portable Wi-Fi 
hotspot that could easily be hiding in a small handbag as shown in Figure 22, and can 
be installed in seconds. It can be easily managed by an operator with a laptop to access 
the data captured. 
 
Figure 22: The components of portable Wi-Fi access point (F-Secure, 2014) 
The team made available of free Wi-Fi service in locations around London as part of 
an experiment to discover what type of actions that people are taken to protect 
themselves against possible danger when they are on the move. 
Investigation of the F-Secure comes based on current conditions, which clearly shows 
the growing number people who reliance on the free Wi-Fi, which is also experiencing 
the mobile phone companies that offer a combination of cellular and Wi-Fi, which in 
many cases uses lists of open Wi-Fi hotspots. 
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This additional danger increases the risk to the public, since most consumers do not 
fully realize that the Internet service via mobile phone is being easily switched between 
different networks. The investigation of F-Secure also proved that offering free Wi-Fi 
hotspots, to maliciously to collect personal data from people when they are on the move 
is a very real and present danger. 
Public Wi-Fi is not secure and security must be considered as a high priority, especially 
when moving in the fast growing area of hotspot 2.0. Now mobile phones connecting 
automatically to Wi-Fi hotspots, while there is not very much work done to verify the 
identity of the organisations that run and control the hotspots (F-Secure, 2014). 
The researchers concluded that these experiments are evidence of the spread of 
ignorance among the population on a large scale on security issue of using unknown 
Wi-Fi. In spite of these experiences seem simple and easy to do, they should not be 
underestimated the seriousness of the results obtained. 
The results show that the very real problem in the modern world is that while people 
heavily relying on the technology, the population is unaware of the capabilities that the 
technology has such as accessing their personal details and intrusion into their lives. 
The problem is that people implicitly trust their technology and are not aware of the 
negative impact of that trust. 
There is a great request of bandwidth mainly driven by the desire of users to gain 
access to video, rich data applications and high-speed performance of the Internet 
during their movement. This desire for bandwidth is very similar to the desire of people 
to get things and free software on the Internet which in many cases has blinded sight 
of users to recognise the risks of the actions they are taking. With regard to the great 
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quest for a free bandwidth, the experiment carried out in spite of the strict conditions 
and circumstances clearly showed that users are willing to do anything. 
Researchers have pointed out that there is a lack of collaboration between the different 
sectors of the industry. Telecommunications sector strives to provide increased user 
confidence and enhance the services it provides, but on the other hand, the sector has 
taken security shortcuts. The industry must be transparent by clearly illustrate what 
they are offering to their customers, and alert them when they are in contact with the 
Wi-Fi service that offers security risk. Moreover, telecommunications companies must 
explain clearly, what data is accessed on the customer’s device in exchange for the 
service provided to the client over and above the terms and conditions. Finally, 
researchers pointed out that regulators, such as the Office of the Information 
Commissioner (ICO), should make an effort to alert customers of potential risks that 
could be faced (F-Secure, 2014). 
Whilst using unknown Wi-Fi networks users should be made aware of the security risks 
that are associated with the use and security policies of such networks. Users’ 
awareness should be raised before they get access to these networks. This could be 
done at the operating system level or the operator of the network should offer this 
opportunity before the users proceed to join the network. This perhaps will help users 
to know the security risks and hence have their chance to better decide whether to use 
or abstain from the offered Wi-Fi connection. 
3.7.3 Using File Sharing Networks 
One of the most appreciated features offered by the Internet is the ability to share and 
download files such as documents, programs, pictures, music, and movies. This is very 
common and practiced by users every day. Although there are a wide variety of large 
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retail sites that offer files for paid download. However, many users share files between 
one another. There is a wide range of ways that users can use to share files such as 
email and using peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing. However, the traditional sense of file 
sharing like using P2P sharing involves security risks which users should be aware of. 
The security risks are including copyright infringement, costly lawsuits, and potential 
criminal consequences (GetCyberSafe, 2014c). 
File sharing networks which also called peer-to-peer networks (P2P), are widely used 
and very popular among users because are used to upload and download different 
types of files, such as music, pictures, movies, games, documents and in addition to 
the computer software across the internet. File sharing software products are available 
free on the global network. However, the use of file sharing network commonly involves 
significant security risks. The Canadian Bankers Association have tried to raise the 
security awareness of their customers by joining the campaign of the Cyber Security 
Awareness Month in October 2014 by strongly advising them not to install P2P file 
sharing software or use P2P websites. Customers also advised in the case that they 
decide to join or use these networks to exercise extreme caution (CBA, 2014). 
Precautions and tips offered by Canadian Bankers Association to users to keep in mind 
to protect themselves from the associate risk with the use of P2P including the following: 
 In addition to issues related to breaking copyrights law, file sharing on peer-to-peer 
sites is widely used by criminals to distribute illegal or harmful files and viruses that 
are pretended to look like harmless downloads of popular songs, movies, or 
anything else popular that the user is looking for. The users also advised that relying 
on recent version of anti-virus software alone might not provide adequate protection. 
 Users also advised not to accept the P2P software default settings, as doing so will 
make the user’s system vulnerable by giving others the opportunity to gain access 
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to user’s personal information, because almost default settings usually give other 
users access to personal folders, which could include full access to the My 
Documents folder on the user's home computer. 
 Users advised at all times to manually determine which folders and subfolders they 
will share on the network. 
For file sharing networks or P2P software, the operating system should warn the user 
about the security risks associated with the use of these networks. One of the big 
concerns of P2P networks is that it requires disabling firewall in order to work and 
hence leaving the user vulnerable to large scale of risks. In addition, users should also 
be made aware of opportunities of breaking copyrights law because of sharing some 
files like music, movies, as well as utilities software. 
3.7.4 Posting Sensitive Information on Social Networking Sites 
At present spread use of the Internet sites promote communication and encourage the 
dissemination and exchange of information between users such as the use of social 
networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and tumblr and use of the internet forums. 
While these sites are used for the purpose of communication between friends and 
family, exchange of ideas and share of information and following news, they also attract 
the attention of cyber criminals and been a very fertile ground for the them (CBA, 2014). 
The information security breaches survey 2014 conducted by PwC, 2013 witnessed 
the increasing importance of social networks for large organisations. However, most 
organisations were struggling to find the best way to control the risks associated with 
the use of social networking sites. 
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Large organisations only tend to restrict use to corporate communications rather than 
just blocking access to social networking sites. Figure 23 illustrates how respondents 
prevent staff misuse of the web and social networking sites. 
 
Figure 23: Preventive ways for staff misuse of web and social networking sites (PwC, 2014) 
According to PwC report 2014, 16% of large organisations identified a security breach 
involving social networking sites in the previous year. However, the case appears 
better for small businesses, as only 5% detected a security breach related to social 
networking sites. This could be because fewer small businesses consider social 
network important for them and that they often have less detection capability compared 
to large organisations. 
With regard to the misuse of social networking, PwC 2014 raised a story that took place 
in a small IT company located in London which did not take any steps to control the 
use of social networking sites. This led to multiple breaches relating to the misuse of 
social networking sites by staff that year. Unfortunately, these multiple breaches were 
not detected in a timely manner due to the lack of focus on the use of social networks 
(PwC, 2014). 
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With respect to increasing security awareness regarding the misuse of social 
networking sites, Canadian Bankers Association has joining the campaign of the Cyber 
Security Awareness Month in October 2014. Canadian banks have united their effort 
to take part in this international effort to help consumers protect themselves and their 
computers from cyber-crime. They have presented some helpful tips that the 
customers should follow in order to protect themselves against the risks that the use of 
these types of websites may introduce, these including the following: 
 Users must be careful about what information included in their profile details. Users 
should not post sensitive information to profile and limit any online information about 
themselves, on social networking sites and in chat rooms, including phone numbers, 
addresses, date of birth, or other personal information, where this information could 
be used to impersonate the user identity and conduct fraud. In addition to alerting 
them to that never include or post any bank account information, or even their bank 
name (CBA, 2014); (RBC, 2014). 
 Users must exercise caution when they add "friends" on the network. Users may 
not know who is behind some of online accounts, as it could be anyone; a new 
"friend" can be criminals who are out there to trick you into disclosing your personal 
or financial information. 
 Users should check the privacy and security settings of the social networking site. 
Users are advised not to just accept the default settings, which normally set to allow 
more access that users want or realize. The normal setting access for the social 
website could be including a very large audience, the same can be applied to the 
discussion forum where the user may post things like their opinion which could be 
reached by everyone through the use of well-known search engines such as Google. 
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 Users should read carefully the privacy policy for the site they are using. Users 
advised to ensure that privacy policy does not include clauses that give the social 
network the right to use information posted on the site, which may mean selling 
contact information or email addresses. 
As raised within aforementioned discussion of security issues related to the use of 
social networks, and their inadequacy in educating users about the underlying inherent 
vulnerabilities. There are many steps that should be taken in order to raise IT security 
awareness of end users whether on the operating system level, within a network 
monitoring level or at the point where a new user would like to join these social 
networking websites. There are also opportunities to raise IT security awareness at the 
web browser level whenever the user is typing the name of the website or before 
signing in. This is where context-sensitive security awareness can help and raise the 
awareness of the users about the security risks associated with the use of such 
websites. 
3.7.5 Opening Unverified Email Attachments 
Emerging computer communication technologies have fundamentally changed the 
way in which people communicate and exchange information (Torrubia et al., 2001). 
Electronic mail is one of the most widely used services on the Internet and has become 
such an important part in modern life that people now prefer to use it as a main tool to 
communicate rather than to make a phone call. Electronic mail is offering many 
advantages of speed and efficiency to stay in touch with friends, communicate with 
colleagues, receive e-bills from utility service providers or order confirmations when 
shopping online, read electronic newsletters, in addition to exchange of highly personal 
information, such as medical and financial data. However, lack of using e-mail safely 
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promotes many security risks which present themselves as the main source of rich 
information for cyber criminals (GetCyberSafe, 2014a). 
Email is one of the easiest methods used by cyber criminals to target ordinary users 
(GetCyberSafe, 2014a). This security problem comes from security risks inherent in 
the use of e-mail service. However, to address this problem, there are many tools and 
methods available to protect users from hackers and malicious software. This includes 
anti-viruses protection solutions, anti-spyware and anti-malware solutions in general. 
Additionally, the email service providers contribute to protect users by introducing 
filleting techniques and give the user ability to block unwanted emails. 
However, according to information security breaches survey 2014 conducted by PwC  
despite the availability of these wide ranges of protection tools and techniques provided 
by email providers, business disruption breaches involving staff misuse of emails or 
the Internet are most disruptive to businesses (PwC, 2014). For example, a small 
technology company specializing in the field of online security had their systems 
infected by a virus via email concealed as false certificates. This virus is not detected 
by a number of commercial anti-virus solutions and caused minor business disruption 
and damaged the reputation of the company. Similarly, a small financial services 
company lost a half-day of work after one of their staff downloaded a file containing 
malware from his personal webmail. As a result, several files shared between staff 
have been encrypted. This incidence took a week of work to deal with and resolve. As 
a result, the company made changes to their email usage policy and reconfigured the 
structure of their system to prevent this happening again (PwC, 2014). 
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3.7.6 Email Scams (Phishing Emails and Phishing Links) 
There are many e-mail scams that have been tried by cyber criminals and these scams 
represent a real danger for users of e-mail. While these email scams have been 
recognized long time ago, cyber criminals continue to achieve the results that they are 
looking for. Email scams are now becoming very shrewd as well, using spoofing to 
make the email looks as much legitimate as possible which confuses users and makes 
it hard for them to notice and as a result make them open these scam emails. 
Here are some examples as presented in the Public Safety Canada website to raise 
security awareness for users with respect to the current email phishing scams 
(GetCyberSafe, 2014b): 
 Fake business opportunities: If a user receives an email with an opportunity to make 
a lot of money with inadequate effort in short time, or there are lack of information 
about the actual business, there is a great chance that this is a scam. 
 Lottery wins and prizing or "Jackpot" scams: Users being asked to supply credit 
card information in order to claim prize or pay for shipping, users should be cautious 
of the source. 
 Health and diet scams: The promise of the magic diet pills or quick weight loss can 
be very attractive for some people, encouraging them to follow these links by 
clicking on them without thinking or verification from the source. If the recipients of 
the email observed words like "quick" and "discount" in the same e-mail, it is very 
likely to be a scam. 
 Discount software: Downloading software is also a trick used by email scams by 
offering a big price reduction with an unrevealed source, which is usually illegal. 
The software is likely pirated and potentially comes with Trojan horses or the 
likelihood is that the user will not get anything never in return for the price paid. 
Chapter 3 — Review of Targeted Security Awareness Opportunities  
85 | P a g e  
 
 Advanced Fee Fraud: These schemes provide a large amount of money should 
user get involved. They are carefully arranged, and provide false documents to give 
the appearance of legitimate business proposal and even invite users to meetings 
in their country. At some point, users may be asked for money to pay fees or other 
expenses and then all communication will be cut off. 
 'Pump 'n' dump' stock scams: These are spam emails from an "investor" with 
confidential information, claiming that a particular stock is about to become very 
profitable. This will then raise the stock price, at which point the individuals behind 
the scheme sell - and the price collapses. 
As mentioned earlier, Email service is among the preferred methods for cybercriminals 
to target users. To protect users, many techniques and tools have been developed to 
keep users from being victims of cyber criminals. However, all of these solutions deal 
with the technical side including software and hardware level. All these techniques and 
tools have not done enough in terms of increasing security awareness of users by 
informing them about potential risks with email links and attachments, before they 
make actions like downloading e-mail attachments or clicking on links with unknown e-
mails. Increasing awareness of users will give users a chance to think before taking 
any actions that will make them victims and infect their systems. 
For example, the Microsoft Outlook webmail service has filtering techniques to identify 
phishing emails. However, in the following screenshot, although it has been detected 
that phishing e-mail as shown in Figure 24, it fails to provide enough information for the 
user before or while making decision to unblock the email content. For instance, if the 
user tries to activate these links a window will appear as shown in Figure 25. This 
window does not contain sufficient explanation to raise security awareness for the user 
about the risks associated with this e-mail. It is only informing the user that parts of this 
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email have been blocked for their safety. It does not provide any explanation for the 
user that this e-mail is expected to be a phishing e-mail and what the potential risks 
are if the user proceeds to unblock these links, nor provides any information such as 
why was the e-mail or link has been blocked. Security awareness of potential risks 
should be raised for users and what users should do if they do not trust this email and 
this should be provided at the point when it is needed. 
 
Figure 24: Detecting phishing email Microsoft Outlook webmail 
 
Figure 25: Warning message when trying to unlock phishing links in MS Outlook 
3.7.7 Using Uncertified Removable Media Devices 
Removable media and removable devices have offered a great assistance for users of 
computer systems used for backup, store data, or to transport data from one computer 
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to another, as well as having the ability to be installed and removed from computer 
systems easily. These removable media or removable devices include USB flash 
drives, External hard disk drives, Optical discs, Memory cards, Floppy disks, In addition 
to other devices that are common today which include Digital cameras, Smart phones, 
tablets Wired or Wireless printers as well as other external/dock-able peripherals that 
can be easily removed from a system. 
However, uncertified removable media devices are also considered as one of the main 
causes of spreading malicious software between computer systems if the files stored 
in them are infected with malicious software (Kaspersky Lab, 2014). 
According to information security breaches survey 2014, removable media devices 
have rapidly become a key area of exposure. For example, over 10% of the worst 
security breaches in 2014 were due to portable media bypassing defences, which is 
more than double the level seen in 2013. Although, organisations increasingly are 
making more effort to develop security policy and controls regarding the use of mobile 
phones and tablets, these security measures do not always take into account the usage 
of removable devices such as USB sticks, removable hard drives, CD or DVDs (PwC, 
2014). 
Mobile devices are now a trend that cannot be stopped as many organisations are 
making risk based decisions on how to facilitate the use of such devices into the 
organisation. Slightly more than half of large organisations and three-quarters of small 
organisations have implemented a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) culture. Most 
organisations are now using a variety of combinations of techniques to protect 
themselves from mobile threats, using both policies and technical defences. This is a 
positive sign as recently businesses have become increasingly aware of the potential 
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risks and the importance of adopting protection against cyber risks associated with the 
use of mobile devices (PwC, 2014). 
There is a wide range of developed solutions to protect computer systems form being 
infected by malicious software including anti-viruses protection solutions like anti-
spyware and anti-malware solutions in general as well as security warnings provided 
by operating systems to raise the security awareness for users. However, the problem 
of getting infected because of transferring malicious software through removable media 
still exists. 
For example, staff at a scientific institute was inadvertently involved in spreading 
malware across their systems by using infected USB devices. It took more than 50 
days to recover because of the ineffectiveness of their contingency plan. This incident 
led to changes made to their systems and measures to make contingency plans more 
effectively. Similarly, a government agency had a security breach because of the 
inappropriate use of mobile devices previous year. A security policy was issued as a 
result of this incident on the use of mobile computing and only allows access via 
approved devices. 
Data shows that the use of mobile devices continues to grow and this means that the 
risks associated with mobile devices is on the rise. There were 9% of large 
organisations who had a data or security breach related to the use of smartphones or 
tablets, the same level as seen in 2013, although it is not clear whether all breaches 
are being detected currently. Only 38% respondents said that they encrypt the data 
held on mobile phones and only 42% of respondents said that they train their staff on 
the threats associated with mobile devices. In addition, there were 16% of the 
respondents who did not take any steps to address the risks associated with mobile 
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devices, which is very alarming, in relation to the increasing popularity of the use of 
mobile devices in daily business operations among all organisations (PwC, 2014). 
As mentioned above, users dealing with removable media devices should be made 
aware of the potential risks before transferring data from these devices, especially if 
these devices are not certified. Despite the presence of security measures and controls 
to protect computer systems against these threats, users also need to be made aware 
of the potential risks associated with the use of removable media devices, especially if 
they are not certain about it. In the absence protection software or the protection 
software not being updated, the result of dealing with infected device will lead to the 
infection of computer system with malicious content. Implementing context security 
interventions will give the users a chance to think before taking any action. 
3.7.8 Downloading Files from Untrusted Sites 
Downloading a file means that this file will be transferred from the Internet to computer 
system. There are a wide variety of most commonly downloaded files such as 
programs, updates or other kinds of files such as game demos, music and video files, 
or documents  (Microsoft, 2015). However, there is a risk that the file may contain a 
virus or a program that can damage computer systems or information stored in it. 
Downloading files from the Internet is potentially unsafe exposing computer systems 
to get infected with malicious software if the computer system is not protected, or the 
website is not trusted. There is no doubt that the worldwide web is the main source of 
malware software (Kaspersky Lab, 2014). 
One of the most common ways in which computer systems become infected with 
malicious software is that users actively cause the malicious software to run not 
realizing that the file being opened or downloaded from untrusted web sites could 
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contain malicious software. Downloading files from untrusted sites is of one of the ways 
to distribute infected files with malicious software. There are some precautions users 
can take into account to help protect their computer when they download files from the 
Internet, such as installing a good anti-virus program on their computer systems. Users 
also advised to configure their anti-virus program to scan all files that they work with in 
real time. Most virus scanners can also be configured to scan emails as it arrives and 
quarantine infected messages. Moreover, because new viruses are discovered almost 
daily, users need to be sure to keep their anti-virus program up to date. Most anti-virus 
software has an automatic update facility that can help with this. Users should also use 
Microsoft's Windows update feature to be sure that they have Microsoft's latest fixes 
and security patches for their version of Windows. Windows update also has an 
automatic update facility that can help keep computer systems up to date (WinZip, 
2014). 
The rate of getting infected with viruses is high although all these security measures 
and controls have been widely available for long time for users dealing with computer 
systems. It is essential that user’s security awareness should be raised and getting 
best advice on the associated risks before they proceed to download any type of files 
from the Internet. There is a wide variety of protection solutions like anti-viruses 
protection solutions, anti-spyware, and anti-malware to keep users and their systems 
safe as well as security patches provided from operating systems developers. However, 
if users fail to update the protection software or ignore security patches for their system 
their systems are defenceless and prone to be infected by malicious software. 
Despite the fact that there are security warnings that operating systems normally 
provide for users to inform them about the potential risks as presented in Figure 26, 
these security warnings in some cases may not be sufficient in terms of providing 
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enough information to users about the potential risks, nor doing much to raise security 
awareness for end users of what has happened and most importantly why this 
happened. With time, users may become familiar with these security warnings and 
intend to ignore these messages and think that nothing bad will happen by doing so. 
 
Figure 26: Security warning when downloading a file from the Internet 
3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has primarily focused on various examples in which targeted security 
awareness-raising approach is implemented, and explored opportunities in which 
targeted security awareness could be adopted. It has also demonstrated one of the 
very important issues regarding the application of targeted security awareness-raising 
approach, is that despite the implementation of this approach by some prominent 
software developers in their applications, other leading developers still do not yet 
realise the advantage of this approach and adopted it in their widely used applications, 
instead they continue releasing applications that provide inadequate security guidance, 
which will not help users to understand the security necessities to protect their systems, 
and may affect a large population of users who are using such applications. 
Furthermore, this chapter exposed that despite the existing use of such approaches, 
the popularization and proliferation of security interventions, which alerts users before 
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making their decisions about security risks remain limited in some applications, 
especially in terms of providing adequate security information and guidance to users in 
order to make informed security decisions. 
Additionally, this chapter has provided a broad discussion regarding the problems 
related to security warning messages. Therefore, to address the aforementioned 
challenges, developing an innovative method to raise the security awareness for the 
end users in a timelier manner becomes an imperative issue. One of the promising and 
effective methods to address the warning messages issues is to provide support to 
users while dealing with IT systems in a timely manner. With the use of a 
comprehensible and simple explanation regarding the potential risk. This can be 
achieved by utilising existing security features such as security meters/indicators, and 
in the same time avoiding the provision of complex technical information at the first 
instance in the initial warning that novice users may not comprehend. Furthermore, 
additional access to more information regarding the risk should be by default offered 
to users to acquire further information in the case that the initial warning message is 
perceived as insufficient. This will also help when the users feel that they need more 
information in order to understand the risk. This approach has great potential to act as 
an effective way to ensure that users would not ignore security-warning messages and 
instead act to avoid potential security issues. 
Finally, with current obstacles to effective information security and the use of existing 
security awareness-raising methods, as well as barriers to training and the possibility 
that users over time may forget what they have been trained on, the adoption of a 
targeted security awareness-raising approach to address these issues has become an 
imperative matter.
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Chapter 4 
The Effect of Targeted Security Awareness 
4.1 Introduction 
The human factor is normally described as the weakest part of security systems, and 
users still remain and are long recognized as the weakest link in the information 
security chain (Patrick et al., 2003; Ifinedo, 2014; Kegel, 2015; Tioh et al., 2017). 
However, in many cases they are ill-positioned to follow good practice and make the 
necessary decisions. Part of the reason here is that, even if security awareness, 
training and/or education have been provided, some of the key points may have been 
forgotten by the time that users find themselves facing security-related decisions. A 
potential solution in this context is to ensure that security guidance and feedback is 
available at the point of need, providing effective information to help users to make the 
right decision at the right time and avoid security risks. 
This chapter examines the issue of targeted security awareness raising and presents 
the results of an experimental study conducted to test the effectiveness of the approach. 
This experiment was based around the scenario of connecting to Wi-Fi networks, to 
determine whether participants could make informed and correct decisions about 
which networks were safe to connect to. Four alternative interfaces were tested 
(ranging from a version that mimicked the standard Windows Wi-Fi network selection 
interface, to versions with security ratings and additional guidance). The aim of the 
experiment was to determine the extent to which providing such information could 
affect user decisions when presented with a range of networks to connect to, and help 
to move them more effectively in the direction of security. The findings revealed that, 
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while users exhibited far from perfect behaviour in terms of selecting more secure 
networks in preference to less protected ones, there was a tangible improvement 
amongst the users that had been exposed to the interfaces that offered and promoted 
more security-related information. In common with findings from other security contexts, 
these results suggest that users’ security behaviours can be positively influenced 
purely through the provision of additional information, enabling them to make better 
choices even if the system does not provide any further means of enforcement. 
4.2 Security Threats Inherent in Insecure Wi-Fi Networks 
Wi-Fi is known for being fast, convenient and reliable; on the other hand, free Wi-Fi 
hotspots are increasingly seen as an IT security risk. In an era where data breaches 
make the main news almost daily, it would be justified for businesses to place a firm 
restriction to access their systems from the outside world. However, it is also apparent 
that modern businesses demands are often prioritized over security. For such 
businesses, the benefit of having their employees able to access email and corporate 
data on the move far outweighs possible IT security risks. As a result, just over half 
(51%) of mobile users stated that their companies allow them to use personal devices 
to access corporate data via public Wi-Fi hotspots (iPass, 2016a). 
For the most part, people make security decisions and choices daily without fully 
considering their security implications. Organisations depend on their staff to frequently 
make security decisions when carrying out different tasks, both whilst in the workplace 
and on the move. An apparent example is the use of insecure public Wi-Fi hotspots to 
work remotely (for business purposes). It is believed that more than one billion workers 
are working remotely and this constitutes more than a third of the total workforce 
worldwide. The choice of using an insecure wireless network, when reliable networks 
or 3G/4G networks are unavailable, can become problematic as users use many 
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devices (perhaps their own devices) to access and potentially transfer sensitive 
information. When faced with time pressure, staff members tend to make hasty 
decisions that leads them to access unknown Wi-Fi hotspots. This behaviour poses a 
serious risk to the security of the device and its data, as these Wi-Fi hotspots provide 
many opportunities for cyber-attacks, including spoofing and man in the middle attacks. 
There are many techniques of manipulating and influencing wireless network 
selections, some of which are as simple as changing the name of the network. Helping 
users to choose networks that are safe and appropriate for their tasks, whether on 
personal or company-owned devices, is imperative to maintain a high standard of 
security. Indeed, choosing a secure and trustworthy Wi-Fi connection is one of the top 
10 security behaviours that are encouraged on sites like www.staysafeonline.org 
(Turland et al, 2015). Nonetheless, many studies have found in general that users are 
impetuous about security risks related to the use of Wi-Fi hotspots (F-Secure, 2014). 
This has increased the need for further investigation of the attitudes of Wi-Fi users 
towards security risks related to the use of unknown Wi-Fi networks (in particular, the 
use of unknown Wi-Fi networks within public areas). To further evidence the problems, 
Table 7 gathers findings from various sources to demonstrate the tendencies of users 
on connecting to insecure Wi-Fi and accessing sensitive information. 
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Table 7: Evidence of users’ trends towards using insecure Wi-Fi networks 
Source Key findings 
(Kaspersky 
Lab, 2016) 
 71% of the surveyed users use insecure public Wi-Fi. 
  15% of questioned consumers stated that they use public Wi-
Fi to shop, bank, or make payments online without additional 
precautions. 
 People are still using their devices without equipping their 
devices with security solution and acting negligently. 
 As a result, 29% have been affected by online threats. 
 Consumers continue engaging with the online world at every 
opportunity, with 42% using free but potentially insecure public 
Wi–Fi, and only 13% using a secure VPN connection. 
 Kaspersky Lab concluded that the figures indicated a lack of 
security awareness among consumers in this regard. This 
places their valuable data at risk. Consumers share data 
insecurely, conduct important transactions on public Wi-Fi and 
treat their passwords without additional precautions. In 
addition, while these habits continue, only 60% of consumers 
protect themselves with a security solution on every device they 
own. 
(iPass, 2016a) 
 The report highlights that although mobile data services are 
available to users on the move, these services still cannot 
surpass the quality that the Wi-Fi hotspots provide in terms of 
speed, cost, convenience and performance. 
 63% of respondents will choose a Wi-Fi hotspot over mobile 
data services. 
  Worryingly, employees know the security risks of public Wi-Fi; 
nevertheless, many are still used it anyway. 
 66% of respondents stated they were concerned about the 
security of Wi-Fi hotspots. However, only 28% of respondents 
said they use a VPN all the time, and more than a third 38% 
never do. 
 The iPass report concluded that mobile users expect to remain 
connected and productive always working as they see fit, not 
based on the type of the communication method used to 
connect to the Internet. 
 Mobile users do not want to waste their mobile data on draining 
business/personal applications or use slower connectivity 
options which may not provide the reliability and performance 
they require. They want to use Wi-Fi first. 
(iPass, 2016b) 
 94% of organisations see public Wi-Fi as a threat. In the 
meantime, 88% of organisations admitted that they find it 
difficult to consistently implement a safe mobile usage policy. 
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 Businesses are struggling to create security policies that 
provide mobile users with the flexibility they demand. 
 The report also highlights that many employees still choose 
high-risk connectivity options despite knowing the potential 
security risks. 
 66% of mobile users said they were worried about data security 
when using free public Wi-Fi hotspots, yet 42% still access 
company data using public Wi-Fi hotspots. 
(F-Secure, 
2014) 
An independent investigation was conducted by the Cyber Security 
Research Institute and the German penetration testing company 
SySS on behalf of F-Secure company. 
 It found hundreds of people are regularly logging onto a 
"trojanized free Wi-Fi hotspot service that was created to carry 
out their experiment. 
 The research also revealed the presence of significant 
weakness in the Wi-Fi system which allows the usernames and 
passwords for users who use email accounts on the POP3 
protocol which is widely used to be easily discovered when 
users send emails through Wi-Fi hotspots. This vulnerability 
can be exploited by any criminal offering and controlling a Wi-
Fi hotspot to gather account information that would allow them 
to impersonate the user through their email account. 
 The experiment highlighted that people pay no attention to 
computer security when they are on the move. 
While using unknown Wi-Fi networks, users should be made aware of the security risks 
that are associated with the use of such networks and its security policies. Users’ 
awareness should be raised before they get access to these networks. This ought to 
be done at the operating system level or the operator of the network should offer this 
opportunity before the users proceed to join the network. This perhaps will help users 
to know the security risks and hence have their chance to better decide whether to use 
or abstain from the offered Wi-Fi connection. 
There is a lack of investigation into the existing systems in terms of whether the users 
are getting best support and advice before they get connected to unknown Wi-Fi 
hotspots. In response to these issues and to achieve a comprehensive study, an 
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experiment has been conducted to assess users’ attitudes towards the use of unknown 
Wi-Fi networks in a public environment using four different user interfaces. 
The findings of the research will enable the identification of the level of guidance that 
is required to help Wi-Fi users when performing routine online tasks without unduly 
interrupting or overloading them with vast amounts of information. 
4.3 The Limitations of End-User Recommendations of Selecting Wi-Fi Network 
Most existing platforms seem to not provide adequate security recommendations and 
security guidelines that nudge users towards selecting appropriate Wi-Fi hotspots 
based on their need and to mitigate user’s security risks of connecting to insecure Wi-
Fi hotspots. The only available option that the existing platforms are providing to users 
are the padlocks, which indicates that the wireless network (Wi-Fi hotspot) is protected 
with a password. 
Apple’s iOS is beginning to take steps in this direction. However, the currently used 
feature does not seem as adequate. When the user is exploring available Wi-Fi 
networks that have no protection, a text appears beneath the network name (i.e. 
security recommendation), where the user can then click on more information, and then 
a new window appears providing the following message “Unsecured Network Open 
networks provide no security and expose all network traffic. If this is your network, 
configure the router to use WPA2 personal (AES) security type.” In addition, a link is 
provided which leads to a new page offering support from Apple. This page however is 
not quite what users are expecting, as it is firstly, titled “Recommended settings for Wi-
Fi routers and access points” and secondly, the target audience for this page is clearly 
inconsistent with the typical users’ scenario “this article is for network administrators 
and others who manage their own networks”. 
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Providing these tips would probably help in mitigating users behaviours that might put 
their data and devices at risk by connecting to insecure Wi-Fi networks rather than 
telling them the settings of wireless networks which they have no control of which are 
probably in public areas. The screenshots in Figure 27 illustrate the message that users 
get when exploring Wi-Fi hotspots and the message they get when trying to connect to 
any insecure Wi-Fi network using Apple iOS. 
 
Figure 27: Selecting Wi-Fi network using Apple iOS 
In comparison, the Android platform has taken no concrete steps in this direction as 
shown in the screenshots illustrated in Figure 28. The only message that told the user 
about the level of security was a subtitle with “None” beneath, which probably would 
not be adequate to provide an answer for the user of why the security of this Wi-Fi 
network is “None”. Furthermore, it does not provide security guidelines and advice of 
what sort of activities that users can do if they are connected to the Internet using this 
Wi-Fi network. 
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Additional example is that when a user is trying to look up for available wireless 
networks within the Microsoft Windows 7 platform a window will appear as per the 
screenshot shown in Figure 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although this window is to inform the users about the available Wi-Fi networks within 
their area alongside with their signal strength and the name of these Wi-Fi networks, 
users can also get additional information about these available wireless networks by 
Figure 28: Selecting Wi-Fi network using Android mobile operating system 
Figure 29: Selecting Wi-Fi network using Microsoft Windows 7 
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pointing the pointer at the name of any of these networks. However, this information 
may not be sufficient in terms of providing sufficient security guidance to users to 
whether these networks trustworthy or to give them the chance to better decide or 
abstain from these Wi-Fi hotspots. Users perhaps would not understand abbreviations 
and technical terms such as “Security Type: WPA2/ WPA2-PSK”, what users need at 
this point is some advice like whether these networks are trustworthy or not, whether 
to use any of these networks or not and perhaps what can the network be used for. 
Additional information that have the potential to support the users decision may include 
some characteristics of these networks, such as informing the user whether the 
network is using or providing encryption protocols or if it is not using them at all, also 
giving users more advice and security guidance of the sort of activities that they can 
carry out, or the sort of activities they should not carry out based on the characteristics 
of these networks and the security considerations if the user connect to it.  This type of 
security advice may have the potential to be very useful in supporting the user’s 
decisions at the point when needed (i.e. in making a decision whether to use the Wi-Fi 
or not) and consequently nudging them towards better security decisions. 
4.4 An Experimental Trial of Alternative Wi-Fi Selection Interfaces 
The main aim of this research work is to utilise different user interfaces of Wi-Fi 
networks in order to evaluate their usability and the security, to overcome some of the 
information limitations presented by existing user interfaces. The purpose of the user 
trials is to investigate the usability, security, and clarity of different user interfaces and 
to determine whether they have an effect upon user decisions. 
4.4.1 Experimental Methodology 
Four prototypes were developed, an existing interface used in MS Windows platforms; 
an improved user interface with warning message; and an advanced interface with a 
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security meter (Design 1) and (Design 2), these were developed to simulate the user 
interface of Wi-Fi networks in order to address the main objectives of the proposed 
experiment. 
The aim of this research experiment was to identify whether users will connect or will 
continue to connect to unknown Wi-Fi networks in public areas if they have been 
provided with adequate security information about the available networks. 
All interfaces contained two known Wi-Fi networks to participants namely the eduroam 
and withPlymouth, which users normally expect to see during their Wi-Fi interactions 
on the university campus, and two unknown Wi-Fi networks namely BellaCostaCafe 
and eduroamhighspeed. Eduroamhighspeed was named purposely to test if this name 
will affect participants’ selection as to whether they will be attracted to the name as it 
implies a high speed network by including the wording of a high-speed with the 
existence of the known and trustworthy network eduroam. BellaCostaCafe was named 
to test if users will recognise that this name is not known to them within the university 
campus environment and hence they would abstain from connecting to it. 
The design of the experiment was to examine whether users would connect or continue 
to connect to unknown Wi-Fi networks if they have been provided adequate security 
information about the presented Wi-Fi networks. To achieve this, the first and second 
interfaces were designed to analyse whether the user is tempted to connect to 
unknown Wi-Fi network in case a trustworthy network would be inaccessible. In 
contrast, the third and fourth interfaces present a padlock, on the trustworthy network, 
to indicate that an authentication is required. However, when clicked it connects the 
user without requiring authentication. This was to investigate whether users would 
recognise this flaw on the network and its potential threat. 
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The participants were divided randomly into four groups and asked to try one of the 
four interfaces, to choose an appropriate Wi-Fi network and to perform the task that 
was stated in the following given scenario: 
“Experiment Scenario 
Consider yourself at the university campus, and you are connecting to a Wi-Fi 
hotspot to browse the Internet in order to use applications such as emails, online 
banking, and social networking services. 
You are requested to use the wireless network selection interface to choose an 
appropriate network from which to conduct these activities. 
Please note that you only need to select and connect to an appropriate network; 
you will not actually be required to send emails, or perform any of the other tasks 
mentioned above. 
You will then be asked to comment upon the usefulness or suitability of the 
interface that was used.” 
The study involved 100 participants who were 18 years of age and older, divided 
randomly into four groups (25 participants for each interface), with all data and 
responses treated anonymously. The users were involved in only one session of the 
study. This means trying only one of the proposed four interfaces for approximately 15 
minutes. 
The experiment procedure required participants to use the prototype software that 
simulated the process of viewing available Wi-Fi networks and asked them to connect 
to the most appropriate network in a given scenario as mentioned earlier. 
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After completing the session, users were also asked to fill out an online survey that 
took approximately 15 minutes. The survey was used to investigate users’ acceptance 
of the developed interfaces from both the aspect of security and usability. 
All users’ interactions in the four groups with the four interfaces were captured and 
stored on the computer that was used for the experiment to collect the results for later 
analysis and to examine if the improvements of the interface were helpful in making 
users change their behaviour of connecting to unknown Wi-Fi networks in a public 
environment. In addition, there was a screen recording for the user interaction with the 
interfaces to assist in analysis and revision at later stages. 
4.4.2 Experimental Prototypes 
The prototypes were implemented as an application to run on the Microsoft Windows 
platform, and the trial design considered four different user interfaces for selecting Wi-
Fi networks. The first interface was designed to simulate the Wi-Fi dialog window that 
is used in the Microsoft Windows platforms, when a user is searching for Wi-Fi 
networks.  Windows 7 operating system was chosen over the later versions of the OS 
because participants were most likely to be familiar with this version on the basis that 
(a), it was the version of the OS used on campus at the time of the study and (b) it was 
the most prevalent version of Windows in general use at the time of the study and 
remains so at the time of writing (Netmarketshare, 2017). 
The screenshots presented in Figure 30 illustrate the designed first interface that was 
used in the experiment. This interface is defined as "Existing interface used in MS 
Windows platforms". 
The second interface was also designed to simulate to the Wi-Fi dialog window that is 
used in the Microsoft Windows platforms. Furthermore, it also has some improvements 
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and changes, which include a dialog window that appears when the users click the 
connect button, as shown in the screenshots below, to alert the users and allow them 
to choose either to “Accept” or “Reject” the connection. It also has the padlocks which 
are no longer used in recent Microsoft Windows platforms to indicate to the user 
whether the network requires a password to access it or not (see the screenshots in 
Figure 31). This interface is defined as "Improved user interface with warning message". 
The third interface was designed differently compared to the previous interfaces, with 
improved information security panels that have security information about the explored 
Wi-Fi network and recommended usage. This interface also had security meter 
indicators for each available Wi-Fi network, which presents the extent of the security 
level that the Wi-Fi network had as illustrated in Figure 32. This interface also had the 
advantage of featuring a “Click for more information” link opposite each security meter. 
When a participant clicked, a dialog window was presented as shown in Figures 33, 
34, 35 and 36 to alert participants and give them more security information about the 
Wi-Fi network that they are exploring and allow them to make their decision based on 
the security information and recommended usage. This interface is defined as 
"Advanced interface with security meter (Design 1)". 
In order to influence the security behaviour of users in terms of making more security-
oriented decisions, four security meter settings were used. The first security level 
(Excellent) was specified with the colour code green, the second (Good) with yellow, 
the third (Fair) with amber and the fourth (Poor) with red. The security panels were also 
designed to have a traffic light design where green was used to indicate that the 
setting(s) are (Enabled) for the security protocols or for the encryption protocols for the 
presented Wi-Fi networks in the interface and red to indicate that the setting(s) are 
(Disabled). The green colour was also used in the start-up time setting to indicate that 
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the Wi-Fi network was in operation for a long time and red was used to indicate that 
the Wi-Fi start-up time is very recent. Moreover, green was also used in the settings of 
previously connected to indicate that the Wi-Fi network has been used previously and 
red to indicate that it has not been used before. Finally, yellow was also used to indicate 
that there was a change in the setting(s) of the presented Wi-Fi network and green to 
indicate that there were no changes. Users also have the feature to hover the pointer 
over the traffic lights to gain more information about the traffic lights by providing a brief 
explanation of why it is yellow, amber, or red. 
The fourth interface (illustrated in Figure 37) was designed to be similar to the third 
interface with the only difference being that users will see the security panels that have 
security information about the explored Wi-Fi network and recommended usage if they 
either clicked on the link “Click for more information” or if they clicked on the button 
“Connect” and in the latter case users would have the choice to either “Accept” or 
“Reject” connecting to the selected network. This will ensure that users have the 
chance to know about the security information and the recommended usage for any 
network they select before they make their decision to gain access. Figures 38, 39, 40 
and 41 illustrates the improved information security panels with two buttons to allow 
the user to either “Accept” or “Reject” connecting to the selected network. This interface 
is defined as "Advanced interface with security meter (Design 2)". 
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Figure 30: Second Wi-Fi interface - Improved interface with a warning message 
Figure 31: First Wi-Fi interface - Simulating existing interface in MS Windows platforms 
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Figure 33: The security panel for the first Wi-Fi network in the third interface 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Third Wi-Fi interface - Advanced interface with security meter (Design 1) 
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Figure 34: The security panel for the second Wi-Fi network in the third interface 
 
 
Figure 35: The security panel for the third Wi-Fi network in the third interface 
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Figure 36: The security panel for the fourth Wi-Fi network in the third interface 
 
 
Figure 37: Fourth Wi-Fi interface - Advanced interface with security meter (Design 2) 
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Figure 38: The security panel for the first Wi-Fi network in the fourth interface 
 
Figure 39: The security panel for the second Wi-Fi network in the fourth interface 
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Figure 40: The security panel for the third Wi-Fi network in the fourth interface 
 
Figure 41: The security panel for the fourth Wi-Fi network in the fourth interface 
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4.4.3 Results 
The participants’ selection choices of the Wi-Fi networks of the four interfaces are 
presented in Figure 42. For the first interface, given that most participants are students 
and that the experiment was carried out within the university campus, it is not surprising 
that 60% of them selected the eduroam Wi-Fi as their first choice, as this is the network 
managed by the university. 
Despite being unknown, 8% of the participants chose BellaCostaCafe after being 
unable to connect to eduroam with their credentials. 
Because of its name, it was expected that the withPlymouth network would be within 
the main selection of the participants. The network is also managed by the university; 
however, it is intended for guests and therefore it only provides four hours of connection 
each day at no cost or authentication. It must also be noted that this connection does 
not use any encryption protocols, making it less secure than eduroam. Nevertheless, 
20% of the participants chose this network as their first choice, whereas 24% of them 
selected this network after being unable to connect to eduroam. 
Despite being unknown to participants and not within the networks managed by the 
university, the eduroamhighspeed network attracted 16% of the participants as their 
first choice and 28% of the participants as their second choice. The implied speed of 
the network clearly measured as a great factor on the influence of the selection, as 
participants chose this network on the basis that it is a high-speed connection, due to 
its nomenclature. 
On the second interface, 76% of the participants selected the eduroam network as their 
first choice for the same reasons described previously. In contrast to the first interface, 
the warning message seems to make participants hesitant on connecting, as only 4% 
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of them chose the BellaCostaCafe as their second choice, compared to the 8% on the 
first interface. From these results, the impact of the design on the decision of the users 
can be recognised, as the warning message made the participants think more before 
selecting the network. Nevertheless, 4% of the participants chose this network as their 
third and fourth choice, raising some concerns on a small portion of the participants not 
paying enough attention to the warning message. 
 
Figure 42: User’s Wi-Fi network selections for the four interfaces 
Likewise, 8% of the participants chose the withPlymouth network as their first choice 
and 52% selected as their second choice after being unable to connect to eduroam. As 
mentioned earlier, this network is within the main selections, as it is known to most of 
the participants. 
Similar to the BellaCostaCaffe network, the eduroamhighspeed selection also showed 
signs of improvement, as only 8% of participants chose it as their first choice, as 
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opposed to 16% on the first interface. Despite this, 20% chose it as their second choice 
and third choice, compared to 28% and 16% on the first interface respectively, raising 
concerns over the name high speed influencing the choice of the user. 
With regards to the third interface, 92% of the participants chose eduroam as their main 
choice. This is not surprising, as the full green security meter and the encouraging 
security information motivated participants to choose this network. On the other hand, 
this raises some concerns as the interface was designed to allow access without any 
authentication. The padlock was only to demonstrate that the network is secured, and 
to test whether users would recognize this flaw and the abnormal behaviour. 
Surprisingly, only one user detected this, whereas others did not recognize the flaw 
and continued to connect without any perception. 
Regarding the BellaCostaCafe, the security meter and the advice message influenced 
the users on deciding to connect to the network and, as a result, only 4% made it their 
first and second choice equally. The impact of the security meter along with the security 
advice proves to be a better approach, as participants hesitate more to connect to 
unknown networks although the security meter shows that this network is the second-
best network in terms of its security compared to the other presented networks, as 
opposed to the previous interfaces. 
The withPlymouth network attracted 4% of the users to choose it as their first choice, 
8% as their second choice, and 4% as the third choice. Alarmingly, this demonstrates 
that a small portion of participants trust the network by the name and therefore ignore 
the security warnings, despite being told that the connection is insecure. Looking at the 
results of eduroamhighspeed, none of the participants chose it as their first, third or 
fourth selection and only 4% selected it as their second choice. Although it highlights 
a big improvement compared to the previous interfaces, there are still reasons for 
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concern, as some users still selected it as one of their choices, despite being an 
unknown network and alarms being raised regarding its poor security. 
For the fourth interface, 76% of the participants chose eduroam as their main choice 
compared to 92% in the third interface. Although the design of the fourth interface is 
quite similar to third interface, there were some users who selected withPlymouth over 
eduroam because it has a better signal taken into account that they are both trustworthy 
because participants are familiar with both networks. 
With regards to the BellaCostaCafe Wi-Fi network, none of the participants selected 
this network although the security meter shows that this network is the second best 
network in terms of its security features based on the security information provided in 
the security information panel. This demonstrates that some participants tend to make 
their choices based on the familiarity of the network name but not of the security 
features the network. 
In addition, 24% of the users made the withPlymouth network their first choice, whereas 
4% made it their second. None chose it as their third or fourth selections. This shows 
a significant improvement over the previous interfaces, nevertheless, there is still some 
reason for concern, as many users still chose this network despite the security 
warnings, since they are familiar with the network name. 
Regarding the eduroamhighspeed Wi-Fi network, there were a few participants who 
selected this network as their third choice and none of the participants chose this 
network as their first, second or fourth choice. Although this is a great improvement 
compared to what has been seen in the first and the second interfaces, it arguably 
shows that some people will ignore whatever advice is given. 
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4.4.4 Discussion and Findings 
From the results described above, it was perceived that the name of the network has 
a significant impact on the participants when choosing an appropriate network to 
access the Internet within a known environment like the university campus. Results 
obtained from the experiment revealed that in the absence of security information, 
users are very prone to connecting to names that look like a known name. 
As presented in Figure 42, a considerable number of the participants in the first, second, 
third and fourth interfaces have chosen to connect to the eduroam Wi-Fi network as 
their first choice. This was driven by the recognition of the Wi-Fi network, as it is the 
mainly used Wi-Fi network in the university campus. When participants were asked 
what their reasons were for choosing the eduroam as their first choice, their answers 
were because they are familiar with the name within the university campus and 
considering the network name, it indicates that it is run and managed by the university 
and therefore it is trustworthy. It seems that the users greatly trust the location as an 
assumption that there is a correlation between the network name and location. For 
example, students and staff within an academic environment have become 
accustomed to the fact that the eduroam Wi-Fi network is run and managed by the 
university and hence it is a trustworthy network. However, it is well known that the 
network name can be modified to any name or spoofed which indicates the confidence 
of the users in the network name could be interpreted as a lack of knowledge of this 
security issue. 
This reflects the lack of security awareness for the participants regarding the possibility 
of falling victim of a spoofed network. In a wider setting, in places such as shops and 
shopping malls, restaurants and cafes, where the user will focus only to get access to 
a free Wi-Fi and will be looking to any network that has partly or totally the name of the 
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place within the users range like the name of a shop, restaurant or cafe, this increases 
the possibility of the users falling victim to deception and getting access to spoofed Wi-
Fi networks. 
In addition, it appears that claimed signal strength is also a persuading factor, 
especially if the Wi-Fi network name includes an indication that it is a high-speed Wi-
Fi network. This explains the selection of 16%, 28% and 16% of the participants to 
eduroamhighspeed network, who tried the first interface as their first, second and third 
choice respectively. Similarly, with the second interface 8%, 20% and 20% of the 
participants who tried the second interface choose this Wi-Fi network as their first, 
second and third choice respectively. The large proportion of the participants who have 
selected the eduroamhighspeed network, as seen in the first and second interfaces, 
reflects the extent of the danger which could be exposed to these users because of 
their lack of knowledge in the associated risks of unknown Wi-Fi networks, and the 
extent of the damage that they may be subjected to when connecting to fraudulent Wi-
Fi networks. More importantly, this proves that the first and the second interfaces have 
limited capabilities in providing the required security guidance and feedback to 
participants to allow them to choose the most appropriate Wi-Fi network. 
However, as few as 4% participants chose the eduroamhighspeed Wi-Fi network as 
their second choice with the third interface and same chose this Wi-Fi network as their 
third choice with the fourth interface which proves that the advanced interfaces with 
security meter (Design 1 and 2) have educated users and made them aware of the 
security risks associated with use of this unknown Wi-Fi network. This proves that 
users are influenced if suitable security guidance and visible feedback is provided at 
the point of need to help the users to make the right decision at the right time to avoid 
security risks associated with risks of using unknown Wi-Fi networks. 
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This has also highlighted the fact that some participants access Wi-Fi networks that 
provide greater speed rather than focusing on the security aspects of the Wi-Fi 
networks. This demonstrates that the need for internet speed, in the eyes of a few 
participants, sometimes outweighs the security concerns. 
Moreover, it was also observed during the experiment that the participants interacted 
with the second interface with disinterest when the warning message popped up, as 
some of them read the warning message without giving it enough consideration and 
then clicked either the “Accept” or the “Reject” button, while others dealt with it quickly 
without reading its content or without paying any attention to the message. This 
perhaps is due to the fact that it was the first time participants perceived such a warning 
message when they tried to connect to Wi-Fi network using the MS Windows platform. 
It was also perceived during the experiment that since it is often difficult for users who 
have a limited knowledge of computer systems to understand the security issues and 
concerns of Wi-Fi networks, most users will simply connect to the network with the 
greatest signal or the greatest speed and will not look into the security details. 
Additionally, participants’ interactions with the four interfaces showed that they intend 
to connect to the next best network in terms of speed or best signal if they could not 
access the more secure one. For example, one of the participants commented: “I 
wasn't able to connect to the preferred secure network, so I connected to the network 
with the best signal that was unsecured”. 
The new design of the interfaces with the security meter and the information security 
panels that provides information and recommended usage for the users about the Wi-
Fi networks, has proven to be a promising approach in providing adequate information 
for the users before they make their decision, educate and make them aware of the 
security implications before connecting to insecure Wi-Fi hotspots in public areas. Only 
Chapter 4 — The Effect of Targeted Security Awareness  
120 | P a g e  
 
4% of the participants who tried the third interface selected the network that has poor 
security “eduroamhighspeed” as their second choice and only 4% of the participants 
who tried the fourth interface selected this network as their third choice. Participants 
made their decision on the basis that it is a high-speed Wi-Fi network as its name 
implies. 
Moreover, it should also be mentioned that the name of the network is still a vital fact 
that keeps influencing the participants when selecting the network especially if the 
name of the network is known to the users and is seen in the environment they are 
familiar with. This is obtained from the results of the third and the fourth interfaces. For 
example, the network named “withPlymouth” is well-known to the participants within 
the university campus and it has been designed in the experiment to have a fair level 
of security in the third and fourth interfaces, however, 8%, 52%, 4%, 12% of the 
participants who tried the third interface selected this network as their first, second, 
third and fourth choice respectively. Similarly, with the fourth interface, 24%, 4% of the 
participants who tried the fourth interface selected this network as their first and second 
choice respectively. 
4.4.5 Post-Experiment Participant Feedback 
To evaluate the four tested interfaces in the experiment, it was essential to create four 
questionnaires. However, there are some questions, which apply to the full population 
of participants and other questions vary according to the specific subgroups from the 
variants of the trials. Therefore, some of the questions are designed to conform to the 
interface used. For example, the first interface is designed to simulate the interface 
used in Microsoft Windows 7 platform. The second interface is designed to include 
some of the differences and improvements, such as, when the user clicks the 
“Connect” button a warning message will be raised which tells the user that “The 
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information sent over this network might be visible to others” and allows the user to 
either “Accept” or “Reject” the connection based on this message. The third interface, 
which is the most different and improved in terms of containing a security meter 
indicator that shows the extent of the Wi-Fi network security and also gives the user a 
chance to click on a link to acquire more information to see the “Security information” 
and “The recommended usage” of the selected Wi-Fi network and the fourth interface 
which is designed similar to the third interface with the only diverse that users will see 
the security panels if they either clicked on the link “Click for more information” or if 
they clicked on the button “Connect” and in the latter case users would have the choice 
to either “Accept” or “Reject” to connect to the selected network. To properly analyse 
the results, participants were divided randomly into four groups, group (A) which have 
used the Existing interface in MS windows 7 platform, group (B), which have used the 
improved user interface with a warning message, group (C); which have used the 
Advanced interface with a security meter (Design 1), and group (D), which have used 
the Advanced interface with a security meter (Design 2). 
4.4.6 Participants Feedback and Analysis 
Our subjects consisted of males and females as Figure 43 shows. The vast majority 
were students from Plymouth University excluding the School of Computing, 
Electronics and Mathematics, as the target was only users with average computer 
skills. 
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Figure 43: Participants gender 
Figure 44 presents the age groups of the participants. The vast majority of population 
of the participants were aged between 18-59 years old. 
 
Figure 44: Age groups of the participants 
Participants were asked whether the instructions for conducting the experiment were 
suitably clear to ensure that the participants understood the experiment and 
participated in the experiment correctly. Figure 45 shows the participants' agreement 
on the clarity of the instructions provided for conducting the experiment. The results 
reveal that a substantial proportion of the participants understood the experiment 
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procedure which demonstrates that the experiment procedures were carried out with 
minimal errors. 
 
Figure 45: Participants agreement of the clarity instruction provided for the experiment 
Moreover, participants were asked to what extent they feel that they followed the 
instructions. Figure 46 shows the extent to which participants followed the instructions 
for the experiment. The results demonstrated that the most of participants followed the 
instructions fully or moderately to conduct the experiment. This can be interpreted as 
a direct result of their understanding of the procedures of the experiment. 
 
Figure 46: The extent of participants following the instructions in the experiment 
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The entire population of the participants were asked regarding the use of Wi-Fi at 
home, public areas and at work. Figure 47 shows the frequency of using Wi-Fi by 
participants at home, public areas and at work. The fact perceived here is that there is 
a considerable proportion of the participants (36%) who are using public Wi-Fi hotspots 
in the public areas on a daily basis, and this reflects the popularity of using Wi-Fi in 
public areas. This is perhaps because of the high demand of accessing the Internet 
and online services while people are on the move. This also reveals that a considerable 
number of the participants are opting for public Wi-Fi as an inexpensive alternative or 
sometimes free connection to 3G or 4G connectivity. The increasing use of Wi-Fi 
hotspots at the expense of wireless networks would further complicate the security 
landscape of mobile IT for businesses and individuals equally. Furthermore, this 
highlights the imperative need to educate and make the users aware of the existing 
security implications of using unknown Wi-Fi hotspots in the public areas that have no 
security features or no protection at all. The results published by (Kaspersky Lab, 2016; 
iPass 2016a and iPass 2016b) show that people use Wi-Fi in public areas without 
proper precautions, increasing the risk of theft of their confidential information by cyber 
attackers. 
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Figure 47: The frequent of using of Wi-Fi at home, public areas and work 
Considering the use of Wi-Fi at different places including home, public areas and at 
work, all participants were asked how frequently they perform a range of tasks and 
activities including checking email, online banking, social networking, bookings, 
buying/selling goods, and other uses. Figure 48 presents the range of tasks and the 
frequency of performing these tasks by the participants using Wi-Fi at home. It is not 
surprising, that almost all the participants would use and trust the connection at home 
because they own the routers that are supplied by ISPs and the Internet connection is 
protected with a password. The Wi-Fi connection at home is protected and equipped 
with security features such as security and encryption protocols to protect customers 
from cyber threats to potentially penetrate customers’ home network. 
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Figure 48: The range of tasks participants perform using Wi-Fi at home 
The results in Figure 49 show that a large number of participants are using the Wi-Fi 
hotspots in the public areas to access their emails, which indicates that participants are 
unaware of the security risks and the security implications that are associated with the 
use of unknown Wi-Fi hotspots in the public areas to access their emails, which mostly 
are not using encryption features leading them vulnerable for interception. This 
emphasizes the need to increase the security awareness of users with respect to 
providing security advice to them regarding the security risks associated with the use 
of Wi-Fi networks in public areas especially unknown ones before they connect to any 
Wi-Fi network in a public area. Particularly, the Wi-Fi networks in public places cannot 
be trusted, in addition to the inability to verify them and users cannot know who 
manages these Wi-Fi networks. 
Similarly, regarding the usage of Wi-Fi in public areas for accessing online banking, it 
is very worrying that relatively large number of the participants stated that they are 
using Wi-Fi at public areas for online banking, which will increase the probability of 
these participants to become victims of spoofed Wi-Fi networks. 
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Figure 49: Type of tasks participants perform using Wi-Fi at public areas 
Figure 50 presents the range of tasks and the frequency of performing these tasks by 
the participants using Wi-Fi at work. As witnessed before, it would not be surprising 
that participants would use and trust the use of Wi-Fi connections at their work place 
since it the Wi-Fi hotspots would be managed by the company they work for. However, 
the security implications would still exist if the Wi-Fi connection is not protected with a 
password and proper precautions should be taken by users if the Wi-Fi connections is 
not protected in their work place. 
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Figure 50: Type of tasks participants perform using Wi-Fi at work 
Moreover, participants were asked if they know the difference between secured and 
insecure Wi-Fi networks as shown in Figure 51. The chart  demonstrates that only 40% 
of the participants stated that they know the difference between secured and insecure 
Wi-Fi networks and the other portion, 61% of the participants, are either uncertain 
about the difference between the secure and insecure Wi-Fi network or have no 
adequate information about the differences between the secured and insecure Wi-Fi 
networks. This large proportion of participants highlight the possibility of a large number 
of users to become victims of spoofed Wi-Fi networks. This increases the importance 
and need to provide adequate security information about the security implication of the 
use insecure Wi-Fi networks to users before they decide to connect to any especially 
if the Wi-Fi network is unknown to them. 
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Figure 51: Participants’ knowledge of the difference between secured and insecure Wi-Fi networks 
Statistics in Figure 52 presents the level of the participants’ awareness of the security 
risks associated with the use of insecure Wi-Fi networks. The results here, 
corresponding to previous findings, demonstrate that 61% of the participants are either 
uncertain about the risks, have no adequate information, or impetuous about security 
risks associated to the use of Wi-Fi networks. This illustrates the imperative need to 
provide a new way to increase the security awareness of users about the security risks 
associated with the use of Wi-Fi networks, especially if it is unknown and specifically if 
it is in public areas. Participants who have tried the second interface (Group B), the 
third interface (Group C), or the fourth interface (Group D) were asked if they think the 
full implementation of the software can be used to facilitate users in choosing the 
appropriately secure Wi-Fi network, as shown in Figure 53. 
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Figure 52: Participants’ awareness of the security risks associated with insecure Wi-Fi networks 
 
Figure 53: Participants agreement with user Wi-Fi network selection in view of full software 
implementation 
In comparison, between the three interfaces, it appears that the third and fourth 
interfaces excel the second interface. Although the participants are not the same, 
presumably the features of the third and the fourth interfaces, such as the security 
meter, the panels with the security information and recommended usage, make the 
difference as more participants agreed on that the full implementation of the software 
can be used to facilitate users in choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network, as 
opposed to the percentage of users that used the second interface. Participants who 
have tried the first interface were not asked this question because the first interface 
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was designed to simulate the existing Wi-Fi that is used in MS Windows platforms and 
has no additional features compared to the other three interfaces. 
Participants were also asked if they considered the security aspects of the Wi-Fi 
network when they made their decision. Results in Figure 54 demonstrates that the 
number of participants who tried the third and the fourth interfaces, who considered the 
security aspects of the Wi-Fi network  when they made their decision, is higher 
compared to number of participants who tried the first and the second interfaces. 
Probably this is due to the fact that the new design of the third and the fourth interfaces 
provided more presentable security information that is adequate, easier to understand 
the key security characteristics of the Wi-Fi networks, compared to the design of the 
first and second interfaces, which consequently helped towards nudging participants 
to consider the security aspects when connecting to Wi-Fi networks. 
 
Figure 54: Participant Wi-Fi network selection considering security aspects 
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whether the network was safe/trustworthy or not. Figure 55 shows the results for each 
group according to the interface they tried. It is not surprising, that most of the 
participants who tried the third and the fourth interfaces stated that they had enough 
information to make a decision, compared to the participants who tried the first and the 
second interfaces. As observed earlier, perhaps this is due to the features that the third 
and the fourth interfaces have such as the security meter and the security panels with 
the security information and recommended usage, which makes the difference clear 
here in terms of participants' satisfaction with the availability of adequate information 
that helped them make their decision. 
 
Figure 55: Participants' opinion on network being safe/trustworthy 
Participants were also asked what are the features they looked at when making their 
decision. This question was structured according to the security features of the 
networks that each interface is presenting to the user when exploring the available Wi-
Fi networks. For example, the first interface is only presenting a pop-up window that 
has a basic information when the user points the pointer at the explored network, 
similar to what is currently used in Microsoft Windows 7 platform. The second interface 
is also being designed similarly. Therefore, Figure 56 is only presenting the results of 
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the participants who tried the first or the second interface. The results show that the 
name of the network was the most important security feature in the view of participants 
who have tried either the first or second interface. As per earlier findings, in the absence 
of the security guidelines and information in the Wi-Fi networks, it is not surprising that 
users will be very inclined to connecting to known names. This also confirms that in the 
absence of sufficient and important security information that is easy to understand, 
participants will rely heavily on the name of the network when choosing instead of 
others, even if this network is less secure or it has no security features that protect user 
data and information. In contrast, there was smaller number of participants who stated 
that they looked at the security feature of using the security protocols and the security 
features of using the encryption protocols. In addition, it is very worrying, that there 
were 16% of the participants who tried the first interface and 20% of the participants 
who tried the second interface, stated that they did not look at any of the security 
features of the Wi-Fi network when they made their decision. This indicates that a 
reasonable portion of users paying no attention to the security at all and perhaps 
unfamiliar with threats posed while on the move. This is a major security challenge and 
an obstacle to using Wi-Fi networks securely for both individuals and companies while 
on the move. 
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Figure 56: Types of the security features participants' looked at when deciding on Wi-Fi networks 
selection (the First or the Second interface) 
Similarly, participants who tried the third and fourth interfaces were also asked what 
are the security features did they looked at when they made their decision. Figure 57 
shows the results. Both interfaces were designed with improved information security 
panels that have security information about available Wi-Fi networks and 
recommended usage. In addition, both interfaces are also having security meters that 
determine the security level for each presented Wi-Fi network within the interface. For 
this reason, the participants who tried these interfaces were asked about additional 
security features as presented to them with the third and the fourth interfaces. In other 
words, in both interfaces, the security panel was designed to display additional security 
information about the explored Wi-Fi network such as the start time of the network and 
whether it has been previously connected. Compared to what is seen in the first and 
third interface regarding the importance of the network name for the participants, the 
network name was less important to participants who tried the third or the fourth 
interface, which indicates that the new design has influenced the users’ perceptions 
when connecting to Wi-Fi networks. In addition, there was a larger number of 
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participants who tried the third and the fourth interface and stated that they looked at 
the security feature of using the security protocols and the security feature of using the 
encryption protocols, compared to what is seen in the first and the second interface. 
This shows that the new design provides improved security information and advice, 
which helps in persuading and encouraging users to look at the important security 
aspects of Wi-Fi networks when selecting Wi-Fi networks. In regard to the security 
feature of whether the network has been connected, over a third of the participants for 
both interfaces indicated that they looked at this feature. This is noticeably indicating 
that participants will appreciate seeing the history of whether the network has been 
previously used or not. Furthermore, this perhaps will nudge users towards thinking 
securely when connecting to a new/unknown network and will consequently make 
them less vulnerable of falling victim to deception, and getting access to spoofed Wi-
Fi networks. Nonetheless, the start time has not been given enough appreciation by 
the participants as a security feature that they should look at. This can be interrelated 
as participants did not experience this feature in all platforms that are accustomed to 
use, whether computers or mobile phones. This also evidences the fact that 
participants do not realize the existence of deceptive Wi-Fi networks or are unaware of 
the potential of falling victims to portable networks that can be easily constructed and 
fully controlled by cybercriminals and deployed in the public areas. This generally 
raises serious concerns about the risks that can be exposed to the users of unknown 
and potentially insecure Wi-Fi networks that are widely spread nowadays in public 
places. 
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Figure 57: Security features reviewed by participants selecting third or the fourth interface 
Figure 58 shows the results of the answers of participants whether the Wi-Fi connection 
they selected was secure or not, according to the interface they tried. Results 
demonstrate that most of the participants who tried the third or the fourth interface were 
quite confident that they know whether the Wi-Fi connection they selected was secure 
or not. In contrast, participants who tried the first or the second interface were less 
confident. This is perhaps due to the security guidelines, the security information 
supported with the security meter that the third and the fourth interface provided to the 
participants, which was simple and easy to understand with less technical terminology 
that most users would not necessarily understand. This perhaps helped the 
participants to comprehend the security level of the networks displayed within the 
interface and increased their confidence in knowing whether the Wi-Fi network they 
selected was secure or not. On the other hand, in the lack of the availability of security 
guidelines and the security information in the first and second interface led to users 
finding it difficult to see whether the Wi-Fi network is secure or not and hence hindrance 
to making a better security driven-decision and what is the kind of activities should they 
use it for if they decide to contact with it. 
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Figure 58: The level of participants' knowledge about Wi-Fi connection security 
All groups of the participants were asked how concerned they are when connecting to 
unsecured Wi-Fi, the results in Figure 59 illustrate that 43% of participants were slightly 
or not at all concerned when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi hotspots. These results 
demonstrate that a relatively substantial number of Wi-Fi hotspot users either pay no 
attention to the security problems associated with using Wi-Fi hotspots in public areas 
or unaware of the existence of these problems. This emphasizes the urgent need to 
deploy solutions that helps in making users aware of the security implications of 
connecting to insecure Wi-Fi hotspots. This can be achieved by developing better 
solutions that provide security information, supported with a recommended usage to 
make users aware of the implications of connecting to insecure Wi-Fi networks, nudge 
users towards security and consequently help them to protect their devices and the 
data stored on their devices while on the move. 
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Figure 59: Particpants’ Level of concern when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi 
All groups of the participants were asked to rank the security features that a user must 
take into account before using Wi-Fi hotspots, based on their point of view. This was 
including the security protocols and encryption protocols, in addition to the network 
name. Figure 60 presents the participants' opinions in this regard. There was just over 
90% of participants who claimed that it is very important or important that network uses 
the security protocols, and more than 80% claimed that it is very important or important 
that the network uses the encryption protocols, while over 55% claimed that the 
network name is very important or important. Results also show that the participants’ 
views on this aspect did not correspond to their interactions with the interfaces during 
the experimental study, especially for the participants who tried the first and the second 
interfaces, where it was observed that most of the participants' choices were influenced 
either by the network name, speed or signal strength. Nevertheless, the percentage of 
those who claimed that the network name is very important or important as a reliable 
security feature for the Wi-Fi network is still very high. This is worrying, as more than 
half of the participants are likely to be victims of a spoofed Wi-Fi network simply due to 
their reliance on the name of the network, where cybercriminals can deploy fake Wi-Fi 
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networks that be very similar or identical to the name of any known network in a known 
location to target users. 
 
Figure 60: Participant importance: Security protocols, Encryption protocols, and the network name 
Due to the substantial difference in the design of the third and fourth interfaces 
compared to the first and second interfaces, the participants who tried the third and 
fourth interfaces were asked about their view of the features that appeared in these 
interfaces, this was including the start time of the network, previously connected, in 
addition to the security level indicator. Figure 61 presents the participants' opinions. 
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Figure 61: Participant importance: network start time, previous connection and security indicator 
With the increase use of various types of meters/indicators in the IT field that are widely 
used to show the strength or risk of something, it is not surprising that over 95% of the 
participants who tried the third or the fourth interface claimed that the security level 
indicator/meter was very important or important. Effortlessly, the indicator/meter will 
attract users' attention and alert them directly to the security level of the network, by 
employing a variety of colour codes that can be easily interpreted. This result also 
highlights that the use of security level meter greatly influences the choices of 
participants who only tried the third or fourth interfaces. In terms of the new design, this 
reinforces the fact that the presence of a security level meter has enhanced the 
selection of participants to the most secure networks in the third and fourth interfaces, 
compared to the choice of participants for the less secure networks in the first and 
second interfaces in the absence of the security meter. In addition, this also 
emphasizes that users will appreciate the presence of the security meter which 
probably will help them to recognize the security levels of the available networks in a 
more appealing manner so they can decide to connect to the most appropriate Wi-Fi 
networks for their daily need when they are on the move. In contrast, there was only 
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50% who claimed that the feature of previously connected it very important or important, 
whereas the start-up time for the network was very much less appreciated by the 
participant, as only 14% of the participants claimed that it was important. 
Figure 62 presents the level of the participants' confidence on connecting to the 
appropriate network for each interface. Due to the design that the third and fourth 
interface is providing, i.e., the visual appearance that can be easily interpreted and 
understood, and simple well-known tools such as the security indicator and colour 
codes, which  demonstrate the security level of the network and employing traffic lights 
to determine the variations in the network characteristics status to reveal the relevant 
factors utilised to convey the relevant security information to the users in an easily 
perceived manner, supported with definite security guidelines with a recommended 
usage, it is not surprising that almost all the participants of the third and the fourth 
interface stated they are confident that they have connected to the appropriate network. 
In contrast, the absence of an acceptable visual design, which does not explain the 
security level of the network in a good way, nor provides a visualization that can be 
easily interpreted and understood, it is not likely that users would be confident that they 
connected to an appropriate network. One of the apparent examples in this regard is 
the use of a pop-up window currently used in Microsoft Windows 7 when users are 
exploring the available Wi-Fi networks. The pop-up window is visible only for a few 
seconds and then disappears, which probably would not be sufficient to convey the 
security message to users about the security level of the Wi-Fi network and will not be 
enough to provide security guidelines to help users to understand the security level of 
the Wi-Fi network and then make the appropriate security decision. 
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Figure 62: Participants' confidence about connecting to the appropriate network 
Figure 63 shows the participants' view on whether they think the usability aspect can 
be improved in the interface they tried. Although the sample involved only users with 
average computer skills, who perhaps have no solid background to criticize software 
or computer interfaces in terms of the design, nevertheless their point of view should 
be considered as the sample of the study and because they are the most representative 
sample of the knowledge level for the largest number of computer users. Participants 
who tried the third or fourth interface showed their satisfaction with the usability of these 
interfaces, with only 16% of the participants of the third interface believing that the 
usability aspect of this interface can be improved, and only 8% of those who tried the 
fourth interface. In the comparison, participants of the first and the second interfaces 
were less optimistic in this regard, with 24 % of the participants who tried the first 
interface believing that the usability aspect of this interface can be improved, and the 
same percentage of the participants who tried the second interface. This view 
conceivably explains the participants' satisfaction with the security information and 
advice provided to them in the third and the fourth interfaces, and the dissatisfaction 
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with the security information and advice provided to the participants who tried the first 
and second interfaces. 
 
Figure 63: The participants' view on usability aspect of tried interface 
Again, the results presented in Figure 64 suggests that the third and the fourth 
interfaces excel the first and the second interfaces in this regard, where just over three-
quarters of the participants of the third interface claimed that they are either completely 
or very satisfied with the supported information about the presented networks, and over 
90% of the participants of the fourth interface claimed so. In comparison, there were 
just over two-thirds of the participants of the first interface claimed that they are either 
completely or very satisfied with the supporting information about the presented 
networks and just over half of the participants of the second interface claimed so. 
Results suggested undoubtedly that there is advantage of using the security control 
panel and the security meter that is used in the new design for the third and the fourth 
interfaces, and that the third and the fourth interfaces are performing much better in 
satisfying the users by providing the required security information and provide a better 
support for the participants, compared to the design of the first and the third interfaces. 
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Linking this result to the previous results, it is undoubtedly that the new design has 
helped the participants of the third and the fourth interfaces in a simple manner without 
information overload of technical terminology to make appropriate security decisions 
when connecting to Wi-Fi networks. 
 
Figure 64: Participants' satisfaction: supporting information about the presented networks 
Participants were asked after their experience with the interface they tried how likely 
their behaviour online would be changed depending on whether the Wi-Fi connection 
is secure or not. Figure 65 presents the participants' opinions for each interface in this 
regard. 
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Figure 65: Post-experiment Views: Security consideration in selecting Wi-Fi 
In general, one of the main motives of this experiment was to highlight the lack of 
adequate security information aiding in making appropriate security decisions and 
reducing end-user security compromises in different scenarios. The problem of 
connecting to insecure public Wi-Fi networks that are wide speared in public places 
was an example of such scenarios. In particular, the various interfaces and surveys 
have been introduced to appreciate whether this will make users aware of the issue 
and to educate them about the problem. Moreover, this was also to increase their 
awareness in this regard and to see if the users will change their behaviour towards 
the security related issues in general and towards connecting to insecure and unknown 
Wi-Fi hotspots after the experiment. The following section is presenting the 
participants' comments for each interface on whether on whether they will change their 
behaviour after their experience or not. 
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Comments of the participants who tried the first interface: 
1. I am cautious already with regards to using public networks. But certainly I will think 
more about the network I am connecting to. I believe the main problem would be 
that the general public are naive or just uneducated on the subject. It is largely the 
younger generation who take an interest into the internet and would have some 
knowledge about the type of networks they are connecting to. 
2. I already don't use online banking services or payment while on an unknown public 
network. 
3. If I needed to access something urgently (e.g. banking) then I would take the risk, 
however I would attempt to not do it so regularly. 
4. If it is secure, I will do all tasks that I need to, however if insecure I will limit using 
things that involve money and confidential information. 
5. It is something I haven't given much thought to it before, but thinking it through whilst 
completing this survey has made me consider there could be some risks. 
6. If you require Wi-Fi to complete a task, you'll still connect to an unsecure Wi-Fi if a 
secure network isn't available. 
7. Has made me think a little bit more about what it could do when I connect to 
unsecure networks, I would like to know the risks as they aren't clear. I think I might 
be a bit more reserved in the future when connecting to open Wi-Fi systems such 
as in shopping centres etc. 
8. I'm already quite aware of internet security and rarely use Wi-Fi hot spots. 
9. I'm generally cautious about unsecured Wi-Fi anyway. 
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10. When out and about, and I see a network I will be more cautious when connecting. 
I only use public networks for google searches or google maps. However even then 
there is a risk that when I have connected they could give me Malware etc. 
11. I believe that I already have security measures in place i.e. using my own networks 
for banking and anything where I need to input information that could be stolen. 
12. I already follow quite good security procedures when I use the internet. 
Comments of the participants who tried the second interface: 
1. It may make me think a bit more before just logging on. 
2. I will still act the same as before as it is quicker and easier to use the Wi-Fi that 
works instead of the secure Wi-Fi which I don’t actually understand. 
3. More likely to check to see if the network is secure. 
4. I should take more care when selecting a Wi-Fi connection. 
5. I feel that I am already fairly careful when connecting to unsecured networks. 
6. Will be more careful to check that my connection is secure. 
7. I think I will actually look more closely at the details of each network to decide which 
would be the most appropriate and safest. 
8. I may be more concerned when choosing a Wi-Fi network from now on. 
9. Making you choose a network and then questioning you on your choice has made 
me think about what information is being shared over that network, but as I don't 
know the full extent of data sharing and the consequences of connecting to a 
network that is not secure I will probably still use unsecure networks more than I 
probably should. 
10. I need to be more aware of what Wi-Fi network I choose to connect to. 
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11. I will be more aware of connecting to networks - not just choosing any old network. 
12. I will look up what is an unsecured network so that I am more informed. 
13. I would always choose the secure network first, however now I would also consider 
exactly what about the network is secure e.g. security and encryption. I am also 
likely to go away and find out more about secure networks and what information 
can be accessed from secure network. 
Comments of the participants who tried the third interface: 
1. I will definitely pay more attention to the security level. I was not aware of all the 
features previously that need to be taken into account while connecting to Wi-Fi 
hotspots. 
2. I am generally cautious but this will make me look at bit harder at hotspots in 
particular. 
3. Might double check rather than just connect. 
4. I’m usually trying to keep an eye open to what I connect, so I don't think there's 
much to change. 
5. I was cautious before, however, it has shown me how certain Wi-Fi networks may 
pose a threat to my personal information. 
6. I would try and minimise the amount of detail I entered during that period when 
connected to an unsecure network. 
7. I think I will be more aware of what I am connecting too. I never really thought before 
if a connection was secure before, but I think I will now. 
8. Security was the main feature I was looking for and will be more likely to check 
security details of future connections. 
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9. I am not sure how I would apply the information given to me in the experience today 
to my real online activities. 
10. I already know some of the risks of using an unsecured network. 
Comments of the participants who tried the fourth interface: 
1. I will most likely check to see if the Wi-Fi is secure next time I connect. 
2. I am familiar with Wi-Fi security, however, this has reminded me that I should check 
more often than just connecting. 
3. I would be more careful and wary when connecting to Wi-Fi networks, and not 
connect with the first Wi-Fi network I see. I would assess the Wi-Fi network based 
on their security level. 
4. I think this will now make me check whether the Wi-Fi I connect to is secure or not. 
5. I would be slightly more aware of it, but I don’t think it will make a lot of difference 
in which network I select. 
6. I think I'm likely to check security of the Wi-Fi before just connecting, maybe even 
encryptions. 
7. I believe the knowledge of whether a connection is secure or not would influence 
the way I would use that connection or whether I would even use it at all. 
8. As I already used to do what was recommended. 
9. It would make too much of a difference as I can usually gauge the security level of 
a Wi-Fi connection. But the information did explain the risks and what each 
connection should be used for. 
Although the answers of the participants show no tangible difference between the 
interfaces in this regard, the comments of the participants showed that make users 
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aware of whether the Wi-Fi network is secure or not in a more apparent manner that 
can be easily comprehended would make a difference in the eyes of the users and 
nudge them towards changing their behaviour when connecting to unknown and 
potentially insecure Wi-Fi networks in public areas. 
Participants were also asked whether the system has the functions and capabilities 
that they expect it to have. Figure 66 presents the results for this question for each 
interface. it could be argued that undoubtedly, the participants of the third and fourth 
interfaces had and benefited from the opportunity to compare the new design of these 
interfaces with the interface currently used in the Microsoft Windows 7 platform and 
thus, had the opportunity to understand the differences and improvements introduced 
to the new interfaces and were able to distinguish and became aware of the differences 
between the two designs. Therefore, on this basis, they built their view that the system 
they tried has the functions and capabilities that they expect it to have. On the other 
hand, however, it can also be explained that a high proportion of participants of the first 
interface as just over 90% and two-thirds of the second interface stated that the system 
has the functions and capabilities that they expect to have, despite the shortcomings 
that the currently used interface in Microsoft Windows 7 platform has, as discussed in 
the previous sections. This is probably due to the fact that the participants of the first 
and the second interfaces did not have the opportunity to see the new design and 
hence compared with the old design as the participants of the third and the fourth 
interfaces had, therefore their view here would not reflect the accurate state of the 
current design in which they were able to compare two different designs and the 
improvements in the new interfaces. 
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Figure 66: Post-experiment Views: Expected system functionalities & capabilities 
Participants were asked in overall if they are satisfied with the software system (i.e. the 
interface) they tried. Figure 67 presents their opinion. 
Although the answers of the participants here on this question also show no concrete 
difference between the interfaces in this regard, nevertheless results still demonstrate 
that overall satisfactions of the participants of the third and the fourth interfaces excel 
the first and second interfaces. It could be argued that if the participants of the first and 
the second interfaces have the opportunity to explore different interfaces then they 
would probably differentiate the features and express their satisfaction about whether 
they would be satisfied or not about the system they tried in more apparent manner. 
The following section is presenting some of the participants' comments for the first and 
the second interfaces on why they were/were not or somewhat satisfied, however, 
none of the participants of the third and the fourth interfaces were somewhat or not 
satisfied, so there were no comments from the participants of these interfaces. 
Comments of the participants who tried the first interface: 
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1. A warning when logging on to an unsecure network, with info about what the risks 
might be could be useful. 
2. I think that there could be some more details about security on the software so that 
it is clearer to people what they are signing up too. 
3. The software system does not highlight to the user that the network is a danger to 
their devices and their information. 
4. There was little opportunity for me to establish how secure the Wi-Fi networks were 
and so I am not satisfied. 
Comments of the participants who tried the second interface: 
1. It could be made clearer by using colours to draw your eyes to the recommended 
secure networks. 
2. The warning that pops up needs to be more explicit in what it means. 
3. It would be beneficial to have more information on the level of security provided my 
secure networks, but apart from this it was easy to use, navigate and understand. 
It also allowed the user to make an informed choice on the network they connected 
to. 
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Figure 67: Participants' overall satisfaction of the tried interface 
Participants were also asked if the information provided by the software was easy to 
understand. Due to the variation in the design of the four interface, Figure 68 presents 
the results for the participants' opinions based on the interface they have tied. Yet again, 
the results in Figure 68 indicate that there is no significant difference between the 
interfaces in this regard. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this is may be due to the 
fact that the views of the participants of the first and the second interfaces relied 
primarily on their experience with a similar interface currently used in Microsoft 
Windows 7 platform, so that they can expect and understand what the interface offered 
through their experience with that similar interface. On the other hand, distinctly the 
participants' opinions of the third and fourth interfaces were entirely based on their 
experience in dealing with the new design of the third and fourth interfaces. Therefore, 
their point of view reflects their understanding of the information and the security 
guidance provided by these new interfaces. 
The following section is presenting some of the participants' comments on this question 
for each interface: 
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Comments of the participants who tried the first interface: 
1. The information is not always clear when provided, sometimes it can miss lead or 
not provide enough info. 
Comments of the participants who tried the second interface: 
2. A little message popped up, but I can't remember what it actually said, but it was 
easy to understand. Again, I'm not entirely sure what the meaning of the message 
meant in practice. 
3. It could have given me more direction with what was best to do. 
4. It needs to tell you to choose a connection and list the connections in order of 
strongest signal. It was only under assumption from the lock/unlock icons that I 
knew whether or not it was secured so there needs to be text. 
5. When hovering over each Wi-Fi option, you could see the speed of the connection, 
whether it was secure and the name of the Wi-Fi which gives an indication of what 
you are connecting to. It was also very clear when you were about to connect to an 
unsecure server that it was just that - unsecure. 
Comments of the participants who tried the third interface: 
1. I had a harder time to understand some of the aspects of transferring the data 
between two parties, however otherwise the info was quite clear (encryption part). 
2. It need for some improvement especially for how to connect to the choose network. 
3. I did not know how to interpret this information. 
4. Some of the computing ' jargon' may have been hard to understand to some. 
However, the examples of recommended use were helpful. 
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5. The information about a particular network's security seemed especially relevant 
and was quite easy to find. 
6. Having coloured categories of important Wi-Fi features was helpful to quickly 
understand the most secure and strongest Wi-Fi connection. 
7. Easy to read and had various colours where appropriate. 
Comments of the participants who tried the fourth interface: 
1. I didn't fully understand all the technical terms. 
2. Very clear. 
3. The information on a general note is friendly and ease to use. 
4. Although it did explain to me the recommended usage of different security levels 
and the security information, I personally missed the security information as I didn't 
pay attention to this as I was only interested in the signal strength. The reason being 
that I was intending to use the internet only for browsing news websites and other 
non-sensitive websites. 
5. I usually just connect to the Wi-Fi straight away, I don’t read information, I just look 
at the bars and how fast the connection is. So reading any information doesn’t 
usually matter to me. 
6. It is easy to understand, and security information is quite helpful.  
But I'm not sure what encryption protocols mean and how it works. It takes a bit time 
for me to read the information and compare. I would expect less information 
provided in the interface and clearer sign or buttons. Just to reduce the time and 
effort in reading all the information. 
7. It’s perfect to understand the process that I go through the WIF I chose. 
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8. I wasn't very aware of what some of the words meant, like encryption for example. 
This is because I use computers but I don't necessarily know much about them. 
The information was clearly presented and had I understood the meanings of all the 
words I would say it was easy to understand. The diagrams showing bars for the 
connection strength and the level of security was helpful. 
9. It could have more details for what some of the complex terminologies mean. Some 
people may not understand some of the words used. For example, what upstart 
time meant for the user. 
 
Figure 68: Participants' Views: Simplicity of information provided by the software 
Due to the new variation of the design for the second, third and the fourth interfaces 
compared to the current dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Window 
7 platform, participants who tried these interfaces were asked whether the new design 
makes the information more presentable. Figure 69 presents the participants' opinions 
who tried the second, third and the fourth interfaces. It is not surprising that majority of 
the participants of the third and the fourth interface stated that the information more 
presentable in these interfaces than the current dashboard that displays the wireless 
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networks in the Windows platform. The third and the fourth interfaces were expected 
to be more presentable compared to the first and the second interfaces as discussed 
previously, because of  the usage of the security level meter with coloured categories, 
which  will attract users' attention and alert them directly to the security level of the Wi-
Fi network and by employing traffic lights to determine the variations in the network 
characteristics status to reveal the relevant security information to the users in an easily 
perceived manner, supported with security information and a recommended usage, 
which was helpful to quickly understand the security level for each presented Wi-Fi 
network in these interfaces. 
 
Figure 69: Participants' Views: Second, third and fourth interfaces vs. current Win 7 Wi-Fi dashboard 
Participants were also asked if using software system (i.e. the interface) was 
convenient. This question was asked to the participants who tried the second, third and 
fourth interfaces and it was due to the new design of these three interfaces compared 
to the current dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Windows 7 platform. 
Figure 70 presents the participants' opinions in this regard. In light of previous findings, 
it is not surprising that majority of the participants of the third and the fourth interface 
stated that using software system (i.e. the interface) was convenient. The third and the 
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fourth interfaces were expected to be more convenient compared to the first and the 
second interfaces, because of using the security level meter with coloured categories 
that will easily convince users and make them aware of the security level of the Wi-Fi 
network in an easily and an apparent manner, supported with security information and 
a recommended usage, which was not requiring exertion to understand the security 
level for each presented Wi-Fi network in these interfaces. 
 
Figure 70: Participants' Views: Convenience of software system use 
Participants were also asked if they think the full implementation of the software can 
be used to facilitate users in choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network. This 
question was asked to the participants who tried the second, third and fourth interfaces, 
this was due to the new design of these three interfaces compared to the current 
dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Window 7 platform. Figure 71 
presents the participants' opinions in this regard. Results demonstrate that almost all 
participants of the third and the fourth interface agreed that the full implementation of 
the software can be used to enable users in choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi 
network and that it could help them straightforward to be more aware of connecting to 
insecure Wi-Fi networks. In comparison, there were less than 50% of the participants 
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of the second interface who agreed on this, probably due to the shortcomings of the 
second interface that impede users in choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network. 
 
Figure 71: Participants' Views: Implementation of the software to facilitate secure Wi-Fi selection 
Due to the substantial difference in the design of the third and fourth interfaces 
compared to the first and second interfaces, the participants who tried the third and 
fourth interfaces were asked if they are more confident in using Wi-Fi software that 
provides security related information because it helps them to decide whether it is safe 
to connect to an available Wi-Fi network. Figure 72 presents the participants' opinions 
in this regard. Almost the participants of both interfaces stated the same in this regard. 
Probably this is due to the fact they are designed very similar to each other and there 
are no concrete differences between them as mentioned in the previous sections. 
Results suggested that users are convinced and will be confident in using the tools or 
software that provides security related information to help them to decide whether it is 
safe to connect to an available Wi-Fi network. These findings also suggest that there 
is a high probability of positive response from users towards any tools or software that 
might be released by system developers to help users with the problem of connecting 
to an insecure Wi-Fi network and to highlight the risks of insecure Wi-Fi networks. 
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Figure 72: Participants' confidence in using software (Wi-Fi) providing security related information 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the results of an experimental study that examined the 
effectiveness of using targeted security awareness-raising approach. The study has 
shown that while users did not exhibit perfect behaviour, there was a tangible 
improvement with interfaces offering more security-related information. In common 
with other security contexts, results suggest that users’ behaviour can be positively 
influenced purely through the provision of additional information and better choices can 
be made even if the system does not provide any further enforcement. 
The results have also proven that the new design of the Wi-Fi interfaces has made an 
important improvement in terms of the security behaviours of the participants before 
connecting to insecure Wi-Fi hotspots in public areas. 
Moreover, the results revealed that known Wi-Fi networks for participants are mostly 
treated as trustworthy networks, although the network name has the potential to be 
spoofed. This conceivably highlights the lack of knowledge of the participants regarding 
this security issue. 
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From the obtained results, it was also perceived that the network name has greatly 
affected some of the participants’ decisions especially if its name implies that it has a 
high speed without paying any attention to security issues. This demonstrates that the 
speed in some cases outweighs the security concerns in the eyes of the participants. 
One of the very important lessons learned from this experiment is that if leading 
developers such as Microsoft are prone to releasing software that gives insufficient 
security guidance to help users to understand the security and make the appropriate 
security decisions that lead to protect their data and devices, then what does this 
suggest is that this will likely not encourage other software developers to direct their 
attention to focus on the security in the software they release. If this occurs in the most 
important software developed by Microsoft, such as Windows, it affects a large 
population of users and sets a standard that others may consider acceptable in their 
own software. 
Results of the surveys demonstrate that a relatively large number of the participants 
are impetuous about security risks related to the use of Wi-Fi networks. This illustrates 
the urgent need to provide a new way to increase the security awareness of users 
about the security risks associated with the use of Wi-Fi networks, especially if 
unknown.
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Chapter 5 
Design Principles and Guidelines for Targeted Security 
Awareness 
5.1 Introduction 
The need for developing security features and tools available in computer systems and 
applications, which are used to make users aware of security risks while the task in 
hand, has increased significantly over the years to accompany the increased range of 
cyber security attacks. 
While many computer systems and applications provide and use a wide range of 
security features that users can use or rely on to protect themselves against these 
security threats, the current design of some of these security features is often blamed 
for shortcomings in making users fully aware of the security risks that they may face. 
This reduces the level of protection that can be achieved by using the current design 
of the security features and tools particularly for novice and other non-technical 
computer users. 
The findings of the prior experimental work conducted during this research and 
described in chapter 4, have revealed that user’s security behaviours can be positively 
influenced through the provision of additional information, enabling them to make 
better-informed security choices even if the system does not provide any further means 
of enforcement. Furthermore, results suggests that users will appreciate if adequate 
security guidance is provided before making a security decision to help them to 
understand the security risks, so that they can make appropriate and informed security 
Chapter 5 — Design Principles for Providing Targeted Security Awareness Raising  
163 | P a g e  
 
decisions that help to mitigate the security threats and protect their data and devices. 
Results also revealed that tools such as security level indicators (Security meters) with 
a combination of background colour codes, which demonstrate the security status and, 
supported by accompanying text to explain the security risks and proposed 
recommendations, have played a vital role by aiding users towards that end. Findings 
were used to identify design principles to assist targeted awareness raising. Seven 
valuable key security design principles were identified and proposed, each with 
underlying guidelines for system designers/developers to improve security features in 
their software to help to make users appropriately aware of the security threats they 
may encounter. 
It can be argued that the existence of design principles and guidelines is imperative for 
the development of UI elements in a wide range of applications, for several reasons, 
including improving the usability of the IT systems, and user productivity through a 
user-friendly system. This should improve efficiency and reduce user errors. It can be 
achieved by producing consistent and less confusing UI elements of the applications. 
User confusion may occur because of the inconsistencies of UI elements of the same 
type of applications which will reduce the efficiency of these applications. Thus, the 
need to develop design principles and guidelines may continue as new issues arise, 
which need to be addressed by adhering to new design principles, to avoid confusion 
and provide applications of the same type in a consistent design. 
The dominant objective of HCI is to facilitate the interaction between the user and the 
computer. Human-computer interaction field emerged as a part of intertwined roots in 
computer graphics, operating systems, human factors, ergonomics, industrial 
engineering, cognitive psychology, and the part of computer science systems. Human-
computer interaction defined by Hewett et al. (1992) as “a discipline concerned with 
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the design, evaluation and implementation of interactive computing systems for human 
use and with the study of major phenomena surrounding them”. The introduction of 
graphical user interfaces made computers easier to operate, contributing to huge 
growth in research in the field of HCI. As a result, a number of design principles have 
been created and developed (Johnston et al., 2003). 
From a computer science perspective, human-computer interaction (HCI) deals with 
the interaction between one or more users and one or more computers using the User 
Interface (UI) of a program. The long-established HCI concepts can be used to design 
an interface or improve an existing one, taking into account aspects such as usability, 
which is used to determine the ease of use of a particular technology, the level of 
technology effectiveness according to the user’s needs and user satisfaction with the 
results obtained using a particular technology to perform specific tasks (Muñoz-
Arteaga et al, 2009). 
With the development of computer software, the imperative need and the importance 
of creating design principles and guidelines for the development of applications have 
emerged. More specifically, for the development of UI elements for various types of 
applications so that they are easy to use, leading to reliability in these systems. It was 
noted that there should be specific design principles and guidelines that applications 
developers can rely on when developing their applications, which will reduce confusion 
for users, and ultimately increase their efficiency. 
With the development of software applications and the emergence of new 
requirements aimed at increasing the security of information systems, there is a need 
for specific design principles that contribute to increasing the efficiency of these 
systems while providing protection to IT systems through adhering to new design 
principles and guidelines. 
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5.2 The Need of Design Principles for Targeted Security Awareness 
Usability is arguably one of the most important focusses in the field of cybersecurity 
today. Supported by the need for confidentiality, integrity, availability; these features 
have become common components of IT systems that require use by novices and 
experts alike. As security features are exposed to wider categories of the users, it is 
essential to ensure that these functions are highly usable. This is mainly because poor 
usability in this situation often translates into an inadequate application of cybersecurity 
tools and functionality and, as a result, ultimately limiting their effectiveness.  In order 
to achieve this objective of highly usable security, there have been extensive studies 
in the cybersecurity literature focused on identifying security usability problems and 
proposing guidelines and recommendations to address them (Nurse et al, 2011). 
Over time, requirements have changed, and new ones emerged with a more focused 
set of design principles and guidelines that have become necessary to address more 
specific issues and achieve specific objectives. For example, creating design principles 
and guidelines for designing UI elements which addresses issues related to the 
security of the IT systems. 
Security HCI (HCI-S) was introduced to reflect the need to explicitly support security in 
the development of UI elements in the IT systems field. The HCI-S concept built mainly 
upon modifying and adapting traditional HCI concepts to focus on security aspects in 
order to improve the security of IT systems by improving the elements of their user 
interfaces (Muñoz-Arteaga et al, 2009). The term HCI-S was first introduced and 
defined by Johnston et al. (2003) as “The part of a user interface which is responsible 
for establishing the common ground between a user and the security features of a 
system. HCI-S is human computer interaction applied in the area of computer security” 
(Johnston et al., 2003). 
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Users interact with computers and technology through various user interfaces. These 
interfaces are designed to help users understand IT systems and increase productivity 
in using them. For example, a well-designed user interface assists the user to become 
skilled in operating the software in a short period of time. This helps to increase the 
user’s efficiency in completing a particular task, thus the user feels in control and 
satisfied with the technology. Conversely, if the interface is poorly designed, it can 
frustrate the user and hinder on completing the task successfully, which will result in 
decline and uncertainty about the use of specific technology in the future. Generally, 
users experience security functionality through the user interfaces. The interface 
notifies the user of the available security functions and how to use them. A user may 
not be aware of the security feature or may be using it incorrectly. The interface should 
ensure that the user is appropriately guided in order to minimise the potential for the 
user to be the ‘weakest’ link (Johnston et al., 2003). 
As such, Johnston et al. (2003) principles have come to balance the usability of 
systems while increasing their protection by adhering to new design principles to 
increase system protection without compromising usability at the same time. Although 
these principles exist for user interfaces are purposely oriented on the security 
environment, there is still a need to introduce new principles or develop existing ones 
to adapt to the new requirements such as increasing the users’ security awareness 
through the security features that are included in the user interfaces of the existing 
applications. 
Although Johnston's security-related design principles have been widely cited in the 
literature, there is currently a need to introduce new principles to adapt to new 
requirements. For instance, in the case when users are exploring Wi-Fi networks and 
wanted to know the security concerns of the available Wi-Fi networks and what to use 
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it for. In addition, in the case of spotting phishing emails using email applications. In 
these examples, there is a lack of design of the interfaces of these applications, which 
does not provide adequate security information to users about the type of security 
threat faced by the user during their daily use or interactions with these applications, 
as well as not providing recommendations to users to help them stay safe. 
One example is connecting to insecure Wi-Fi networks. Kaspersky reported that 71% 
of the surveyed users use insecure public Wi-Fi (Kaspersky Lab, 2016). The interfaces 
currently used to select Wi-Fi networks do not provide sufficient security information to 
make users aware of the security risks associated with the use of unknown and 
potentially insecure Wi-Fi networks. As a result, it is not surprising the percentage of 
users who connect to insecure Wi-Fi networks is at these high levels. 
Another example is the number of victims of phishing email attacks. 76% of the 
surveyed Infosec professionals reported that their organisation experienced a steady 
or higher volume of phishing attacks in 2017 compared to 2016 statistics (Wombat 
Security Technologies, 2018), despite the availability of security awareness programs, 
which aim to increase the security awareness of users of this type of attacks and 
despite the availability of protection software. By examining the interfaces currently 
used in some email applications, it can be seen that these applications are inadequate 
to make the user aware of this type of security risks and there is a lack of information 
provided to increase security awareness of the users before taking any actions that 
may lead to compromise their systems. 
In the two examples described above, there is a design flaw of the user interfaces of 
these applications in terms of properly making users aware of the potential risks, as 
with their current design, they do not provide adequate information or suitable 
recommendations to users to take appropriate actions or make proper and informed 
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decisions. Ensuring that users are aware of the potential threats they may face, 
whether through phishing email or using an insecure Wi-Fi network, is the difference 
between the occurrence of a security breach and completely avoiding the risk. To 
mitigate these risks, there should an adoption of new methods to increase users' 
awareness of such risks. 
Nonetheless, despite the existence of security awareness programmes, many 
companies are unprepared to deal with cyber-attacks. 48% of the 9,500 executives in 
122 countries surveyed by the 2018 Global State of Information Security Survey 
(GSISS) stated that they do not have an employee security awareness training 
program (PwC, 2018). Often, staff compromise security unintentionally.  The Cyber 
security breaches survey 2017 reveals that 72% of reported security breaches 
occurred after they received a fraudulent email. Only 20% of the staff surveyed 
attended any form of cyber security training (IT Governance, 2018). Users are also 
prone to forgetfulness and therefore over time, users may forget their training. It is 
therefore imperative to ensure that user interfaces in applications provide the 
necessary security information to increase awareness of users. 
Perhaps a part of the problem can also be blamed on the shortcomings of the current 
interface design of some applications. Whitten and Tygar (1999) stated that user errors 
contribute to most computer security failures, nonetheless user interfaces for security 
still tend to be inconvenient and confusing. They posed a question whether this is 
simply due to failure to apply some standard UI design techniques to security and 
whether the general user interface design principles are adequate for security. They 
argued that effective security requires, in contrast, a different usability standard and 
that the effective security will not be achieved through the user interface design 
techniques appropriate to other types of consumer software. Furthermore, they stated 
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that user security interface designers should not assume that users will be motivated 
to read the manuals or to search for security controls that are designed to be not easily 
observed or noticed. Moreover, if security is very difficult, irritating or disturbing, users 
may completely abandon it.  From the results obtained from their work, they conclude 
that the standard model of user interface design, particularly the once represented by 
PGP 5.0 (their area of study) is not sufficient to make computer security usable for 
people who are not already knowledgeable in that area. 
From their work which was focused on evaluating PGP 5.0’s usability, the standard 
principles of user interface design, is not sufficient to make computer security usable 
for users who have a lack of understanding and limited skills in that area. Their 
conclusion was precisely stating that user interface design for effective security 
remains a problem that needs to be further investigated, and argued that this problem 
remains open and unresolved (Whitten and Tygar, 1999). 
It is clear that there is a need for specific design principles that aim to increase the 
security awareness of users in their daily usage of IT systems and ensure that sufficient 
information is available to users when needed and providing them with the necessary 
advice and recommendations. 
5.3 Related Work 
There is an absence of published research on the need for design principles that 
directly focus on the problem of the design of user interfaces that serve the objective 
of "making users aware" of the security threats through improving the user interfaces 
of the applications. Since users are primarily dealing with IT systems through user 
interfaces and the vast majority of the users of IT systems often find it difficult to deal 
with existing security risks because of having inadequate skills, it is imperative to 
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investigate other existing design principles and compare them with the proposed 
design principles, to ensure that no essential design principles are ignored. 
5.3.1 A General-purpose Usability Heuristics 
Nielsen (1994) has developed 10 Usability Heuristics for user interface design by 
comparing several published sets of usability heuristics with a database of existing 
usability problems derived from a variety of projects in order to determine what the best 
explanation of actual usability problems is. Based on the analysis of the explanations, 
as well as the analysis of the heuristics providing a broader explanatory coverage of 
the problems, Nielsen has introduced a new set of ten heuristics. This was to increase 
usability and address the problem of user interface inconsistencies. Nielsen (1994) has 
also concluded that these heuristics seems to be excellent to explain the usability 
problems previously found. It continues to be seen to what extent it is also good for 
finding new problems, which is the main objective of heuristic evaluation (Nielsen, 
1994). Nielsen’s Usability Heuristics are presented Table 8 (Nielsen, 1995). 
Table 8: Nielsen 10 Usability Heuristics 
No Criteria of HCI Description 
1 Visibility of system status 
The system should always keep users informed 
about what is going on through appropriate 
feedback within reasonable time. 
2 
Match between system 
and the real world 
The system should speak the users' language with 
words, phrases, and concepts familiar to the user, 
rather than system-oriented terms. Moreover, it 
should follow real-world conventions, making 
information appear in a natural and logical order. 
3 User control and freedom 
Users often choose system functions by mistake 
and will need a clearly marked "emergency exit" to 
leave the unwanted state without having to go 
through an extended dialogue. Support undo and 
redo functions. 
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4 
Consistency and 
standards 
Users should not have to wonder whether different 
words, situations, or actions mean the same thing. 
It should follow platform conventions. 
5 Error prevention 
Even better than good error messages is a careful 
design which prevents a problem from occurring in 
the first place. The system should either eliminate 
error-prone conditions or check for them and 
present users with a confirmation option before 
they commit to the action. 
6 
Recognition rather than 
recall 
Minimize the user's memory load by making 
objects, actions, and options visible. The user 
should not have to remember information from one 
part of the dialogue to another. Instructions for use 
of the system should be visible or easily retrievable 
whenever appropriate. 
7 
Flexibility and efficiency of 
use 
Accelerators — unseen by the novice user — may 
often speed up the interaction for the expert user 
such that the system can cater to both 
inexperienced and experienced users. It allows 
users to tailor frequent actions. 
8 
Aesthetic and minimalist 
design 
Dialogues should not contain information which is 
irrelevant or rarely needed. Every extra unit of 
information in a dialogue competes with the 
relevant units of information and diminishes their 
relative visibility. 
9 
Help users recognize, 
diagnose, and recover 
from errors 
Error messages should be expressed in plain 
language (no codes), precisely indicate the 
problem, and constructively suggest a solution. 
10 Help and documentation 
Even though it is better if the system can be used 
without documentation, it may be necessary to 
provide help and documentation. Any such 
information should be easy to search, focused on 
the user's task, such as a list of concrete steps to 
be carried out, and not be too large. 
5.3.2 A Security-specific User Interface Design Principles 
The HCI-S design principles were introduced by Johnston et al. (2003) and are 
intended to address how the security features of the GUI can be made as user-friendly 
and easier to understand and operate as possible. This results in making the system 
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easier to use, further improves the user experience, and makes less likely that the user 
will make mistakes or attempt to bypass the security feature, resulting in a more reliable 
system. The objective of HCI-S is to improve the interface in order to enhance the 
security. This makes the system more secure, robust, and reliable. HCI is focused on 
making the IT system as easy to use as possible. However, security features are 
occasionally seen to make the system harder to use. HCI-S addresses the issue and 
balances between security and usability. However, the HCI-S concept introduced by 
Johnston et al. (2003) did not specifically state that it was intended to make users fully 
aware of the security threats nor particularly addressing the issue of the end users lack 
of security awareness. Table 9 presents the design principles of HCI-S introduced by 
Johnston et al. (2003). 
Table 9: Johnston et al. (2003) HCI-S criteria 
No Criteria of HCI-S Description 
1 Convey features 
The interface needs to convey the available security 
features to the user. 
2 Visibility of system status 
It is important for the user to be able to observe the 
security status of the internal operations. 
3 Learnability 
The interface needs to be as non-threatening and 
easy to learn as possible. 
4 
Aesthetic and minimalist 
design 
Only relevant security information should be 
displayed. 
5 Errors 
It is important for the error message to be detailed 
and to state, if necessary, where to obtain help. 
6 Satisfaction 
Does the interface aid the user in having a 
satisfactory experience with a system? 
5.3.3 A Security Domain-specific User Interface Design Principles 
Whitten and Tygar (1999) provide one of the seminal design principles of usable 
security with a focus on encryption and introduced many key issues facing novice and 
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non-technical users who have little initial understanding of security, particularly in the 
use of PGP 5.0 application. As a result of their investigation, they stated that security 
interfaces tend to be confusing, inadequate and inconsistent, thus hindering rather than 
helping users. In addition, they tend to suggest that to make security usable, there 
needs to be a development of domain-specific user interface design principles and 
techniques. According to them, the problem of usability is compounded by several 
implicit characteristics of the security. These characteristics are presented Table 10. 
Table 10: Whitten and Tygar (1999) Criteria 
No Criteria Description 
1 
The unmotivated user 
property 
Security is usually a secondary objective for users. 
Users do not generally focus on security but rather 
they focus on achieving their tasks. It is easy for users 
to postpone learning about security, or to optimistically 
assume that their security is in place, while they focus 
on their primary tasks. 
2 The abstraction property 
Security is governed by the underlying abstract rules, 
such as security policies. Computer security 
management often includes security policies, which 
are abstract rules to determine whether to grant 
accesses to resources. Creating and managing such 
rules is an activity that programmers consider intuitive, 
but it may be atypical and unintelligible to an 
enormously wider user group. The security user 
interface design should take this into consideration. 
3 
The lack of feedback 
property 
Providing quality feedback is difficult noticing 
security’s complex nature. The need to prevent 
dangerous errors makes it crucial to provide good 
feedback to the user. 
4 The barn door property 
The proverb of the futility of locking the barn door after 
the horse is gone is related to the description of an 
important property of computer security: If a secret is 
left unprotected even for a short time, there is no way 
to be sure that it has not already been reached by an 
attacker. It is therefore very important to design the 
user interface for security and give a very high priority 
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to ensure that users understand their security well 
enough to prevent potentially high-cost mistakes. 
5 
The weakest link 
property 
It is well known that a security chain is as strong as its 
weakest link. If a hacker can take advantage of one 
mistake, the game is over. This means that users need 
to be guided to attend all aspects of their security, not 
leaving them to proceed through random exploration 
as they might with the normal application. Therefore, 
all users must understand this fact because it relates 
to the security of their systems. 
5.4 The Proposed Security Design Principles and Guidelines 
Although the usability problem was a major design goal of the previously introduced 
design principles, these principles do not attempt to address the issue of making users 
aware of the security risks they may encounter. 
In this research, a series of related design principles and guidelines have been 
identified from the prior work described in chapter 4 and utilized in the surveyed 
interface design to devise these security features by providing an adequate security 
information and recommended usage, to support users to recognise the security risk 
and understand the required actions that they need to take in order to avoid security 
risks. These key security design principles and guidelines could also be used to inform 
the design and implementation of security-related tools and interfaces to support and 
make users appropriately aware of the security risks they may encounter during their 
daily use of IT systems. The new proposed security design principles and guidelines 
are described in the following section. 
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5.4.1 Principle 1: Severity of the Security Risk 
Aim:  To signify the severity of the security risk, with the aid of tools and techniques 
used by software and operating systems, on a given scenario. 
Guideline 1.1: Consider the use of a meter to highlight the severity and/or risk of the 
action they are about to undertake. 
Guideline 1.2: The use of a status mechanism should aid in enhancing the users' 
selections/actions in a clear and easy way without interfering with the usage of the 
device. 
Signifying the severity of the security risk is the main key and the first step to make 
users aware of the security risk in any security scenario. There are a wide variety of 
tools and techniques used by the software and operating systems developers to 
demonstrate the severity of security risk that users may encounter during their daily 
use of IT systems. 
An apparent example of these techniques and tools is utilizing the security indicators 
related to the application in use. Furthermore, the use of status mechanisms can keep 
users aware and informed about the state of the system (Katsabas et al, 2005). The 
experimental Wi-Fi selection study (see chapter 4) revealed that over 95% of the 
participants who tried the third or the fourth interface claimed that the security level 
indicator/meter was very important or important. This result also highlights that the use 
of security level meter helps significantly by making users aware of the security status 
of the presented Wi-Fi networks and contributed to making users differentiating the 
security level of each presented Wi-Fi network before selecting any Wi-Fi network. In 
addition, this has reinforced the fact that the presence of a security level meter has 
enhanced the selection of participants to the most secure networks in the new design 
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of the Wi-Fi interfaces compared to the choice of participants for the insecure networks 
in the interfaces those has no security meter. 
Furthermore, this also emphasizes that users will appreciate the presence of the 
security meter in other IT security scenarios in which users may face security risks and 
need more help to recognize the severity of the threat in a more apparent manner, so 
they can better understand the severity of the threat they face before taking any actions 
that may lead to compromise the security of their IT system. 
5.4.2 Principle 2: Security Visuals 
Aim: Users should receive a clear indication of the current security status, including 
specific notifications and warnings for events of interest or concern. 
Guideline 2.1: Consider the use of background colour codes to attract attention and 
signify severity. The use of background colour codes is a key factor in demonstrating 
and clarifying the security status of any application that users are dealing with. 
Guideline 2.2: Use visual indicators to convey information about the type of incident 
(pictorial representation, supplemented with brief words or hover-over text). These 
tools and techniques are also well-known to users and have been in use for a long time 
by software developers in a wide variety of applications to demonstrate the different 
status of IT systems. 
The experimental study of the Wi-Fi selection described in chapter 4 revealed that 
almost all participants who tried the third or the fourth interface stated they are 
confident that they have connected to the appropriate network. This is due to the fact 
that the design of the third and the fourth interface (see chapter 4) is providing more 
security visual appearance that can be easily interpreted and understood, and by 
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utilizing a simple well-known tools such as the security indicator and background colour 
codes that demonstrate the security level of the network and employing traffic lights to 
determine the variations in the network characteristics status to disclose the relevant 
factors utilised to convey the relevant security information to the users in an easily 
perceived manner, supported with definite security information with a recommended 
usage. 
Security visuals are mainly built on the use of easily recognizable security warning 
signs, traffic lights and background colour codes (Red for dangerous, Amber for risky, 
Yellow to take precautions and examine, and Green for safe/secure) to help users 
grasp security risks from the first glance. In contrast, in the absence of an adequate 
visual design of the first and the second interfaces (see chapter 4), which does not 
explain the security features and risks of the Wi-Fi networks. In the absence of apparent 
and observable visualization design which can be easily interpreted and understood, it 
is not likely that users would be confident that they connected to an appropriate and 
secure network. 
5.4.3 Principle 3: Simplified Security Explanation 
Aim: To transmit the message to the users in a manner that would be clear and simple 
to understand regardless of their vocational inclination. 
Guideline 3.1: The language used should be suitable for first-time as well as advanced 
users. This will help users to comprehend and correlate the presented security visuals 
with the security explanation of the security threats they are facing. 
Guideline 3.2: There should be a balance between providing enough information 
without overwhelming the user. Furthermore, Katsabas et al, 2005 has found that 
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beginners will find it hard to comprehend the security threats if technical vocabulary 
and advanced terms are used profusely. 
In addition to the security visuals, users also appreciate the presence of text that 
presenting the specifics of the security threat in everyday user language. This will help 
users to comprehend and correlate the presented security visuals with the security 
explanation of the security threats they are facing. The experimental study mentioned 
in the previous chapter revealed that users would appreciate if they will be provided 
with an adequate text that explains the security risk they are encountering with the least 
possible use of technological terminology. For example, participants of the first and the 
second interfaces stated that the information provided was vague or inadequate. In 
contrast, participants of the third and the fourth interfaces stated that the security 
information provided was comprehensible and useful in helping them understanding 
the security features of the presented Wi-Fi networks, make them aware of the security 
statues of the presented Wi-Fi networks and also helped them to make more informed 
decisions based on the information and explanations provided. 
Nevertheless, the terminology used should be suitable for advanced as well as first-
time users in which there should be a balance between the need to provide enough 
information for a first-time user while not too much information for an experienced user. 
5.4.4 Principle 4: Proposed Recommendation 
Aim: Users should have an action recommended in order to avoid/minimize a 
highlighted risk. 
Guideline 4.1: There should be a supporting message with the appropriate 
recommendation for actions to be taken by the user to minimize/avoid the risk. 
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Guideline 4.2: The recommended actions should help to mitigate security implications 
and nudge users towards a better security behaviour and making better informed 
security decisions. 
Guideline: 4.3: The proposed security recommendations should be intelligible and 
precise, without complexity, to allow users to take appropriate actions. 
Providing the security recommendations to users will make it easier for them to make 
the most appropriate and informed decisions in different scenarios where no or 
inadequate recommendations are provided when dealing with IT systems. It also helps 
to mitigate implications and nudge users towards a better security behaviour and 
making a better decisions. 
Due to the lack of knowledge of the security risks of novice computer users and users 
with average computing skills, the need to provide security recommendations to users 
is a vital factor in terms of the action that needs to be taken to prevent compromises. 
Novice computer users with limited computer skills are representing the largest 
population of computer users. Therefore, it would be inadequate to equip users with 
only security warning message without supporting this security message with the 
appropriate security recommendation for the users that need to be taken to avoid the 
risks. 
Nevertheless, the proposed security recommendations should be very clear and 
precise as much as possible without any complexity to allow users proceed to take 
appropriate actions that should help them to make informed security decision rather 
than placing them into a guessing game of what is being recommended to them by the 
application to avoid the risk. 
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5.4.5 Principle 5: Minimal Intrusion 
Aim: Interventions and/or alerts should not attempt to inhibit the user from completing 
their intended tasks. 
Guideline 5.1: Users should not feel overwhelmed by the warning messages and their 
usage of a device should not be diminished due to the security measures implemented. 
Guideline 5.2: The number of clicks should be as minimal as possible from the point 
when the security threat facing the user is presented (or identified) to the point where 
the user is provided with adequate security information and recommended usage about 
the security risk. 
Guideline 5.3: The warning message should not interfere or affect the other 
components of the interface, i.e., it should not block, modify, overlap or make the 
interface harder to interact by the user. 
The clear majority of users tend to accomplish everyday businesses when using IT 
systems as fast as possible especially with time pressure. It could be argued, it is clear 
that the number of security interventions and security warnings have a great impact on 
users, especially if the security interventions and security warnings are overwhelming, 
incomprehensible and or not as expected by users, in many cases, it would not be 
consistent with their tendency. 
The number of clicks and navigation should be as minimal as possible from the point 
where the security threat facing the user is presented or identified to the point where 
the user is provided with adequate security information and recommended usage about 
the risk. 
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From the design point of view, if the number of clicks or the required navigation that 
the user needs to follow in order to know the security risk and make the decision is 
more than expected, it may lead to reduce the user's interest in the issue and hence 
persuade the user to act in a careless manner, leading to an increased risk of the users’ 
data or IT system being compromised. 
For instance, in the experimental Wi-Fi interface study mentioned in the previous 
chapter, only one link was offered to the users to acquire more information about each 
presented Wi-Fi network in the interface that leads to a security panel which provides 
more explanation of security features of the explored Wi-Fi network. However, there 
are still a number of users who selected the Wi-Fi network based on the status of the 
security meter and later after they made their selection, they click on the link “Click for 
more information” to acquire more information about the network that they had already 
selected. 
5.4.6 Principle 6: Aiding the Decision Latency 
Aim: To minimise the time the users spends assessing the information and making 
their decision without looking for further information. 
Guideline 6.1: The process of making the user aware of the risk should be as simple 
and streamlined as possible. For example, the message should not contain more than 
25 words length. 
Guideline 6.2: The time required for users to spend assessing the information and 
making the decision, without the need to search for further information in order to 
understand the security risk encountered, should be as minimal as possible. 
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Simplifying and curtailing the process of making the user aware of the security risk to 
help the user to make an informed decision is a key factor here. The time required for 
users to spend on assessing the information and making the decision without the need 
to search for further information, is a critical factor, particularly when faced with time 
pressure where the chances are high that users tend to make hasty decisions that may 
lead to compromise their IT systems. 
5.4.7 Principle 7: Level of Detail and Clarity 
Aim: To provide a suitable level of detail and clarity to the user in order to ensure they 
are fully aware of the security issue encountered and able to make better-informed 
decisions. 
Guideline 7.1: The user should be presented with enough information (ideally directly, 
but alternatively via a link) to know what is happening and (where appropriate) make 
an informed decision. 
Guideline 7.2: The level of detail and clarity should assist the users without 
confounding them with unnecessary or superfluous details. 
The detail and clarity about the security risk are vital in helping the user by giving full 
disclosure of the related information about the security risk encountered. However, the 
level of detail and clarity differs from once scenario to another. It could be argued that 
this principle is based on the amount of information that is required to inform that user 
and essentially making the user aware of the security risk, without overwhelming the 
user with superfluous information. 
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5.5 Use and Benefits of the Design Principles 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the use of security aids/tools/features, allows 
the user to make more educated decisions regarding their information security. Using 
the principles and the guidelines provided will allow developers to enter the mindset of 
using such features when designing their applications which would in turn assist user 
awareness via a more targeted approach. 
The main objective of the introduced design principles and guidelines is to educate 
users and increase their awareness regarding prominent security threats. This can be 
achieved by applying the identified design principles and guidelines when developing 
the interfaces of applications, which can provide support to users at the point of need, 
so they fully recognise the encountered threat, in order to take the necessary security 
precautions and make informed decisions. 
There is no doubt that consistency is a crucial and key issue for users. For this reason, 
one of the utmost important benefits of these principles, is that the UI elements 
suggested by the design principles and guidelines are based on the utilisation of 
existing tools and features of the IT systems that are used by developers. Furthermore, 
this helps eliminate any confusion that may occur to users with the use of unknown 
tools or features. For instance, they are intended to use notifications, signs and 
warnings or sounds for events of interest or concern, which users are familiar with. 
They are not intended to impede users from performing everyday tasks, but to give 
users the freedom to navigate and perform actions without hindrance or obstruct. It is 
no wonder that if the design is generally inconsistent, it will cause frustration which 
leads to poor user experience, and thus less user interest in security. Therefore, the 
design should always aim to eliminate confusion at every point when dealing with the 
system wherever possible. 
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The design principles identified are intended to provide recommendations and support 
that assists all type of users when they are unsure about decisions and their 
implications. It also focuses on educating users, making them aware of the security 
threat they face to prevent a problem from occurring in the first place. The aim is to 
prevent users from becoming victims by providing sufficient information to users before 
taking actions. 
Another benefit of the principles is to ensure that only the relevant security information 
and advice are expressed to users with a suitable level of detail and clarity, and more 
importantly in users’ language without the use of technical terminology, accurately 
indicate the threat, and constructively provide the appropriate advice to users, in order 
to ensure they are fully aware to make the necessary decisions they are required to 
make. This can be achieved by ensuring that security guidance and feedback are 
available when necessary, and to provide effective information that can help the user 
make security-focused decisions. 
The design of security interfaces should aid to minimise the cognitive load of users 
when using IT systems. Numerous studies conducted over the years on human 
cognition have underlined limitations in working memory and the necessity to support 
users, and work within memory and thought restrictions. This may encompass the 
automation of security procedures, actions or configurations, the ease of setting up the 
security system, and ultimately the demands should be reasonable and within the 
memory capacity of the users (Nurse et al, 2011). 
With the evolving threats in the security landscape and in many cases, by the time 
users tend to forget key points related to security of the system, even if security 
awareness, training and/or education have been provided. For this reason, the 
identified principles are intended to minimise the user's memory load whilst using the 
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system by making adequate and relative information easily retrievable whenever 
needed, recommend action to users to avoid the threats. However, since every extra 
information competes with relevant information and reduces their relative visibility, the 
presented information should not contain irrelevant or seldom relevant information. 
Finally, these principles and guidelines are general rules of design and will mostly be 
valid to any platform. Furthermore, arguably, the successful implementation of all the 
principles will lead to making the user aware of the encountered security threat and 
consequently aid the user to make informed decisions. 
5.6 Comparing Proposed and Existing Usability Interface Design Principles 
To discuss the design principles, it is imperative to refer to the most important and well-
established design principles in this field, namely Nielsen’s usability heuristics (1994) 
and Johnston et al (2003). These two design principles are the fundamental principles 
proposed in the usability of IT systems literature to address both usability and 
consistency issues in the design of user interfaces in general, bearing in mind that the 
Johnston et al (2003) design principles are specifically for the security environment. 
Moreover, they are the essential design principles of the user interfaces referred to and 
appeared to be most commonly cited in the literature. 
While the Nielsen’s usability heuristics focus mainly on the usability problem, the 
identified principles and guidelines are to enable security awareness of end users and 
focusing on utilizing the existing tools and features to educate users, make them aware 
of the security threats they may face and subsequently help them in making informed 
decisions. Arguably, Nielsen’s usability heuristics are reconciled to some degree with 
the identified principles in the way that both are focusing on the interface design or the 
UI elements but the ultimate objective for each one is different. 
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In comparison, while Johnston et al (2003) design principles address the design of UI 
elements to focus on the security environment in general as well, the identified 
principles address a specific issue which is to take into account the increased user 
security awareness and recommends specific principles that make the user aware of 
security threats through the development of user interfaces. This is to ensure that this 
should be taken into account by software developers during the development phase of 
user interfaces of the applications. 
The identified principles also differ but some are intertwined to some degree when 
compared with those established by Johnston et al (2003). Although these are primarily 
established to assist in the development and design of interfaces used in a security 
environment, the identified principles are more security-focused. They also were 
established and derived from the prior experimental work for the security environment 
but more specifically are focused on making the users aware of the security threat they 
encounter. In addition, they have been broken down into guidelines to provide broader 
and more specific guidance on what and how to improve UI elements in order to 
increased users’ security awareness. 
Although both of the mentioned design principles address either the usability problem 
in general or the usability of the security systems, neither explicitly referred to the 
problem of security awareness of users. In contrast, the new principles provided 
broader details of how existing tools are invested and exploited so that they contribute 
effectively and increase security awareness of end users. Moreover, Johnston et al 
(2003) principles did not specifically address the lack of provision of adequate 
information about the security threats, nor the lack of providing recommendations that 
help users make better decisions which may lead to mitigating the security threats. 
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To avoid the reoccurrence of guidelines or mixing different concepts which may lead 
to confusion, it is useful to make a comparison between the mentioned principles. The 
comparison with the earlier principles and guidelines is requisite in order to inspect the 
identified principles and to ensure that no important aspect related to UI elements is 
ignored or neglected. Furthermore, it should be noted that only comparable and 
intertwined principles have been inspected bearing in mind that the ultimate motivation 
or objective may differ. Table 3 provides a comparison between the design principles 
identified from the previous experimental work, Nielsen’s usability heuristics and 
Johnston et al (2003) principles. 
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Table 11: A comparison between the identified design principles, Nielsen’s usability heuristics (1995) and Johnston et al (2003) principles 
                     Source 
 
Comparison criteria 
The Identified principles 
Johnston et al (2003) HCI-S 
principles 
Nielsen’s usability heuristics 
(1995) 
Principle Security visuals Visibility of system status Visibility of system status 
Description 
Aims to provide users with a 
clear indication of the current 
security status, including 
specific notifications and 
warnings for events of interest 
or concern. 
It is important for the user to be 
able to observe the security status 
of the internal operations. 
The system should always keep 
users informed about what is going 
on, through appropriate feedback 
within reasonable time. 
Key differences 
Although the descriptions are similar, the proposed identified principles are providing detailed description 
and mentioning to include specific notifications and warnings for event of either “interest” or “concern”. 
They have also been broken down into guidelines for developers and focus more on how to best deliver 
products which raise the awareness of the user on a security perspective. For example, the colour coding 
to attract attention and alert the users of the extent of the risk they are facing. 
Principle 
Simplified security 
explanation 
Aesthetic and minimalist design Match between system and the real 
world 
Description 
Aims to transmit the message 
to the users in a manner that 
would be clear and simple to 
understand regardless of their 
vocational inclination. 
Only relevant security information 
should be displayed. 
The system should speak the users' 
language, with words, phrases, and 
concepts familiar to the user, rather 
than system-oriented terms. Follow 
real-world conventions, making 
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information appear in a natural and 
logical order. 
Key differences 
While the descriptions are also interrelated here, the proposed identified principle is explicitly stating the 
“target users” by focusing on all users’ categories regardless of their skills or level of knowledge of the IT 
systems in terms of the language used. Moreover, it mentions to the “content” and states clearly that there 
should be a balance between providing enough information without overwhelming the user. They have 
also been broken down into two guidelines Guideline 3.1 and Guideline 3.2 to better deliver security 
features within their software products that help to raise the awareness of the user. 
Principle 
Level of detail and clarity & 
Proposed recommendation 
Errors Help users recognize, diagnose, 
and recover from errors 
Description 
The first principle aims to 
provide a suitable level of 
detail and clarity to the user in 
order to ensure they are fully 
aware of the security issue 
encountered, and able to 
make better-informed 
decisions, while the second 
principle recommends an 
action in order to 
avoid/minimize the risk 
implicated to the security 
issue. 
It is important for the error 
message to be detailed and to 
state, if necessary, where to 
obtain help. 
Error messages should be 
expressed in plain language (no 
codes), precisely indicate the 
problem, and constructively 
suggest a solution. 
Key differences 
While the identified principles are clearly suggesting to provide a “suitable” level of detail and clarity to the 
user to make the users aware of the security issue encountered to make better-informed decisions, and 
the second principle suggesting to “recommends” an action in order to avoid/minimize the risk implicated 
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to the security issue, Johnston et al (2003) is talking about error messages which is something different 
because error messages are not the same as the warning message and Johnston et al 2003 further 
suggested that the message to be “detailed” and did not state to which level of details it should be as 
providing too much details to the users may not be understandable by all users categories. Whereas 
Nielsen description is suggesting to provide a constructive solution and this different when compared to 
recommendations. Nielsen and Johnston et al principles are not explicitly intended to increase the users' 
security awareness. 
Principle Minimal intrusion Learnability Flexibility and efficiency of use 
Description 
Intervention and/or alert 
should attempt not to inhibit 
the user from completing their 
everyday tasks. 
The interface needs to be as non-
threatening and easy to learn as 
possible. 
Accelerators -- unseen by the 
novice user - may often speed up 
the interaction for the expert user 
such that the system can cater to 
both inexperienced and 
experienced users. Allow users to 
tailor frequent actions. 
Key features and differences 
While both Nielsen and Johnston et al (2003) description is stating that it needs to be as user-friendly, as 
easy-to-learn as possible and interactive, the identified principles are also suggesting this, plus the fact 
that it must not interfere with the completion of the user's tasks. They have also clearly state that the 
number of clicks should be as minimal as possible from the point when the security threat facing the user 
is presented or identified to the point where the user is provided with adequate security information and 
recommended usage about the security risk. Furthermore, they have also been suggesting that the 
warning message should not interfere or affect the other components of the interface, i.e., it should not 
block, modify, overlap, or make the interface harder to interact by the user. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter proposed and discussed new design principles for security features that 
can be used to improve the security of IT systems by modifying application interfaces 
to increase the security awareness of users. This objective can be accomplished by 
educating users about the security threats they are facing and assisting them by 
providing security recommendations so they can make informed decisions. 
The interface design of a system is crucial, especially when it relates to making security 
decisions in standard IT applications. The new design principles for security features 
are considered to greatly enhance the users’ experience with the security issue and 
can be implemented to maximize the users’ awareness of the security threats. 
Furthermore, they can be used to provide the necessary security information and 
security recommendations without directing the user to make a specific choice. This 
will result in a system that is fundamentally reliant on making the user aware of the 
threat which should assist the user to make informed security decisions without any 
form of enforcement. 
Additionally, they can also be used by software developers to ensure that the objective 
of making “users aware” is developed into the security interface or within the security 
features of the IT security system. The new design principles and guidelines can also 
be used to evaluate the interfaces of new security products. Moreover, they can also 
provide direction, from a security point of view, on how an interface can be improved 
in the way that helps to make users appropriately aware of the security threat 
encountered. 
Chapter 6 — Applying the Design Principles 
 
192 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 6 
Applying the Design Principles 
6.1 Introduction 
On the basis of the security design principles discussed and recommended previously, 
one of the current scenarios has been evaluated in order to determine its consistency 
with these identified design principles and to have scope for improvement, by using the 
targeted security awareness-raising approach. In order to support this view, revised 
versions of the user interfaces are designed for this scenario, which exhibited the 
shortcomings in this regard and the room for improvement to make the users fully 
aware of the security risk that they are encountering. It will also measure the new 
security design adherence to these new security design principles. This chapter 
discusses the new security design adherence to these new principles and provides an 
example of adhering to these principles with a view to improving the current design of 
this application. Moreover, it will discuss in detail this scenario and suggest the 
potential solutions that may help mitigate the security risks by providing adequate 
security information and guidance. 
6.2 Background 
There are several instances and scenarios in which the users find themselves facing 
security-related decisions. Whilst in such situations, the majority of them do not have 
adequate security guidance and advice to make the appropriate decisions, which 
would help them avoid or mitigate the associated security risks that may have to face 
when dealing with the IT system. One possible solution in this situation is to ensure 
that security guidance and feedback are available when necessary and to provide 
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effective information that can help the users make informed and right decisions at the 
right time to avoid the security risks and its implications. Targeted security awareness 
raising approach has the potential to be useful in providing the support to users at the 
point of need, for them to take the necessary security precautions and make informed 
security decisions. This promising targeted security awareness raising approach can 
act as the most suitable entity in helping users become fully aware of the security 
threats by providing security guidance, and recommendations during dealing with tasks 
in situations in which either inadequate support or help is provided to the users, or in 
which poor security information and guidance is provided to the users. 
It should be noted that this effort is focused on making the users aware of the security 
risk in some security scenarios using the targeted security awareness approach, in 
which the existing security features of some applications were identified to have either 
flaws or shortcomings in making the users fully aware of the security risks. It has been 
identified that these applications have room for improvements in terms of the required 
design to provide the necessary and adequate security information and guidelines to 
make the users aware of the security risk. Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this 
research to discuss broadly other aspects such as the classification of the suspected 
blocked emails, the type of the advice that correlated to each type of the suspected 
blocked emails. However, the main objective of this project is introducing the new 
concept of using targeted security awareness to make the users aware of the security 
risks in some scenarios and explore the opportunities in which there is some visibility, 
in terms of the need to improve the currently used interfaces for some applications in 
order to help users comprehend the security threats in a better and more effective 
manner. 
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The following section will discuss in detail this scenario and suggest the potential 
solutions that may help mitigate the security risks by providing adequate security 
information and guidance. 
6.3 The Problem and Challenges of Phishing Emails 
According to ENISA the threat landscape report (2017), the dominant attack vector for 
malware infections was phishing. The human link is still considered as a weak link in 
the phishing infection vector. Therefore, it is imperative to increase security awareness 
measures to enhance user vigilance (ENISA, 2017). Moreover, according to Ernst and 
Young (2017), 64% of the surveyed organisations considered phishing to be the main 
threat that has most increased their risk exposure during 2017 (Ernst and Young, 2017). 
Similarly, IronScales (2017) Email Security Report revealed that phishing is 
responsible for the vast majority of cyber-attacks worldwide. Furthermore, the report 
also revealed that, among all attack vectors, email is still the most exploited for a variety 
of reasons. Malicious email continues to easily bypass legacy SPAM filters, firewalls, 
and gateway security scans that still rely on signatures and scanning of the email 
content when analysing messages. Moreover, due to human nature, it only requires a 
few users who are unaware, or even those who are actively engaged in the awareness 
training programme, to unintentionally provide attackers access to sensitive corporate 
networks and data. In fact, such users are considered contributing factors as they are 
easily tempted to download an attachment or click on a malicious email link (IronScales, 
2017). 
Phishing generally has been a major security problem for a long time without an 
efficient solution in place (Vayansky and Kumar, 2018). In general, phishing is a 
practice that deceives users to give their sensitive information to attackers, and to date, 
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it has not been addressed by existing security industry. The impact of such attacks can 
be significant. The key to their success is the fact that they exploit what is often 
mentioned as the weakest link in the system – the end-user (Williams and Li, 2017). 
Phishing has been identified by Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) as "a criminal 
mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal 
consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials" (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group, 2017). Phishing has also described and identified by Phishing.org as 
“is a cybercrime in which a target or targets are contacted by email, telephone, or text 
message by someone posing as a legitimate institution to lure individuals into providing 
sensitive data such as personally identifiable information, banking and credit card 
details, and passwords. The information is then used to access important accounts and 
can result in identity theft and financial loss" (Phishing.org. 2018). The problem with 
phishing is that there are no comprehensive solutions that protect users securely from 
being phished. While, the anti-phishing defences have been advanced, the phishing 
techniques have also advanced from simple to more complex methods. As a result, the 
need for innovative security methods to identify phishing scams is crucial. The problem 
with phishing is that attackers are continually searching for new and innovative 
methods and demonstrate the ability to make inventive techniques to trick users to 
believe that they are dealing or interacting with a legitimate website or email. Phishers 
have become more capable of producing phoney and fraudulent websites to look 
indistinguishable, even incorporating logos and illustrations in the phishing emails to 
make them all more persuading. Additionally, phishers have begun to build a 
psychology behind their emails which call for urgency, greed, or trust. Combined with 
the legitimate appearance and feel of the spoofed websites, even more cautious and 
aware users can be tricked into becoming victims of their attacks. Phishing impacts 
individuals globally and is conducted internationally, making it hard to track and 
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prosecute the criminals behind it. One basic method that phishers have used is called 
‘fast flux’, where a substantial pool of proxies and URLs is utilised to keep the actual 
location of the phishing site concealed. By doing this, it is difficult to blacklist the site 
and the server being utilised takes more work to discover (Vayansky and Kumar, 2018). 
More importantly is to increase users' security awareness of this threat, by providing 
them with a security feature that helps them identify phishing emails in an easy and 
uncomplicated manner, enabling them to recognise phishing emails to avoid malicious 
links. 
It is irrefutable that the email is the primary method for organisations and individuals to 
communicate in the present-day. However, this is particularly also one of the most well-
known primary methods of conducting cybercrimes, such as identity theft, spreading 
viruses and breaching users’ accounts. The need to improve the security awareness 
among computer users of these threats is evident in media reports (Kruger et al., 2007). 
Moreover, email is both a premium communication tool, and the best inexpensive way 
that companies are using in the present-day to inform customers about the latest 
products and services. However, email is often used to deliver unsolicited material that 
is at best, annoying and at worst, malicious causing considerable harm to customers 
and their computers (Get Safe Online, 2017). Phishing is also causing significant 
damage to businesses. For example, according to Forbes, phishing results damage 
costs US businesses alone around 500$ million every year (Forbes, 2017). 
Phishing emails are reaming a popular method of compromising the security of IT 
systems and most recently are now the main delivery method for ransomware and 
other malware (Jonathan Crowe, 2016). According to the Verizon 2016 Data Breach 
Investigations Report, email attachments have become the number one delivery 
vehicle for malware, with email links coming in at number 3 (Verizon 2016). 
Chapter 6 — Applying the Design Principles 
 
197 | P a g e  
 
Additionally, Clearswift surveyed 600 business decision makers and 1200 employees 
across the UK, US, Germany and Australia, who ranked phishing emails as the top 
threat when asked what they observed as the biggest cybersecurity danger to their 
organisation. In the UK alone, 59% decision makers highlighted email links as the 
biggest concern for their businesses, and they represent the greatest threat to 
companies of all sizes. Putting this threat above any other threat, its position reflects 
the impact that a single malicious email can have on the organisation. One of the key 
solutions, proposed by Clearswift to mitigate risks and improve email security, is to 
educate employees on how to recognize phishing emails and other malicious email 
based tactics used by cybercriminals that will ultimately help ensure the business stays 
safe. Clearswift also claimed that this needs to be further supported by looking into the 
processes, policies in addition to implementing and investing in the security 
technologies to add an extra layer of protection that ensures systems are protected 
from every angle. (Clearswift, 2018). Table 12 presenting a summary of the state of the 
phishing email attacks. 
Table 12: Summary on the State of Phishing Attacks 
Source Key findings 
(Wombat 
Security 
Technologies, 
2017). 
 Phishing attacks continue to grow in size and complexity, 
supported by more aggressive social engineering practices 
that make phishing more difficult to prevent. 
 The organisations surveyed reported that they suffered from 
malware infections (42%), compromised accounts (22%), 
and loss of data (4%) as a direct result of successful phishing 
attacks. 
 The report found that the most popular phishing attack 
templates with the highest click rates included items 
employees expected to see in their work email such as an 
HR document, or a shipping confirmation. For instance, 
employees were more cautious when receiving “consumer” 
emails about topics like gift card notifications, or social 
networking accounts. However, an “urgent email password 
change request” had a 28% average click rate. 
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 Phishing continues to be a very effective attack vector that is 
increasingly responsible for a large number of data breaches 
in the market today. Despite continued investments in a few 
popular security technologies, phishing messages are still 
success in reaching end users and can cause serious 
damages to a company's important data and reputation. 
 61% of the surveyed reported experiencing spear phishing. 
 The impact of phishing attacks can be highly destructive to 
organisations, with 38% of the surveyed suffered disruption 
of employee activities, 27% malware infection, 17% 
compromised accounts and 7% loss of data. 
 The report found that phishing is still a threat that is evolving, 
as 76.5% reported being a victim of a phishing attack in 2016 
down 10% from 2015, 51% believed the rate of phishing 
attacks is increasing, which is 15% less compared to 2015, 
45% believed the rate of phishing attacks is decreasing and 
4% believed the rate has remained the same. 
 Research conducted in 2015 on the Cost of Phishing and 
Value of Employee Training by Wombat and Ponemon 
Institute found that the majority of costs caused by 
successful phishing attacks are the result of the loss of 
employee productivity and uncontained credential 
compromise, among other factors, which together cost an 
average sized company $3.77 million per year. 
 Wombat also stated that awareness is growing, however 
risky behaviours still exist. The survey of the general public 
revealed that more people are aware of the concept of 
phishing than it was estimated. However, these same people 
struggled to identify what ransomware is. Overall, this survey 
points to the fact that there is work to be done to teach people 
how to stay safe. 
(APWG, 2017). 
 APWG saw a steady set of phishing reports and confirmed 
attack sites in the first half of 2017. 
 Numerous hundred companies are frequently targeted, 
every few weeks, while fewer companies being subjected to 
irregular attacks. Over time, some companies are retreating 
completely from lists, replacing them with new and up-and-
coming targets of opportunity. 
 Phishing attacks have occurred frequently in the Payment, 
Financial, and Webmail sectors. 
 There has been an increase in phishing attacks using free 
hosting providers or web site builders. APWG contributor 
PhishLabs has examined what type of resources phishers 
choose to use. According to Crane Hassold, Manager of 
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Threat Intelligence at PhishLabs, there has been an increase 
in the number of phishing attacks using free hosting 
providers or website builders, which is not only easy to use 
and cheap, but also allows threat representatives to create 
subdomains spoofing that targeted brand, resulting in a more 
legitimate-looking phishing site. Free hosts provide an 
additional level of anonymity, as these services do not make 
registrant information readily available, including some of the 
most common hosts used by phishers. 
000WEBHOST.COM, MYJINO.COM, and 
FREEAVAILABLEDOMAINS.COM. The number of Free 
Hosting attacks was increased to 1,939 in June 2017 
compared to 1,323 seen in January 2017. 
 Of the 7,990 phishing incidents reported, many were spread 
via Facebook. Half were hosted in the United States, 
followed by Brazil, as identified by ASN (autonomous system 
number, or network). 
 The number of unique phishing websites detected in June 
2017 was increased to 50,720 compared to 42,889 in 
January 2017. 
 The number of unique phishing email reports (campaigns) in 
June 2017 was decreased to 92,657, compared to 96,148 
seen in January 2017. 
 PhishLabs found that the number of domain names used 
fluctuated from month to month as various phishers used 
different methods to create and mail out phishing URLs. The 
number of domain names used in attacks was increased to 
18,404 in June 2017, compared to 13,977 in January 2017. 
(Wombat 
Security 
Technologies, 
2018). 
 76% of the surveyed infosec professionals reported that their 
organisation experienced a steady or higher volume of 
phishing attacks in 2017 compared to 2016 statistics. 
 53% of infosec professionals reported that their organisation 
has experienced spear phishing in 2017. 
 The report revealed that organisations are using different 
types of tools to train end users to recognize and avoid 
phishing attacks. In this regard, the number of organisations 
using Computer-Based Awareness Training was increased 
in 2017 to 79% compared to 62% seen in 2016. The number 
of organisations using Phishing Simulation Exercises was 
68%, and 46% used Awareness Campaigns (Videos and 
Posters), 45% used In-Person Security Awareness Training 
and 38% used Monthly Notifications or Newsletters. 
 The report found that UK organisations tend to rely on once-
a-year training models and passive security awareness 
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training tools like (videos, newsletters, and email 
notifications) compared to their US counterparts which are 
mostly rely on interactive training. 
 With regards to the phishing impacts, the report revealed that 
the phishing impacts were more broadly felt compared to 
what is seen in 2016, with more than 80% increase in reports 
of malware infection, compromise, and loss of data 
associated with phishing attacks. 
 Types of phishing emails that are people falling for are 
including consumer emails, corporate emails, commercial 
emails and cloud emails. 
 In regards to the most successful phishing templates, the 
report found that although the click rates were dropped to an 
average, the combat against phishing is undoubtedly 
continuing. The report revealed alarmingly figures of a high 
failure rates regarding the themes and topics that are most 
tempting to end users. In this regard, the most successful 
simulated phishing templates were including Online 
Shopping Security Updates with a rate of 86%, Corporate 
Voicemail from Unknown Caller with a rate of 86% and in 
addition to a rate of 89% Corporate Email Improvements. 
6.4 The Need for Raised Awareness of Spotting Phishing Emails 
There is no surprise that the main tools currently used as the first line of defence in 
combating phishing emails, are the filtering algorithms and tools that are used by email 
applications. However, there are some flaws that require improvement in this first line 
of defence. For example, some legitimate emails are often classified as spam or 
phishing emails and some spam or phishing emails may be classified as legitimate 
emails. It should be mentioned that it is out of the scope of this research to examine 
the performance or the reliability of the algorithms used in the email filters, but rather it 
focuses on how to make users fully aware of the phishing email in the case that the 
email reaches the users’ mailbox. 
Users receive phishing emails almost every day. However, there is a lack of support to 
raise the security awareness for the users in the case that the phishing email has 
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reached their mailbox. The current information provided to users regarding these 
phishing emails are often inadequate and sometimes misleading which makes it harder 
for users to be appropriately aware of the threats. This flaw and shortcomings are 
hindering the efforts to make users aware of the phishing emails threats and therefore 
users in such situations may not able to take the appropriate security precautions that 
help to protect them from the associated threats. 
Users of the email application are provided with a means to block emails before 
reaching their mailbox or moving them to a junk email folder, however, they are not 
appropriately informed, warned and made aware of what the spam or phishing emails 
actually are. 
Email services are among the preferred methods for cybercriminals to target users. To 
protect users, there are many tools and solutions that have been developed to keep 
users from being victims of cyber criminals. The majority of these tools and solutions 
are covering one side of the picture which is the technical side, and have not done 
enough in terms of increasing security awareness of users by informing them about 
potential risks associated with blocked phishing emails, and phishing links and 
attachments before they take actions that unblock the content. Increasing the 
awareness of users before unblocking any content is a key factor to avoid users 
becoming victims of this attack, and to avoid any possible security implications. 
There is currently no adequate security guidance and feedback available within the 
email applications that provide support and help to users to make the appropriate 
security decision to protect themselves from the security risks associated with blocked 
email messages, which could potentially be scam or phishing emails. The currently 
available option is only alerting the user in an inadequate manner by informing the 
users that the email has been blocked. However, what is actually missing in this 
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situation is to provide appropriate security guidance accompanying this risk. 
Furthermore, at this point, users need an appropriate security guidance to take the 
required security countermeasures that would mitigate the security risks which would 
help to protect them from the potential risks. 
Two of the candidate applications that have been evaluated and identified with flaws 
and shortcomings in making users appropriately aware when a phishing email reaches 
their mailbox, are the Microsoft Outlook and YAHOO email. 
The next section provides an example of the proposed solution and provides illustrative 
examples of how the current interface design of the Microsoft Outlook application can 
be improved by applying the identified design principles and guidelines. 
6.5 Proposed Solution for Combating Phishing Emails 
Phishing is growing and it evolves to avoid detection and bypass defences (Vayansky 
and Kumar, 2018). Users receive phishing emails on a daily basis. However, there is a 
lack of support to raise the security awareness for the users in cases where the 
phishing email reached the user mailbox. The current security guidance and the 
security information provided to users regarding these phishing emails are inadequate, 
which makes it harder for users to recognise and be aware of the phishing emails 
threats. This flaw and shortcomings can be perceived to be an effort obstacle to make 
users aware of the phishing emails threats in the first place. Therefore, users in such 
situations may not be able to take the appropriate security precautions to avoid risks 
associated with the phishing emails. 
In order to combat phishing emails and mitigate its implications, Figure 73 illustrates 
the proposed anti-phishing solution in which phishing emails can be combatted by 
adopting targeted security awareness-raising approach as the last protection stage 
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designed to increase security awareness for users if a phishing email arrived in the 
users' mailbox. 
 
Figure 73: Proposed solution for combating phishing emails 
Prevent Phishing from reaching the user 
• Block malicious and phishing websites. 
• Filter phishing emails. 
Detect Phishing 
• Use indicators in web browsers. 
• Use anti-phishing tools and solutions. 
Assist users in spotting the Phishing emails when they reach users’ mailbox 
• Provide a clear classification of the blocked emails. 
• Provide a clear notification to spot the phishing email. 
Combating 
phishing 
emails
First Stage:
Prevent Phishing 
from reaching the 
user
Second stage:
Detect Phishing 
emails
Third stage:
Provide targeted 
security awareness 
raising to assist the 
user in spotting 
phishing
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• Provide adequate security information and advice to users about the blocked 
email to make them fully aware of the threat. 
• Provide a feature for the user to learn more information about how to recognise 
phishing emails. 
The first stage in combating phishing emails is to prevent them from reaching the user 
at the first instance by filtering out phishing emails. There is no doubt that the main tool 
currently used as the first line of defence to achieve this, is the email filtering algorithms 
and tools that are used by email applications. However, there are some flaws that 
require improvement in this first line of defence. For example, in many cases, email 
filters failed to detect and accurately identify phishing emails, since attackers use 
sophisticated methods to bypass the employed defences and reach unprotected and 
unaware users, there is a possibility that they succeed in their try in case the employed 
tools and algorithms are unsuccessful to prevent the phishing emails from reaching the 
users mailbox. 
The second stage is to accurately identify the phishing emails. As per current 
performance of the email filters, there is a lack in accurately identifying and classifying 
the phishing emails, which results in many cases the phishing success in bypassing 
the employed defences and reaches the users’ mailbox. For example, some legitimate 
emails are being classified as spam or phishing emails and vice versa. 
While the first two stages are proposed here to address the technical aspect of the 
problem, the third phase proposed to address the lack of security awareness of the end 
users in spotting phishing emails. Therefore, it should be mentioned that it is out of the 
scope of this research to examine the performance or the reliability of the algorithms 
used in the email filters and discuss in detail the prevention and the detection tools and 
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mechanisms used for preventing and detecting phishing emails. The objective of this 
research is to focus on adopting targeted security awareness-raising approach to make 
users fully aware of the phishing email message when it arrives a user's mailbox. 
The third stage is based on making improvements in the current user interfaces of the 
email applications in spotting phishing emails, by applying the identified design 
principles and guidelines. The first step in this stage is to provide a clear classification 
of the blocked email, the second step is to provide a clear notification to spot the 
phishing email, and the third step is to provide adequate security information and 
advice to the users about the blocked email to make the user fully aware of the risk. 
The fourth step is to provide a feature for the user to learn more information about how 
to recognize phishing email messages. 
6.6 Evaluation methods 
The usability of the current Microsoft Outlook interface design was assessed using an 
informal cognitive walkthrough method. The current interface design has been 
inspected, and some aspects have been identified that could be improved based on 
the proposed design principles and guidelines described in Chapter 5. 
The Cognitive Walkthrough has been defined in many ways as presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13: Different definitions for Cognitive Walkthrough method 
Source Definitions 
(Wharton et al., 
1994). 
The Cognitive Walkthrough is a usability inspection method that 
focuses on evaluating a design for ease of learning, particularly 
by exploration. 
(usability.gov, 
2018). 
An inspection method for evaluating the design of a user 
interface, with special attention to how well the interface 
supports exploratory learning, i.e., first-time use without formal 
training. The evaluation is done by having a group of evaluators 
go step-by-step through commonly used tasks. It can be 
performed by evaluators in the early stages of design, before 
performance testing is possible. 
 
(usabilitybok.org, 
2018) 
 
The cognitive walkthrough is a usability evaluation method in 
which one or more evaluators work through a series of tasks and 
ask a set of questions from the perspective of the user. The 
focus of the cognitive walkthrough is on understanding the 
system's learnability for new or infrequent users. 
As per Whitten and Tygar (1999), in order to conduct a cognitive walkthrough, the 
evaluators need to go step-by-step through the software as if they were novice users, 
trying to mentally simulate what the novices’ understanding of the software would be 
at each point, and looking for potential errors and areas of confusion. As an 
assessment tool, cognitive walkthrough focuses primarily on the user's ability to learn, 
and as such, is an appropriate tool for assessing the usability of security. 
While the provided analysis in this chapter is primarily described as a cognitive 
walkthrough, it also combines aspects of another technique, primarily heuristic 
evaluation. In this technique, the user interface is assessed against a specific list of 
usability principles. The Heuristic assessment is ideally performed by people who are 
experts and are very familiar with both the application area and the techniques and 
requirements of use such as background of people expected to use the program 
(Whitten and Tygar, 1999). 
Chapter 6 — Applying the Design Principles 
 
207 | P a g e  
 
6.7 Improved Interface Design of Spotting Phishing Emails Using the Proposed 
Design Principles 
The identified design principles and guidelines proposed for targeted security 
awareness have been introduced and discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The 
reason for proposing these design principles and guidelines is to assist in the 
development and the design of interfaces that are associated with the security 
environment, and particularly treating and overcoming the flaws of the user interface 
design, by ensuring that the users are provided with the necessary information that 
makes them aware of the risks they may encounter. These design principles are 
identified from the prior experimental work. They have been established and introduced 
to address the essentials in a security environment and in particular to serve the 
objective of increasing users’ security awareness through improving the security 
features that are included in some applications that users deal with on a daily basis. 
These principles are perceived as a security domain-specific user interface design that 
focused on specific design issue in the security environment which should make them 
easier to comply with and be implemented. 
In the next section, some of the design principles are discussed in more detail by 
illustrating the current interface design of the surveyed applications, and the improved 
interface design of Microsoft Outlook using the proposed design principles, which 
should assist the user on how to spot phishing emails and provide a clear indications 
and enhanced security visuals of the security risks associated the suspected blocked 
email. 
6.7.1 Applying Principles 1 and 2: Severity of the Security Risk and the Security Visuals 
The interface should always keep users informed about the current state of the security 
risk through the use of appropriate visual indications before taking any actions. 
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Currently, in order to identify and inspect the sender's email, users need to click on the 
sender's email address and determine whether the email is from a legitimate address. 
Figure 74 shows the only way that users can inspect and identify the sender's email 
address using the current version of Outlook. Although it has been detected as a 
phishing email in this case, it does not provide any security information or guidance for 
the user before or while making a decision to unblock the email content. 
 
Figure 74: Inspecting the sender's email using MS Outlook taken in 2017 
In such situation, it is unlikely that novice users or users with average computer skills 
would have the experience to take these security precautions. It would be challenging 
for them to identify and inspect the sender's email address, given the lack of awareness. 
The screenshots presented in Figures 75, 76, 77, 78 and 79 are illustrating some 
examples of the current notifications used by Microsoft Outlook to inform the user about 
the blocked emails. 
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Figure 75: Detecting phishing email in Microsoft Outlook 
 
Figure 76: The current Microsoft Outlook warning message for blocked email 
 
Figure 77: The used warning message for blocked email by Microsoft Outlook 
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Figure 78: Different warning message for blocked email by Microsoft Outlook 
 
Figure 79: The used warning message for blocked email by Microsoft Outlook 
Another application examined is the YAHOO email application. In contrast, YAHOO 
email has not done better in terms of informing the users about the potential risks 
associated with the phishing email as per screenshots are shown in Figures 80 and 81. 
Moreover, YAHOO email’s current version is not offering the user any type of clear 
security notifications when a suspected phishing email reached the user mailbox. On 
the other hand, in some cases, it warns the user by providing a vague warning message 
only when the user clicks on an active link in the blocked email as per screenshot is 
shown in Figure 82. Furthermore, it did not provide any means of security information 
and security guidance for the user to access if in doubt, to assist the users to 
understand the risk and the consequences of clicking or reacting to this potential 
phishing email. Additionally, it failed to provide this opportunity in other cases of 
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blocked emails which were phishing emails as per screenshots are shown in Figures 
83 and 84. 
 
Figure 80: Detecting phishing email in YAHOO email 
 
Figure 81: Blocked email content by YAHOO email 
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Figure 82: Warning message by YAHOO email when clicking on a link in a blocked email 
 
Figure 83: Blocked email content by YAHOO email 
 
Figure 84: Blocked email content by YAHOO email 
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Clearly users should be alerted to the severity of the security risk of the blocked email, 
to avoid confusion to the user. Users should also receive a clear indication of the 
current security status, including notifications and warnings. This will allow the user to 
easily observe the security risk of the blocked email. An example of this is the use of 
varied banners with background colour codes to attract attention and signify the 
severity of the security risk and/or inform the user whether the email is from a trusted 
sender. This should be accompanied with suitable warning signs, for example by using 
coloured warning triangles which all users are familiar with, which is displayed in the 
left corner of the banners as shown in Figures 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 and 92, to 
attract attention and signify severity. This should persuade the user to take the required 
precautions and appropriate actions. This proposed clear visible security warning 
message should help users to comprehend the security risk quickly and make them 
aware of the risks in a consistent manner. 
 
Figure 85: Proposed warning message when a phishing email is identified 
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Figure 86: Proposed warning message when a phishing email is identified 
 
Figure 87: Proposed warning message when a suspected phishing email is detected 
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Figure 88: Proposed warning message when a suspected phishing email is detected 
 
Figure 89: Proposed warning message when a Spam email is detected 
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Figure 90: Proposed warning message when a Spam email is detected 
 
Figure 91: Proposed notification when receiving an email from a trusted sender 
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Figure 92:  Proposed notification when receiving an email from a trusted sender 
6.7.2 Applying Principle 3: Simplified Security Explanation 
In addition to the security visuals, and based on the results obtained from the prior 
experimental work, users with average computer skills are also appreciate the 
presence of text that explains the specifics of the security threat in a common language, 
with the least possible use of technological terminology, and avoiding presenting 
irrelevant information and options. The language used should be suitable for first-time 
as well as advanced users, in which there should be a balance between the need to 
provide adequate information for a first time user while not providing surplus 
information for an experienced user. This will help users to comprehend and correlate 
the presented security visuals with the security explanation of the security threats they 
are facing. For example, if the interface is providing vague, irrelevant, confusing, or 
inadequate information, the user may not comprehend the security risk and as a result, 
they may act inappropriately which may leads to compromise their system. 
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In relation to providing simplified security explanation issue, the Microsoft Outlook 
offers to users to click on a link to decide whether it is not spam or to show the blocked 
content. Microsoft Outlook also adds more confusion by not specifying the suspicious 
email clearly. For instance, whether it is a spam or a phishing email, whether is certainly 
a phishing email that it has been detected or a suspected phishing email. As per the 
current interface design, it is in some cases categorises both spam and phishing emails 
as spam emails, whereas there is a difference between them, apart from the fact that 
both are associated with cybercriminal activities. The same flaw has been identified in 
the YAHOO email application. 
In these apparent examples, in the current version of the surveyed email applications, 
users face a situation where they need to make security decisions while improper and 
inadequate guidance or advice is provided to them. As a result, this will not make users 
appropriately aware of the threat and practically hindrance the ability of the users to 
make an appropriate and informed decision that leads to protecting their devices and 
data. 
In the screenshots shown earlier in Figures 76 and 77, Microsoft Outlook has blocked 
an email as a spam and warned the user with a message of yellow background setting 
stating that “This message was identified as spam. We'll delete it after 3 days. It's not 
spam| Show blocked content” and offers links to the user to click and decide that this 
is email is not a spam or to show blocked content. In other occasions, it blocks similar 
suspected phishing email from a different illegitimate sender and potentially a scammer 
and warned the user in a different way with a message as presented per screenshots 
in Figures 78 and 79 with red background setting stating that “This sender failed our 
fraud detection checks and may not be who they claim to be”. This design has the 
potential to be a misleading security guidance that potentially leads the user to take 
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inappropriate actions, which potentially lead to compromising the user account and as 
a result the theft of user’s sensitive information. 
This flaw can be tackled by providing only the relevant information to the user at this 
stage. Users at this stage needs a very clear message and notification that explains 
the threat associated with the blocked email and what actually the type of the email 
that has been blocked. There should be no options presented to the users in the banner 
to decide whether it is a spam email or not, instead and as a solution, users should be 
informed clearly whether the blocked email is a phishing email, spam email, suspected 
phishing email or a trusted email. Examples are presented on screenshots in Figures 
93, 94, 95, and 96. These screenshots are demonstrating the proposed security 
warning message or notification by improving the banners appearance and the warning 
message content when a phishing email has been blocked. 
 
Figure 93: Proposed warning message of an identified phishing email 
 
Figure 94: Proposed warning message of a suspected phishing email 
 
Figure 95: Proposed warning message of a suspected spam email 
 
Figure 96: Proposed notification message of a trusted email 
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6.7.3 Applying Principle 4: Proposed Recommendation 
It has been noticed from the previous experimental work conducted during this 
research that there is significant advantage of providing adequate security information 
and advice to the users to deal with security risks. This is required to enable the users 
to take the necessary actions that safeguard their crucial IT systems and data. For 
example, providing a Learn more security information and advice link could be offered 
to the users in this situation to provide preliminary security guidance and feedback 
when necessary that can help the user make informed decisions at the right time and 
when it needed. The security guidance should be brief, specific about the risk and with 
the necessary information that has the least possible use of technical terminology. An 
example of what an adequate security information and security advice in this situation 
might include the following: 
Security information: 
 This email has been blocked because our email filters were unable to verify the 
sender's integrity. 
 There is a potential that this email might be sent to you by a hacker or scammer to 
trick you into disclosing personal information and passwords that will result in 
stealing your sensitive and valuable information. 
 There is a potential risk that your computer gets malware if you unblock the content 
of this email. 
Security advice: 
  You are advised to check the sender's or the company's email by checking the 
sender's address to verify the integrity of the sender by clicking or hovering over the 
email address of the senders. 
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 Do not block the content if you are unsure about the content or the sender and 
delete this email immediately. 
 Never follow links or open attachments in suspicious or unsolicited emails. If in 
doubt, or if you need further assistance, contact directly the company that claims to 
have sent it. 
 Please check that your anti-virus is up to date to avoid acquiring malware as a result 
of unblocking the content of this email. 
This security information and advice has the potential to help and support users by 
making them aware of the threat, thus contributing to mitigate the security risks that the 
users may encounter if a suspicious email has reached their mailbox. However, as with 
the current settings of the notification message used in Microsoft Outlook, offering a 
link to the user to unblock the content without providing adequate security guidance 
and adequate information, may result in the user becoming a victim of a scam. In the 
case that users are still in doubt, a wider information could be offered to them to learn 
more about the blocked email for example by offering a webpage that provides further 
security information and details associated with the encountered threat. 
In the proposed security message that contains the security information and advice, 
users are also offered a link to (Learn more information about how to recognize 
phishing email messages) at the bottom of the security message, to acquire more 
information if they are still not appropriately aware of what is the risk to learn more 
security information and advice about phishing emails, as shown in Figures 97, 98 and 
99. This will be critical if the users are uncertain about the blocked email. Providing this 
additional feature will give the users the opportunity to learn more information about 
how to recognize phishing emails. Microsoft has provided a webpage to educate users 
on how to protect themselves from phishing. However, at present, Microsoft has not 
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provided this opportunity when the task in hand within Outlook when a suspicious 
phishing email identified or blocked. The webpage is provided here: 
https://support.microsoft.com/en-ph/help/4033787/windows-protect-yourself-from-
phishing. 
The security information and the recommended advice provided in the new proposed 
design, should help to raise the security awareness for the users before taking actions 
to unblock suspected phishing emails. This proposed design approach has the 
potential to provide support to users at the point of need, in order to take the necessary 
security precautions and make informed decisions. 
 
Figure 97: Proposed appearance of security message for detected phishing emails 
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Figure 98: Proposed appearance of security message for suspected phishing emails 
 
Figure 99: Proposed appearance of security message for Spam emails 
The previous design of the warning pop-windows has been criticised as not an ideal 
friendly user interface with potential dense nature and high volume of text on the 
information, and recommendations provided. Therefore, the warning security pop-
windows have been revised and the associated appearance and the content based on 
user feedback are significantly improved by reducing the amount of information and 
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making it as focused and concise as possible. These improvements are presented in 
Figures 100, 101 and 102. 
 
Figure 100: Improved appearance and content of the security message for detected phishing emails 
 
Figure 101: Improved appearance and content of the security message for suspected phishing emails 
 
Figure 102: Improved appearance and content of the security message for Spam emails 
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6.7.4 Applying Principle 5: Minimal Intrusion 
In this regard, within the current interface of the Microsoft Outlook application, the 
currently used security notifications using banners in the Microsoft Outlook application 
are not inhibiting the user from completing their everyday tasks and does not intrude 
on screen space. Moreover, the warning message currently used in the Microsoft 
Outlook application does not interfere or affect the other components of the interface, 
i.e., it does not block, modify, overlap or make the interface harder to interact by the 
user. Therefore, no significant changes or improvements have been made apart from 
improving the background colour codes and the appearance of the banners. However, 
regarding the number of actions that require interaction or clicks  that are involving 
users to interact or click on two links in which two options to perform (i.e. to decide It's 
not spam or to Show blocked content), in the improved design users are only see one 
link that leads to a security information and advice to understand the risk and if they 
still unsure or not yet fully aware of the threat, they can access to a broader information 
by clicking on the provided link in the pop up security panel/window to (Learn how to 
spot phishing emails). 
6.7.5 Applying Principle 6: Aiding the Decision Latency 
While the current design of Microsoft Outlook does not provide any means or feature 
for the user to obtain additional information regarding the potential risks, the new 
design has improved the current situation by providing an option to the user to access 
broader information if the user is still unaware of the threat, and not been able to 
comprehend the security risk. 
The improved design is simple and streamlined without confusing the user, for example, 
the proposed designs of the warning messages are consisting a very specific and clear 
description of the type of the blocked email. For instance, when a phishing email has 
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been identified which represents the highest security risk, the presented message at 
this situation is (This email has been identified as a phishing email. Learn more security 
information and advice), the second situation is when suspected phishing email has 
been detected which represents the second degree in terms of the security risk, the 
presented message at this condition is (This email is suspected to be a phishing email. 
Learn more security information and advice). The third situation is when a suspected 
spam email has been blocked, the presented message is (This email is suspected to 
be a spam. Learn more security information and advice), which represents the third 
degree in terms of the security risk and the last type of the presented message is a 
notification to inform the user that the received email is from a trusted sender and the 
message used is (This message is from a trusted sender). The reason for this design 
viewpoint is that providing a different and clear classification of security warnings will 
be practical to assist the users to comprehend, and differentiate between the severities 
risks associated with suspicious emails, and to make them appropriately aware of the 
differences between the blocked emails. 
In the proposed design users are  appropriately aware of the threat, and the time 
requires users to spend assessing the information in order to assist them making an 
informed security decision without the need to search for further information is 
simplified, and curtailed in which users will not be required to search for further 
information. The required and the necessary security information is provided by clicking 
on one link and was made to be easily accessible. 
6.7.6 Applying Principle 7: Level of Detail and Clarity 
As mentioned earlier in the previous sections, users may need to know the level of the 
security consideration that they need to take into account, and what is the nature of 
details that required them to look at, to inspect whether the blocked email is from 
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legitimate or official sender/organisation. For example, users should have the option to 
acquire more information that explains how to identify and inspect whether the sender 
is legitimate or a scammer. 
Although Microsoft has improved the earlier interfaces of Outlook application slightly 
for alerting the user when phishing email is detected and has taken steps towards 
improving the warning design for the users about the blocked emails, Microsoft has not 
done enough in terms of making the users appropriately aware of the phishing emails 
and is still prone to provide the necessary information and assistance that makes the 
user appropriately aware of the threat to mitigate any risks associated with the phishing 
emails. 
Security awareness of the potential risks associated with the phishing emails should 
be raised for users and appropriate security information and advice should be provided 
to users on what they should do if they are not trusting the sender, or the email that 
reached their mailbox. 
It is instead, giving the opportunity for the cybercrimes to be succeed in their quest by 
allowing the user to unblock the blocked email content as mentioned earlier, without 
providing a proper security guidance which would be useful to help the user to make 
the appropriate and informed decision at the right time before unblocking the content 
of the blocked email. 
For more specific assessment, Table 14 presents an assessment of the security 
features of the current and the proposed improved interfaces based on the design 
principles and guidelines discussed in chapter 5. 
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Table 14:  An assessment of current and proposed interfaces’ security features 
The proposed design 
principles 
The current design of the 
interface of Microsoft 
Outlook 
The proposed design of the 
interface of Microsoft Outlook after 
applying proposed design 
principles 
1. Severity of 
Security Risk 
It is using only two different 
background colours to 
demonstrate the severity of 
security risk. However, the 
used background colour 
code not quite visible and 
no warning signs are used. 
Improved by using clear 
illustrations that are easy to 
recognize and comprehend by 
users, which helps to diagnose the 
threat and make users pay more 
attention to the security threat that 
has been detected. 
2. Security Visuals Lack of use of background 
colour codes and security 
signs that help to clearly 
notify the user about the 
security status. 
Improved attention to the visibility 
of the security status, by using four 
colour codes accompanied with 
suitable warning signs were used 
(Triangle warning signs), with 
different background colour codes 
that demonstrate without 
confusion the severity of the 
encountered threat. 
3. Simplified 
Security 
Explanation 
Lack of providing Help, and 
proper explanations to 
users to understand the 
encountered threat, which 
may lead users to make 
uninformed decisions. 
This has been ameliorated in the 
proposed design by providing a 
link with a Learn more security 
information about the detected 
threat that provides a clear 
explanation to the users with the 
necessary information about the 
threat. Additional support is 
offered by accessing Microsoft 
webpage that explains how to 
recognize the threat. 
4. Proposed 
Recommendation 
Absence of providing 
proposed 
recommendations to users 
to deal with the detected 
threat. 
Improved by providing security 
recommendations and advice to 
users in order to help them take 
the appropriate and required 
actions that need to be taken to 
avoid compromise. 
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5. Minimal Intrusion Although is not hindering 
the user from performing 
tasks, it provides no 
adequate information and 
only provides a misleading 
message to allow the user 
to click on a link to decide 
that the blocked email “It’s 
not a spam” or to click on 
“Show blocked content”. 
Has no intrusion. It provides and 
equips the users with the 
necessary information, by 
accessing security information to 
acquiring more recommendations 
about the threat that has been 
detected. 
6. Aiding the 
Decision Latency 
Users have no means of 
support at the time when 
the security threat is 
presented, in terms of any 
sort of available information 
to understand the threat 
that has been detected, 
hence user is forced to 
search for more information 
in order to understand the 
risk, which may require 
more time to search 
around. This may frustrate 
users if they spend too long 
looking, which may lead 
them to give up and thus 
remain unprotected. 
It requires the most minimal time 
for users to assess information 
that is necessary to help them 
understand the security threat that 
has been detected, and 
consequently making an informed 
decision without needing to search 
for more information, as they are 
only required to visit the Microsoft 
webpage that explains how to 
recognize this threat. 
7. Level of Detail 
and Clarity 
The currently used 
interfaces do not provide 
the necessary and required 
details and clarity about the 
detected security threat, 
which makes the user 
uncertain to understand 
and deal appropriately with 
the detected threat. 
Enhanced by providing the 
necessary details and clarity to 
help users understand the 
detected security threat and make 
them aware of the detected threat 
and deal with it appropriately 
without being overwhelmed by the 
superfluous information. 
6.8 Conclusions 
Security issues are being increasingly recognised by IT users, as more security-related 
features are being introduced in a range of applications. However, based on the 
examples discussed in this chapter, it is clear that the effort to highlight aspects related 
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to security issues is still inadequate in raising sufficient awareness among users about 
the security risks they encounter in their daily use of IT systems. 
Microsoft Outlook has not progressed from its previous version, meaning that it still 
provides similar warning messages and notifications when a suspicious email is 
blocked, which is almost representing a phishing email. Although the new interface 
design of the Microsoft Outlook application is slightly enhanced compared to its 
previous interface design, the new design does not introduce any fundamental 
changes that help familiarise users with the phishing email threat, or assist them to 
make an informed security decision before unblocking the content of the blocked email. 
The proposed new design principles are considered to be achievable. To demonstrate 
this, improvements were made to the warning messages and notifications that are 
currently used in the interface of the Microsoft Outlook email application, which either 
do not exist in the current version, or that requires improvements. These improvements 
are intended to redesign the graphical user interface in a manner that will help make 
the users aware of the security risk encountered and simultaneously be easier to use. 
Furthermore, additional attention was paid in the newly proposed interfaces so that the 
use of security features would be improved. For instance, some security signs (warning 
triangles signs to make the warning message more visible) were added, more visible 
background colour codes were used to demonstrate the difference between the 
severity risk, additional functionality was added using links such as, “Learn more 
security information and advice”, to raise the security awareness for the users about 
the detected phishing email, before taking actions to unblock the suspected or the 
identified email. Furthermore, in the warning message, users were offered to visit a 
webpage provided by Microsoft for users to access more information about how to 
recognise phishing email messages. 
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Although this research has conveyed an interesting result in terms of opportunities for 
improvement, it has only achieved an assessment of the appearance level of the 
surveyed application and how the proposed design principles and guidelines would 
help to make users aware of the encountered security threat in a more apparent 
manner. 
The new design principles and guidelines have been applied to the interface of the 
application and compared with the current interface design of the application. The 
results reflect the need for improvement of the current design, which will raise the 
awareness of the user to aid them in spotting phishing threats. 
Chapter 7 — Conclusions and Future Work 
 
232 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the concrete contributions and the 
achievements of the research. The limitations of the research are then summarised 
and followed by identifying the potential opportunities for future work. Finally, the future 
of cybersecurity awareness is highlighted. 
7.1 Contributions and Achievements of the Research 
The research aims and objectives which were initially planned and set in Chapter 1 
have been accomplished, with an experimental study leading to the development of a 
series of related design principles and guidelines for targeted security awareness-
raising approach which has been applied to the appearance of email notifications that 
aim to assist users in spotting phishing threats. The fundamental contributions and 
achievements of this research are briefly listed below: 
 The research highlighted that although there are security features included in the 
applications that users deal with on a daily basis, and there is a presence of design 
principles and guidelines to build applications that contain consistent user 
interfaces and adequate information, the developers of these applications are prone 
to releasing a reliable application that provides adequate security information and 
advice for users to understand the security issue and to make them appropriately 
aware of the threats that they may encounter during their use of these applications. 
Moreover, it should help them recognise the threats in an apparent manner to 
mitigate any security risks associated with these threats. 
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 The results obtained from the experimental study are very encouraging and are 
based primarily on the use of targeted security awareness-raising approach by 
developing the interfaces of some applications that lack adequate information 
which helps to make the users aware of the potential security risk. It can be argued 
that this approach is primarily aiming at increasing user security awareness by 
providing adequate information and recommendations to users regarding the 
potential risks, and leaving users with the option to make informed decisions based 
on providing adequate security information and recommendations to mitigate 
security risks and its related implications. 
 From the investigation conducted during this research to examine the opportunities 
for applying this approach in other security scenarios, it can be said that despite the 
availability of a good design principles that are recognised in terms of effectiveness 
and their wide use, does not mean neglecting the development of new principles in 
line with new requirements that may arise as a result of several factors, including 
the possibility of shortcomings in the existing user interfaces of some applications, 
as well as the evolving and changing of the potential security risks faced by users. 
 One of the most important contributions of this research is the introduction and 
discussion of new design principles and guidelines for security features that can be 
used to improve the security of IT systems, by modifying the interfaces to increase 
the security awareness of the users. This objective can be accomplished by moving 
towards making the users aware through focusing on educating users about the 
security threats they are facing and assisting them by providing appropriate security 
recommendations so they can make informed decisions. 
 Another contribution of this research is that it highlighted the possibility of 
developing user interfaces for some of the prominent applications currently used to 
effectively protect systems and data, by improving the design of user interfaces 
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currently used, to help increase security awareness of the users in order to improve 
their decisions. 
 Besides, an additional contribution of this research is that it has introduced an 
innovative, promising and an effective approach that can be relied on to increase 
user security awareness by ensuring that security guidance and feedback is 
available during the task in hand, providing effective information to help the users 
to make the right decision at the right time to avoid security risks. The use of the 
targeted security awareness raising approach to increase the security awareness 
of users has become more imperative than ever before. It is an emerging area that 
has the potential to be considered as a valuable method for raising the security 
awareness of end-users. This can be achieved without the need for any additional 
costs, such as, training users, or make substantial changes to the systems currently 
in use. The only requirement is to develop the user interfaces by appropriately 
optimizing the existing security tools and features used in a variety of applications, 
to increase users' security awareness of the potential threats. 
 Despite the existence of some examples where some prominent software 
developers have adopted and implemented targeted security awareness-raising 
approach in their software (as discussed in chapter 3), along with evidence of 
related studies, this research observed that there is a lack of direct and extensive 
research and studies that explores and investigates targeted security awareness-
raising approach profoundly. This emphasizes that there is an imperative need for 
further research to study this approach. This work paves the way for further 
research and studies in this field and outlines the possible application areas to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in other security scenarios. 
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7.2 Limitations of the Research 
Despite the tangible achievements of this research and the fact that objectives have 
been met, some issues have identified, which may have limited the work progress and 
findings. The key limitations of the research are briefed below: 
 There were insufficient resources and a lack in the literature that precisely explores, 
discusses and evaluates the implementation of the targeted security awareness-
raising approach and its effectiveness. Therefore, all the discussions are built on 
the diligence and self-effort of exploring the potential opportunities for implementing 
this approach in some security scenarios. 
 Although the effectiveness of the targeted security awareness-raising approach has 
been assessed through a wide pilot study that involved 100 participants by using a 
prototype software that simulates the process of viewing available Wi-Fi networks 
and allowing the user to connect to the most appropriate network in different given 
scenarios. The results were encouraging and promising in adopting this approach 
in raising users’ awareness of the potential threats. It should be noted that was not 
a full implementation of a new software that detects Wi-Fi networks and reads a 
real Wi-Fi networks data and provides a feedback and recommendations based on 
an actual data. It should be also noted that this was to establish, provide evidence 
and evaluate the effectiveness of the targeted security awareness-raising approach 
in increasing users’ awareness by conducting an experimental study. Considering 
the research nature, a full implementation of the software in a real environment was 
not required to prove and evaluate the effectiveness of this approach. Therefore, it 
should mentioned that to appraise the practical usefulness of the proposed 
approach, a full implementation of the software will be very useful to evaluate this 
approach in the real environment and can give better understanding of the 
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effectiveness of it, bearing in mind that high programming skills and enough time 
are required for a full implementation such software. 
 Moreover, although the new design principles have been devised to adopt the 
targeted security awareness-raising approach and apply these design principles to 
improve user interfaces for Microsoft Outlook, no empirical study has been 
conducted to assess the effectiveness of the improved interfaces in increasing 
users' awareness of spotting phishing emails. It would, therefore, be very useful to 
conduct a pilot study to evaluate the effectiveness of the improved interfaces of 
email applications on this aspect. 
 Due to issues and difficulties which were experienced during the course of this 
research, only two scenarios where investigated in which the targeted security 
awareness raising approach can be useful, and this was achieved by either a pilot 
study or applying the design principles in existing interfaces of applications. 
However, it would better to investigate further opportunities by conducting further 
empirical studies to broadly explore this approach and to deeply investigate the 
effectiveness of it. 
7.3 Opportunities for Future Work 
This research programme has in general perspective introduced a new approach in the 
field of raising the security awareness of the users with design principles and guidelines 
for targeted security awareness in particular. However, there are a number of 
opportunities for empirical work and further investigations which can be carried out in 
order to better evaluate and understand the areas precisely related to this research. 
These opportunities are listed below: 
 One of the most important possible future work for this research is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the targeted security awareness approach in other security 
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scenarios, where there are weaknesses and lack of user interfaces that make users 
aware of the potential security risks they may face, and also inadequate 
recommendations provided to users to make better security decisions that 
contribute to protection of their devices and data and/or reduce the security 
implications of any security breach. 
 In addition, this research can also be further developed to include the evaluation of 
interfaces of some applications currently in use, find the shortcomings in them and 
study the possibility of developing these interfaces by adhering to the new design 
principles, which aims to improve the user interfaces currently used in some 
applications in order to increase the security awareness by adopting the targeted 
security awareness-raising approach for users. In general, it can be argued that 
there is a broad scope to study and evaluate the effectiveness of the targeted 
security awareness-raising approach for users by conducting further empirical 
studies on other security scenarios. 
7.4 The Future of Cybersecurity Awareness 
Users are often referred to as the weakest link in the information security chain. This is 
mainly due to a number of factors, the primary factor is the lack of security awareness 
among users regarding the emerging and evolving security threats. Moreover, unaware 
users can pose more risks to their organisations’ IT security and potentially can be the 
root cause of security breaches, for example by responding to phishing emails, visiting 
malware infected websites, writing their passwords down or sharing them with others, 
or even providing sensitive information over the phone when exposed to social 
engineering.  In order to transform the weakest link into a primary defence line against 
cybersecurity threats and to strengthen them in an information security perspective, 
there are different and diverse methods employed to support them. These methods are 
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ranging from simple, such as the use of posters, scheduled security awareness 
campaigns, to the most ratified method which is conducting security awareness 
programs designed to cover specific security topics. The number of security threats is 
increasing and becoming more complex as cybercriminals create new ways to breach 
IT systems. This makes it difficult to rely solely on the material provided in these 
security programs. Furthermore, users may forget what they have been trained over 
time and are likely to get confused by the similarity of security-related topics. 
In addition, security awareness programs are often criticised for their lack of 
appropriate materials, the methodology which they are implemented, and the ability of 
staff to comprehend and practice the acquired material. Despite the notable criticism, 
security awareness programs like all related efforts, are to mitigate security risks rather 
than fully preventing security threats from taking a place, consequently they need to be 
implemented appropriately. 
Furthermore, organisations may tend to rely on “One-size-fits-all” or may be tempted 
by a “set it and forget it” security awareness programs. These organisations should 
exercise caution when adopting these approaches, as they may lose the ability to 
respond to the emerging threats or mitigate their implications. Increasing the security 
awareness of end users is an ongoing issue because of several crucial factors. Firstly, 
the workforce changes over time, staff come, go and roles often also change over time. 
Secondly, threats change and evolve in an accelerated manner, taking ransomware as 
an example, which has been a very different security concern in the last few years 
compared to how it is perceived now. Thirdly, awareness is not the same as knowledge, 
because knowing a threat is not necessarily knowing how to recognise it and respond 
to it. Fourthly, knowledge is not a constant especially in the cybersecurity domain, 
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users tend to forget what they have trained for or what they have gathered from the 
security awareness programs. 
This emphasises the imperative need for innovative techniques and methods to 
increase users' awareness other than using the traditional methods, to provide support 
and assistance and increase the security awareness of the user while dealing with the 
IT systems. Providing adequate security information and guidance in a timely manner 
during the task in hand is a method that has the potential to help the user to deal with 
potential security threats and thus make informed decisions that help protect the user 
and device data. 
From aforementioned, it is clear that there is an imperative need to devise innovative 
methods to increase the security awareness of users while dealing with IT systems 
during their day-to-day operations, when they need support to understand a specific 
security problem. Novice users or users with limited computer skills are representing 
the largest population of computer users, therefore there is a need to ensure that only 
related information is provided to them regarding the potential threats, while in the 
same time ensuring not superfluous information are provided to avoid confusion for 
them. Undoubtedly, there is a need to maintain a balance between security and 
usability. Security should not intrude or hinder the interaction between the user and the 
device. Users are more likely to disable such features if they interfere with the task the 
user is trying to achieve. Furthermore, users should be able to find information when 
needed and not spending too much time to find such information, otherwise they may 
give up on looking up for the information and remain unprotected. No unrealistic 
assumptions about the user should be made by the technology. Users should be able 
to determine the level of protection from the technology. Appropriate warnings and 
status indicators are useful to remind users when such safeguards are not enabled. 
Chapter 7 — Conclusions and Future Work 
 
240 | P a g e  
 
Security awareness tends to be unreliable at times it is needed. One of the most 
promising and innovative methods to effectively increase security awareness for users 
is to use targeted security awareness-raising approach. This approach provides 
guidance and nudges during the task in hand. The experimental study conducted 
during this research exposed the effectiveness of adopting this approach to increase 
the security awareness of users. The study was conducted to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of providing adequate security information and recommendations before 
users connecting to unknown and potentially insecure Wi-Fi networks. The results 
obtained showed that providing adequate security information and the necessary 
guidance and recommendations improved user’s decisions and helped them in making 
better security decisions by choosing secure Wi-Fi networks. 
The Targeted Security Awareness Raising field is a promising and rich area for 
conducting further research and studies and is an innovative method that relies merely 
on providing support, adequate security information, guidance, and recommendations 
to help users make better and informed decisions that protect their data and devices. 
This approach does not require additional costs or make substantial changes to the 
existing IT systems. All that is required to implement this promising new approach is to 
improve existing user interfaces of some applications, which are providing inadequate 
security information and recommendation, and have shortcomings and flaws in their 
interfaces, to provide adequate security information and guidance that are necessary 
for the users to help them to make better security decisions.
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Appendix B– Post-Experiment Participant Feedback (surveys) 
Wi-Fi Interface Testing (Group A) 
 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
 
This survey is being conducted for PhD research on testing different alternatives for 
user interface design in the context of Wi-Fi networking at Plymouth University, United 
Kingdom. The survey aims to investigate and find out whether users would connect or 
continue to connect if they have been given extra informative information before they 
make their decision to access unknown Wi-Fi hotspots within public environments. 
There are 5 main sections in this survey. 
 
Researcher details: 
Najem Mahmoud 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics 
Plymouth University 
Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: najem.mahmoud@plymouth.ac.uk 
Project Supervisors: Prof. Steven Furnell and Dr. Paul Dowland. 
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A note on privacy 
This survey is anonymous. 
The record kept of your survey responses does not contain any identifying 
information about you. 
If you click 'Next', you confirm that you have read and understood the information given, 
understand that you are free to withdraw up until the point of submission of your 
responses, you are 18 years or above, and agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
Section (A) 
 What is your gender? 
Male □  
Female □  
 What is your age group (in years)? 
18-29 □  
30-39 □  
40-49 □  
50-59 □  
60+ □  
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 What is your current employment status: 
Employed □  
Self-employed □  
Student □  
Other □  
 What is your highest educational level? 
Postgraduate (e.g. Masters, PhD) □  
Higher education (e.g. Bachelor Degree, HND, 
Diploma) 
□  
Further education (e.g. Certificates, A-Levels, 
GNVQ) 
□  
Other □  
 
Section (B) 
 The instructions provided were suitably clear. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 To what extent do you feel that you followed the instructions? 
Fully Moderately Partially Did not follow any 
□  □  □  □  
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Section (C)  
 How frequently do you use the following types of Wi-Fi connections? (Please select 
the most appropriate choice for each row).  
 Hourly Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely N/A 
Wi-Fi (Home)   □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Public) □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Work) □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Home), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
 Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Public), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
 Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Work), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
 Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Do you know the difference between secure and unsecure Wi-Fi? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
Section (D)  
 Was the information provided by the software easy to understand? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Do you think the usability aspect can be improved? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "Yes" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 How satisfied were you about the supported information about the presented 
networks? 
Completely 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 Did you feel confident that you connected to an appropriate network? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Did you consider the security aspects of the Wi-Fi network when you made your 
decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 (If yes), did you feel that you had enough information to make a decision about 
whether the network was safe/trustworthy or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
Appendices 
 
266 | Page 
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 What are the security features did you look at when you made your decision? 
The network uses security protocols □  
The network uses encryption 
protocols 
□  
Network Name □  
None of the above □  
 
 Do you know whether the Wi-Fi connection you selected was secure or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Are you aware of the security risks associated with the use of insecure Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
 
Appendices 
 
267 | Page 
 
 Please indicate how concerned are you when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Not at all 
concerned 
Slightly 
concerned 
Moderately 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Extremely 
concerned 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is " Not at all concerned " or " Slightly concerned ", please 
provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
 From your point of view, please rank the security features that the user must take 
into account before using Wi-Fi hotspots. 
 
Very 
important 
Important 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Unimportant 
Very 
unimportant 
Security protocols □  □  □  □  □  
Encryption 
protocols 
□  □  □  □  □  
Network Name □  □  □  □  □  
 
 After your experience today, please rank how likely your behaviour online would be 
changed depending on whether your Wi-Fi connection is secure or not? 
Not at all 
likely 
Slightly 
likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Completely 
Changed 
□  □  □  □  □  
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*Note: If the answer is “Not at all likely " or " Slightly likely ", please provide more 
details in the opposite comments box. 
 
Section (E) 
 This system has the functions and capabilities I expect it to have. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
   
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Overall, I am satisfied with the software system. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
   
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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Wi-Fi Interface Testing (Group B) 
 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
 
This survey is being conducted for PhD research on testing different alternatives for 
user interface design in the context of Wi-Fi networking at Plymouth University, United 
Kingdom. The survey aims to investigate and find out whether users would connect or 
continue to connect if they have been given extra informative information before they 
make their decision to access unknown Wi-Fi hotspots within public environments. 
There are 5 main sections in this survey. 
 
Researcher details: 
Najem Mahmoud 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics 
Plymouth University 
Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: najem.mahmoud@plymouth.ac.uk 
Project Supervisors: Prof. Steven Furnell and Dr. Paul Dowland. 
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A note on privacy 
 
This survey is anonymous. 
The record kept of your survey responses does not contain any identifying 
information about you. 
 
If you click 'Next', you confirm that you have read and understood the information given, 
understand that you are free to withdraw up until the point of submission of your 
responses, you are 18 years or above, and agree to take part in the study. 
Section (A) 
 
 What is your gender? 
Male □  
Female □  
 What is your age group (in years)? 
18-29 □  
30-39 □  
40-49 □  
50-59 □  
60+ □  
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 What is your current employment status: 
Employed □  
Self-employed □  
Student □  
Other □  
 What is your highest educational level? 
Postgraduate (e.g. Masters, PhD) □  
Higher education (e.g. Bachelor Degree, HND, 
Diploma) 
□  
Further education (e.g. Certificates, A-Levels, 
GNVQ) 
□  
Other □  
 
Section (B) 
 The instructions provided were suitably clear. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 To what extent do you feel that you followed the instructions? 
Fully Moderately Partially Did not follow any 
□  □  □  □  
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Section (C)  
 How frequently do you use the following types of Wi-Fi connections? (Please select 
the most appropriate choice for each row).  
 Hourly Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely N/A 
Wi-Fi (Home)   □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Public) □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Work) □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Home), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Public), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Work), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Do you know the difference between secure and unsecure Wi-Fi? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
Section (D) 
 Was the information provided by the software easy to understand? 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Do you think the usability aspect can be improved? 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "Yes" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 How satisfied were you about the supported information about the presented 
networks? 
Completely 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
□  □  □  □  □  
 Did you feel confident that you connected to an appropriate network? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Did you consider the security aspects of the Wi-Fi network when you made your 
decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 (If yes), did you feel that you had enough information to make a decision about 
whether the network was safe/trustworthy or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 What are the security features did you look at when you made your decision? 
 
The network uses security protocols □  
The network uses encryption 
protocols 
□  
Network Name □  
None of the above □  
 
 Do you know whether the Wi-Fi connection you selected was secure or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Are you aware of the security risks associated with the use of insecure Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
 Please indicate how concerned are you when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Not at all 
concerned 
Slightly 
concerned 
Moderately 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Extremely 
concerned 
□  □  □  □  □  
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*Note: If the answer is " Not at all concerned " or " Slightly concerned ", please 
provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
 
 From your point of view, please rank the security features that the user must take 
into account before using Wi-Fi hotspots. 
 
Very 
important 
Important 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Unimportant 
Very 
unimportant 
Security protocols □  □  □  □  □  
Encryption 
protocols 
□  □  □  □  □  
Network Name □  □  □  □  □  
 
 After your experience today, please rank how likely your behaviour online would be 
changed depending on whether your Wi-Fi connection is secure or not? 
Not at all 
likely 
Slightly 
likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Completely 
Changed 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is “Not at all likely " or " Slightly likely ", please provide more 
details in the opposite comments box. 
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Section (E) 
 Does the new design make the information more presentable than the current 
dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Windows platform? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 This system has the functions and capabilities I expect it to have. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
   
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Using the software system was convenient. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
   
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 I think the full implementation of the software can be used to facilitate users in 
choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Overall, I am satisfied with the software system. 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
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Wi-Fi Interface Testing (Group C) 
 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
This survey is being conducted for PhD research on testing different alternatives for 
user interface design in the context of Wi-Fi networking at Plymouth University, United 
Kingdom. The survey aims to investigate the information that users would find useful 
in determining whether or not to connect to unknown Wi-Fi hotspots within different 
public environments. 
 
There are 5 main sections in this survey. 
Researcher details: 
Najem Mahmoud 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics 
Plymouth University 
Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: najem.mahmoud@plymouth.ac.uk 
Project Supervisors: Prof. Steven Furnell and Dr. Paul Dowland. 
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A note on privacy 
This survey is anonymous. 
The record kept of your survey responses does not contain any identifying information 
about you. 
 
If you click 'Next', you confirm that you have read and understood the information 
given, understand that you are free to withdraw up until the point of submission of your 
responses, you are 18 years or above, and agree to take part in the study 
 
 
Section (A) 
 What is your gender? 
Male □  
Female □  
 What is your age group (in years)? 
18-29 □  
30-39 □  
40-49 □  
50-59 □  
60+ □  
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 What is your current employment status: 
Employed □  
Self-employed □  
Student □  
Other □  
 What is your highest educational level? 
Postgraduate (e.g. Masters, PhD) □  
Higher education (e.g. Bachelor Degree, HND, 
Diploma) 
□  
Further education (e.g. Certificates, A-Levels, 
GNVQ) 
□  
Other □  
 
Section (B) 
The instructions provided were suitably clear. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 To what extent do you feel that you followed the instructions? 
Fully Moderately Partially Did not follow any 
□  □  □  □  
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Section (C)  
 How frequently do you use the following types of Wi-Fi connections? (Select the 
most appropriate choice for each row). 
 Hourly Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely N/A 
Wi-Fi (Home)   □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Public) □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Work) □  □  □  □  □  □  
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Home), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Public), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Work), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Do you know the difference between secure and unsecure Wi-Fi? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
Section (D)  
 Was the information provided by the software easy to understand? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Do you think the usability aspect can be improved? 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "Yes" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 Was the security level indicator helpful? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 How satisfied were you about the supported information about the presented 
networks? 
Completely 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 Did you feel confident that you connected to an appropriate network? 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Did you consider the security aspects of the Wi-Fi network when you made your 
decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
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*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 (If yes), did you feel that you had enough information to make a decision about 
whether the network was safe/trustworthy or not 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 What are the security features did you look at when you made your decision? 
The network uses security protocols □  
The network uses encryption 
protocols 
□  
Start Time □  
Previously connected □  
Network Name □  
None of the above □  
 
 Did you find the security information panel useful to help you to make your decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 Do you know whether the Wi-Fi connection you selected was secure or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Are you aware of the security risks associated with the use of insecure Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
 Please indicate how concerned are you when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Not at all 
concerned 
Slightly 
concerned 
Moderately 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Extremely 
concerned 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is " Not at all concerned " or " Slightly concerned ", please 
provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
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 From your point of view, please rank the security features that the user must take 
into account before using Wi-Fi hotspots. 
 
Very 
important 
Important 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Unimportant 
Very 
unimportant 
Security protocols □  □  □  □  □  
Encryption 
protocols 
□  □  □  □  □  
Start Time □  □  □  □  □  
Previously 
connected 
□  □  □  □  □  
Network Name □  □  □  □  □  
Security level 
indicator 
□  □  □  □  □  
 After your experience today, please rank how likely your behaviour online would be 
changed depending on whether your Wi-Fi connection is secure or not? 
Not at all 
likely 
Slightly 
likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Completely 
Changed 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is “Not at all likely " or " Slightly likely ", please provide more 
details in the opposite comments box. 
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Section (E) 
 Does the new design make the information more presentable than the current 
dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Windows platform? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 This system has the functions and capabilities I expect it to have. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Using the software system was convenient. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 I am more confident in using Wi-Fi software that provides security related 
information because it helps me to decide whether it is safe to connect to an 
available Wi-Fi network. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
  *Note: If the answer is " Disagree or Strongly disagree “or “Strongly disagree ", 
please provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
 
 I think the full implementation of the software can be used to facilitate users in 
choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Overall, I am satisfied with the software system. 
 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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Wi-Fi Interface Testing (Group D) 
 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
 
This survey is being conducted for PhD research on testing different alternatives for 
user interface design in the context of Wi-Fi networking at Plymouth University, United 
Kingdom. The survey aims to investigate the information that users would find useful 
in determining whether or not to connect to unknown Wi-Fi hotspots within different 
public environments. 
 
There are 5 main sections in this survey. 
 
Researcher details: 
Najem Mahmoud 
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics 
Plymouth University 
Plymouth, PL4 8AA 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: najem.mahmoud@plymouth.ac.uk   
Project Supervisors: Prof. Steven Furnell and Dr. Paul Dowland. 
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A note on privacy 
This survey is anonymous. 
The record kept of your survey responses does not contain any identifying information 
about you. 
  
If you click 'Next', you confirm that you have read and understood the information 
given, understand that you are free to withdraw up until the point of submission of your 
responses, you are 18 years or above, and agree to take part in the study 
 
Section (A) 
 What is your gender? 
Male □  
Female □  
 What is your age group (in years)? 
18-29 □  
30-39 □  
40-49 □  
50-59 □  
60+ □  
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 What is your current employment status: 
Employed □  
Self-employed □  
Student □  
Other □  
 What is your highest educational level? 
Postgraduate (e.g. Masters, PhD) □  
Higher education (e.g. Bachelor Degree, HND, 
Diploma) 
□  
Further education (e.g. Certificates, A-Levels, 
GNVQ) 
□  
Other □  
Section (B) 
The instructions provided were suitably clear. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 To what extent do you feel that you followed the instructions? 
Fully Moderately Partially Did not follow any 
□  □  □  □  
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Section (C) 
 How frequently do you use the following types of Wi-Fi connections? (Select the 
most appropriate choice for each row).  
 Hourly Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely N/A 
Wi-Fi (Home)   □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Public) □  □  □  □  □  □  
Wi-Fi (Work) □  □  □  □  □  □  
 
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Home), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
                                 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Public), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
 Considering your use of Wi-Fi (Work), please select how frequently do you perform 
the following tasks? 
 
 
Frequently 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
Not used at 
all 
Checking email  □  □  □  
Online banking  □  □  □  
Social networking  □  □  □  
Do bookings □  □  □  
Buying/ Selling goods □  □  □  
Other □  □  □  
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 Do you know the difference between secure and unsecure Wi-Fi? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
Section (D) 
 Was the information provided by the software easy to understand? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Do you think the usability aspect can be improved? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "Yes" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Was the security level indicator helpful? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
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*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 How satisfied were you about the supported information about the presented 
networks? 
Completely 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Completely 
dissatisfied 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
 Did you feel confident that you connected to an appropriate network? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Did you consider the security aspects of the Wi-Fi network when you made your 
decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 (If yes), did you feel that you had enough information to make a decision about 
whether the network was safe/trustworthy or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 What are the security features did you look at when you made your decision? 
The network uses security protocols □  
The network uses encryption 
protocols 
□  
Start Time □  
Previously connected □  
Network Name □  
None of the above □  
 
 Did you find the security information panel useful to help you to make your decision? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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 Do you know whether the Wi-Fi connection you selected was secure or not? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Are you aware of the security risks associated with the use of insecure Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
 Please indicate how concerned are you when connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi 
hotspots? 
Not at all 
concerned 
Slightly 
concerned 
Moderately 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Extremely 
concerned 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is " Not at all concerned " or " Slightly concerned ", please 
provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
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 From your point of view, please rank the security features that the user must take 
into account before using Wi-Fi hotspots. 
 
Very 
important 
Important 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant 
Unimportant 
Very 
unimportant 
Security protocols □  □  □  □  □  
Encryption 
protocols 
□  □  □  □  □  
Start Time □  □  □  □  □  
Previously 
connected 
□  □  □  □  □  
Network Name □  □  □  □  □  
Security level 
indicator 
□  □  □  □  □  
 After your experience today, please rank how likely your behaviour online would be 
changed depending on whether your Wi-Fi connection is secure or not? 
Not at all 
likely 
Slightly 
likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Completely 
Changed 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is “Not at all likely " or " Slightly likely ", please provide more 
details in the opposite comments box. 
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Section (E) 
 Does the new design make the information more presentable than the current 
dashboard that displays the wireless networks in the Windows platform? 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 This system has the functions and capabilities I expect it to have. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
 Using the software system was convenient. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 
Appendices 
 
303 | Page 
 
 I am more confident in using Wi-Fi software that provides security related 
information because it helps me to decide whether it is safe to connect to an 
available Wi-Fi network. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Disagre
e 
Strongly 
disagree 
□  □  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is " Disagree or Strongly disagree “or “Strongly disagree ", 
please provide more details in the opposite comments box. 
 I think the full implementation of the software can be used to facilitate users in 
choosing the appropriately secure Wi-Fi network. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
 Overall, I am satisfied with the software system. 
Yes No Somewhat Not sure 
□  □  □  □  
 
*Note: If the answer is "No" or "Somewhat", please provide more details in the 
opposite comments box. 
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Appendix C – Ethical Approval Letter, Research Information Sheet, Consent 
Form and the Experiment Scenario 
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Appendix D – Wi-Fi prototypes Software Code 
Requirement: To run the code and for the best experience, use Microsoft Visual Studio 
2015 or later version. 
 First Wi-Fi interface software code. 
(Simulating of Existing interface used in MS Windows platforms). 
 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Public network1 As Integer = 0 
    Public network2 As Integer = 0 
    Public network3 As Integer = 0 
    Public network4 As Integer = 0 
 
    Public startTime As DateTime 
    Dim MyPanel1Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel2Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel3Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel4Clicked As Boolean = False 
 
    Public eduroamPasswordEntered As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamLoginSuccessful As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamLoginFailed As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamCanceled As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamKilled As Integer = 0 
 
Public Sub Button1_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles Button1.Click 
        Dim win As Form2 = New Form2 
        If Button1.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isSuccessful Then 
                Button1.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network1 = network1 + 1 
                eduroamLoginSuccessful = eduroamLoginSuccessful + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isFailed Then 
                eduroamLoginFailed = eduroamLoginFailed + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isCanceled Then 
                eduroamCanceled = eduroamCanceled + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                eduroamKilled = eduroamKilled + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button1.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
 
        If win.isPasswordEnetered Then 
            eduroamPasswordEntered = eduroamPasswordEntered + 1 
        End If 
Appendices 
 
309 | Page 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button2_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button2.Click 
        If Button2.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button2.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network2 = network2 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
Private Sub Button3_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles Button3.Click 
        If Button3.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button3.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network3 = network3 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button4_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button4.Click 
        If Button4.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button4.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network4 = network4 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseHover 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseHover 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseHover 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseHover 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = True 
        Button1.Visible = True 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
        PictureBox6.Visible = False 
        Label5.Visible = False 
        Label7.Visible = False 
        PictureBox9.Visible = False 
        Label6.Visible = False 
        PictureBox10.Visible = False 
 
    End Sub 
Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseClick 
 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = True 
        Button2.Visible = True 
        Label7.Visible = False 
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        PictureBox9.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
        PictureBox6.Visible = True 
        Label5.Visible = True 
        Label6.Visible = False 
        PictureBox10.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = True 
        Button3.Visible = True 
        PictureBox9.Visible = True 
        Label6.Visible = True 
        PictureBox10.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
        PictureBox6.Visible = False 
        Label5.Visible = False 
        Label7.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = True 
        Button4.Visible = True 
        PictureBox6.Visible = False 
        Label5.Visible = False 
        Label7.Visible = True 
        PictureBox9.Visible = False 
        Label6.Visible = False 
        PictureBox10.Visible = True 
    End Sub 
Private Sub MyPanel5_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel5.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
        PictureBox6.Visible = False 
        Label5.Visible = False 
        Label7.Visible = False 
        PictureBox9.Visible = False 
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        Label6.Visible = False 
        PictureBox10.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form1_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
 
        Dim path As String = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop) + 
"\MyControlGroup.csv" 
        Dim currTime As DateTime = DateTime.Now 
        Dim startMilliseconds As Long = CLng(startTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 
1, 1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim milliseconds = CLng(currTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 1, 
1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim ellapsedTime As Long = milliseconds - startMilliseconds 
        Dim startDateString As String = startTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim startTimeString As String = startTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim endDateString As String = currTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim endTimeString As String = currTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim frirst As Integer = 1 
 
        If System.IO.File.Exists(path) = True Then 
            Dim text As String = network1 & "," _ 
                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroamPasswordEntered & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginSuccessful & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginFailed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamCanceled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamKilled & vbNewLine 
 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, Text) 
        Else 
 
            Dim header As String = 
                       "eduroam" _ 
                     & ",BellacostaCafe" _ 
                     & ",withPlymouth" _ 
                     & ",eduroam highspeed" _ 
                     & ",StartMilliseconds" _ 
                     & ",Elapsed Time" _ 
                     & ",Start Date" _ 
                     & ",Start Time" _ 
                     & ",End Date" _ 
                     & ",End Time" _ 
                     & ",eduroamPasswordEntered" _ 
                     & ",eduroamLoginSuccessful  " _ 
                     & ",eduroamLoginFailed " _ 
                     & ",eduroamCanceled  " _ 
                     & ",eduroamKilled  " & vbNewLine 
 
            Dim FirstRec As String = network1 & "," _ 
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                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroamPasswordEntered & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginSuccessful & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginFailed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamCanceled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamKilled & vbNewLine 
 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, FirstRec) 
 
        End If 
 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
        startTime = DateTime.Now 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Function convertMsToMinSec(millsec As Long) As String 
        Dim result As String 
        result = "" 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = millsec 
        time = time / 1000 
        time = time / 60 
        Dim min As Integer 
        Dim sec As Double 
        min = Math.Truncate(time) 
        time = time - min 
        time = time * 60 
        sec = time 
        result = min.ToString() + ":" + sec.ToString() 
        convertMsToMinSec = result 
    End Function 
 
End Class 
 
 
Public Class Form2 
    Public Username1 As String = "Alsharief" 
    Public Password1 As String = "Alsharief77" 
    Private Canceled As Boolean = False 
    Private Successful As Boolean = False 
    Private Failed As Boolean = False 
    Private PasswordEntered As Boolean = False 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isCanceled As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Canceled 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isPasswordEnetered As Boolean 
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        Get 
            Return PasswordEntered 
        End Get 
    End Property 
    Public ReadOnly Property isSuccessful As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Successful 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isFailed As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Failed 
        End Get 
    End Property 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Canceled = True 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Cancel_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Cancel.Click 
        Canceled = True 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnLogin_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Login.Click 
        If (Username1 = TextBox1.Text And Password1 = TextBox2.Text) Then 
            Successful = True 
            Me.Close() 
        Else 
            Failed = True 
            MsgBox("Password or username is invalid", MsgBoxStyle.Critical) 
        End If 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub TextBox2_keypress(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.Windows.Forms.KeyPressEventArgs) Handles TextBox2.KeyPress 
 
        If TextBox2.Text <> " " Then 
            PasswordEntered = True 
        End If 
 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
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 Second Wi-Fi interface software code. 
(Improved user interface with a warning message). 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Public network1 As Integer = 0 
    Public network2 As Integer = 0 
    Public network3 As Integer = 0 
    Public network4 As Integer = 0 
    Public startTime As DateTime 
    Dim MyPanel1Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel2Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel3Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel4Clicked As Boolean = False 
    
    Public clickedAccept As Integer = 0 
    Public clickedReject As Integer = 0 
    Public Killedthewindow As Integer = 0 
 
    Public eduroamPasswordEntered As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamLoginSuccessful As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamLoginFailed As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamCanceled As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public BellacostaCafeAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public withPlymouthAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public withPlymouthRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public withPlymouthKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public eduroamhighspeedAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedKilled As Integer = 0 
Public Sub Button1_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles Button1.Click 
        Dim win As Form2 = New Form2 
        If Button1.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isSuccessful Then 
                Button1.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network1 = network1 + 1 
                eduroamLoginSuccessful = eduroamLoginSuccessful + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isFailed Then 
                eduroamLoginFailed = eduroamLoginFailed + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isCanceled Then 
                eduroamCanceled = eduroamCanceled + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                eduroamKilled = eduroamKilled + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button1.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
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        End If 
 
        If win.isPasswordEnetered Then 
            eduroamPasswordEntered = eduroamPasswordEntered + 1 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button2_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button2.Click 
 
        Dim win As WiFiSecurityWarning = New WiFiSecurityWarning() 
 
        If Button2.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button2.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network2 = network2 + 1 
                BellacostaCafeAccepted = BellacostaCafeAccepted + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                BellacostaCafeRejected = BellacostaCafeRejected + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                BellacostaCafeKilled = BellacostaCafeKilled + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button2.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button3_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button3.Click 
 
        Dim win As WiFiSecurityWarning = New WiFiSecurityWarning() 
 
        If Button3.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
        If win.isAccepted Then 
            Button3.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network3 = network3 + 1 
            withPlymouthAccepted = withPlymouthAccepted + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
            withPlymouthRejected = withPlymouthRejected + 1 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            withPlymouthKilled = withPlymouthKilled + 1 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button3.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
Private Sub Button4_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles Button4.Click 
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        Dim win As WiFiSecurityWarning = New WiFiSecurityWarning() 
 
        If Button4.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button4.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network4 = network4 + 1 
                eduroamhighspeedAccepted = eduroamhighspeedAccepted + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                eduroamhighspeedRejected = eduroamhighspeedRejected + 1 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                eduroamhighspeedKilled = eduroamhighspeedKilled + 1 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button4.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseHover 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseHover 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseHover 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_Paint(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseLeave 
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        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseHover 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = True 
        Button1.Visible = True 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = True 
        Button2.Visible = True 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = True 
        Button3.Visible = True 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
Appendices 
 
319 | Page 
 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = True 
        Button4.Visible = True 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel5_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel5.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form1_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
 
        Dim path As String = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop) + "\MyTest1Group.csv" 
        Dim currTime As DateTime = DateTime.Now 
        Dim startMilliseconds As Long = CLng(startTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 
1, 1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim milliseconds = CLng(currTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 1, 
1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim ellapsedTime As Long = milliseconds - startMilliseconds 
        Dim startDateString As String = startTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim startTimeString As String = startTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim endDateString As String = currTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim endTimeString As String = currTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim frirst As Integer = 1 
 
        If System.IO.File.Exists(path) = True Then 
 
            Dim text As String = network1 & "," _ 
                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroamPasswordEntered & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginSuccessful & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginFailed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamCanceled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamKilled & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeAccepted & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeRejected & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeKilled & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthAccepted & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthRejected & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthKilled & "," _ 
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                     & eduroamhighspeedAccepted & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedRejected & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedKilled & vbNewLine 
 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, text) 
        Else 
 
            Dim header As String = 
                       "eduroam" _ 
                     & ",BellacostaCafe" _ 
                     & ",withPlymouth" _ 
                     & ",eduroam highspeed" _ 
                     & ",StartMilliseconds" _ 
                     & ",Elapsed Time" _ 
                     & ",Start Date" _ 
                     & ",Start Time" _ 
                     & ",End Date" _ 
                     & ",End Time" _ 
                     & ",eduroamPasswordEntered" _ 
                     & ",eduroamLoginSuccessful  " _ 
                     & ",eduroamLoginFailed " _ 
                     & ",eduroamCanceled  " _ 
                     & ",eduroamKilled  " _ 
                     & ",BellacostaCafeAccepted " _ 
                     & ",BellacostaCafeRejected " _ 
                     & ",BellacostaCafeKilled " _ 
                     & ",withPlymouthAccepted " _ 
                     & ",withPlymouthRejected " _ 
                     & ",withPlymouthKilled " _ 
                     & ",eduroamhighspeedAccepted " _ 
                     & ",eduroamhighspeedRejected " _ 
                     & ",eduroamhighspeedKilled " & vbNewLine 
 
            Dim FirstRec As String = network1 & "," _ 
                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroamPasswordEntered & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginSuccessful & "," _ 
                     & eduroamLoginFailed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamCanceled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamKilled & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeAccepted & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeRejected & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeKilled & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthAccepted & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthRejected & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthKilled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedAccepted & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedRejected & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedKilled & vbNewLine 
 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, FirstRec) 
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        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
        startTime = DateTime.Now 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Function convertMsToMinSec(millsec As Long) As String 
        Dim result As String 
        result = "" 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = millsec 
        time = time / 1000 
        time = time / 60 
        Dim min As Integer 
        Dim sec As Double 
        min = Math.Truncate(time) 
        time = time - min 
        time = time * 60 
        sec = time 
        result = min.ToString() + ":" + sec.ToString() 
        convertMsToMinSec = result 
    End Function 
 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class Form2 
    
    Public Username1 As String = "Alsharief" 
    Public Password1 As String = "Alsharief77" 
    Private Canceled As Boolean = False 
    Private Successful As Boolean = False 
    Private Failed As Boolean = False 
    Private PasswordEntered As Boolean = False 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isCanceled As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Canceled 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isPasswordEnetered As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return PasswordEntered 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isSuccessful As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Successful 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isFailed As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return Failed 
        End Get 
    End Property 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
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        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Cancel_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Cancel.Click 
        Canceled = True 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnLogin_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Login.Click 
        If (Username1 = TextBox1.Text And Password1 = TextBox2.Text) Then 
            Successful = True 
            Me.Close() 
        Else 
            Failed = True 
            MsgBox("Password or username is invalid", MsgBoxStyle.Critical) 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub TextBox2_keypress(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.Windows.Forms.KeyPressEventArgs) Handles TextBox2.KeyPress 
 
        If TextBox2.Text <> " " Then 
            PasswordEntered = True 
        End If 
 
    End Sub 
End Class 
 
Public Class WiFiSecurityWarning 
 
    Private accepted As Boolean = False 
    Private rejected As Boolean = False 
    Public ReadOnly Property isAccepted As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return accepted 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isRejected As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return rejected 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnAccept_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnAccept.Click 
        accepted = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnReject_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnReject.Click 
        rejected = True 
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        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class FormClickRecord 
 
    Private openTime As DateTime 
    Private closeTime As DateTime 
    Private network As String 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        openTime = Now 
        network = "" 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub New(name As String) 
        openTime = Now 
        network = name 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub closeRecord() 
        closeTime = Now 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Function getNetwork() As String 
        getNetwork = network 
    End Function 
 
    Public Function ellapsedTime() As Double 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = -1 
        If (Not (IsDBNull(closeTime))) Then 
            time = closeTime.Ticks - openTime.Ticks 
            time = time / 10000000 
        End If 
        ellapsedTime = time 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub setNetwork(name As String) 
        network = name 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
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 Third Wi-Fi interface software code. 
(Advanced interface with security meter (Design 1) 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Public network1 As Integer = 0 
    Public network2 As Integer = 0 
    Public network3 As Integer = 0 
    Public network4 As Integer = 0 
 
    Public startTime As DateTime 
    Public Records As FormClickRecord 
 
    Dim MyPanel1Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel2Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel3Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel4Clicked As Boolean = False 
 
    Dim eduroam As Integer = 0 
    Dim BellacostaCafe As Integer = 0 
    Dim withPlymouth As Integer = 0 
    Dim eduroamhighspeed As Integer = 0 
 
    Public eduroamElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public withPlymouthElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime As Double = 0 
 Dim clickRecords As List(Of FormClickRecord) = New List(Of FormClickRecord) 
 
    Private Sub Button1_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button1.Click 
        If Button1.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button1.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network1 = network1 + 1 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button2_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button2.Click 
        If Button2.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button2.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network2 = network2 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button3_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button3.Click 
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        If Button3.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button3.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network3 = network3 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button4_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button4.Click 
        If Button4.Text = "Connect" Then 
            Button4.Text = "Disconnect" 
            network4 = network4 + 1 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        Else 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Public Sub LinkLabel2_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel2.LinkClicked 
        eduroam = eduroam + 1 
        Dim form As Form2 
        form = New Form2(Me, "eduroam") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
Private Sub LinkLabel4_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel4.LinkClicked 
        BellacostaCafe = BellacostaCafe + 1 
        Dim form As Form3 
        form = New Form3(Me, "BellacostaCafe") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LinkLabel6_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel6.LinkClicked 
        withPlymouth = withPlymouth + 1 
        Dim form As Form4 
        form = New Form4(Me, "withPlymouth") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LinkLabel8_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel8.LinkClicked 
        eduroamhighspeed = eduroamhighspeed + 1 
        Dim form As Form5 
        form = New Form5(Me, "eduroamhighspeed") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseHover 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
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        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseHover 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseHover 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseHover 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = True 
        Button1.Visible = True 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
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        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = True 
        Button2.Visible = True 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = True 
        Button3.Visible = True 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = True 
        Button4.Visible = True 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel5_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel5.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
Private Sub Form1_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) Handles 
MyBase.FormClosing 
        saveData() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
        startTime = DateTime.Now 
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        Dim colourSetter As New Framework.Controls.FiveWayColourScheme() 
        SecurityLevelExcellent.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelFair.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelGood.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelPoor.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Function convertMsToMinSec(millsec As Long) As String 
        Dim result As String 
        result = "" 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = millsec 
        time = time / 1000 
        time = time / 60 
        Dim min As Integer 
        Dim sec As Double 
        min = Math.Truncate(time) 
        time = time - min 
        time = time * 60 
        sec = time 
        result = min.ToString() + ":" + sec.ToString() 
        convertMsToMinSec = result 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_2(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_3(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_4(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_5(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub saveData() 
        Dim path As String = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop) + "\MyTest2Group.csv" 
        Dim currTime As DateTime = DateTime.Now 
        Dim startMilliseconds As Long = CLng(startTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 
1, 1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim milliseconds = CLng(currTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 1, 
1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim ellapsedTime As Long = milliseconds - startMilliseconds 
        Dim startDateString As String = startTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim startTimeString As String = startTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim endDateString As String = currTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim endTimeString As String = currTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim frirst As Integer = 1 
 
        If System.IO.File.Exists(path) = False Then 
            Dim header As String = 
                      "eduroam" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth" _ 
                    & ",eduroam highspeed" _ 
                    & ",StartMilliseconds" _ 
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                    & ",Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",Start Date" _ 
                    & ",Start Time" _ 
                    & ",End Date" _ 
                    & ",End Time" _ 
                    & ",eduroam Clicked" _ 
                    & ",eduroam Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe Clicked" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth Clicked" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeed Clicked" _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeed Elapsed Time" & vbNewLine 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
        Else 
            Dim header As String = "NEW SESSION STARTED" & vbNewLine 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
        End If 
        For Each record As FormClickRecord In clickRecords 
 
            eduroam = 0 
            BellacostaCafe = 0 
            withPlymouth = 0 
            eduroamhighspeed = 0 
 
            eduroamElapsedTime = 0 
            BellacostaCafeElapsedTime = 0 
            withPlymouthElapsedTime = 0 
            eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime = 0 
 
            Select Case record.getNetwork 
                Case "eduroam" 
                    eduroam = 1 
                    eduroamElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "BellacostaCafe" 
                    BellacostaCafe = 1 
                    BellacostaCafeElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "withPlymouth" 
                    withPlymouth = 1 
                    withPlymouthElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "eduroamhighspeed" 
                    eduroamhighspeed = 1 
                    eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
            End Select 
 
            startTimeString = record.getOpenTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
            endTimeString = record.getCloseTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
            Dim CurrRec As String = network1 & "," _ 
                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroam & "," _ 
                     & eduroamElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafe & "," _ 
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                     & BellacostaCafeElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouth & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime & vbNewLine 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, CurrRec) 
        Next 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form2 
 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form2_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_2(record) 
    End Sub 
 
     
End Class 
Public Class Form3 
 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form3_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_3(record) 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form4 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
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    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form4_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_4(record) 
    End Sub 
 
    
End Class 
Public Class Form5 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form5_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_5(record) 
    End Sub 
End Class 
Imports System 
Imports System.Collections 
Imports System.IO 
Imports System.Windows.Forms 
Imports System.Drawing 
Imports System.Drawing.Drawing2D 
Public Class CustomTextBox 
 
 
    Inherits TextBox 
 
#Region " Component Designer generated code " 
 
    Public Sub New(ByVal Container As System.ComponentModel.IContainer) 
        MyClass.New() 
 
        'Required for Windows.Forms Class Composition Designer support 
        Container.Add(Me) 
    End Sub 
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    Public Sub New() 
        MyBase.New() 
 
        'This call is required by the Component Designer. 
        InitializeComponent() 
 
        'Add any initialization after the InitializeComponent() call 
 
    End Sub 
 
    'Component overrides dispose to clean up the component list. 
    Protected Overloads Overrides Sub Dispose(ByVal disposing As Boolean) 
        If disposing Then 
            If Not (components Is Nothing) Then 
                components.Dispose() 
            End If 
        End If 
        MyBase.Dispose(disposing) 
    End Sub 
 
    'Required by the Component Designer 
    Private components As System.ComponentModel.IContainer 
 
    'NOTE: The following procedure is required by the Component Designer 
    'It can be modified using the Component Designer. 
    'Do not modify it using the code editor. 
    <System.Diagnostics.DebuggerStepThrough()> Private Sub InitializeComponent() 
        components = New System.ComponentModel.Container() 
    End Sub 
 
#End Region 
 
 
 
    Protected Overrides Sub OnTextChanged(ByVal e As System.EventArgs) 
        If Not File.Exists(Me.Text) Then 
            Me.ForeColor = Color.Red 
        Else 
            Me.ForeColor = Color.Black 
        End If 
 
        MyBase.OnTextChanged(e) 
    End Sub 
End Class 
Public Class FormClickRecord 
 
    Private openTime As DateTime 
    Private closeTime As DateTime 
    Private network As String 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        openTime = Now 
        network = "" 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub New(name As String) 
        openTime = Now 
        network = name 
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    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub closeRecord() 
        closeTime = Now 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Function getNetwork() As String 
        getNetwork = network 
    End Function 
 
    Public Function ellapsedTime() As Double 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = -1 
        If (Not (IsDBNull(closeTime))) Then 
            time = closeTime.Ticks - openTime.Ticks 
            time = time / 10000000 
        End If 
        ellapsedTime = time 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub setNetwork(name As String) 
        network = name 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Function getOpenTime() As Date 
        getOpenTime = openTime 
    End Function 
 
    Public Function getCloseTime() As Date 
        getCloseTime = closeTime 
    End Function 
 
End Class 
Public Class MyPanel 
    Inherits System.Windows.Forms.Panel 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None 
    End Sub 
 
    Private bWidth As Integer 
    Public Property BorderWidth() As Integer 
        Get 
            Return Me.bWidth 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Integer) 
            Me.bWidth = Math.Abs(value) 
            Me.Refresh() 
        End Set 
    End Property 
 
    Private bColor As Color 
    Public Property BorderColor() As Color 
        Get 
            Return Me.bColor 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Color) 
            Me.bColor = value 
            Me.Refresh() 
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        End Set 
    End Property 
 
    Public Overridable Sub MyPanel_Paint(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.Windows.Forms.PaintEventArgs) Handles Me.Paint 
 
        e.Graphics.DrawRectangle(New Pen(Me.bColor, Me.bWidth), 
Me.ClientRectangle) 
 
    End Sub 
End Class 
Option Explicit On 
Option Strict On 
 
Imports System.ComponentModel 
 
Public Class TextboxCustBorder 
 
    Inherits TextBox 
 
    Private clrBorder As Color = Color.Black 
    Private style As CustomBorderStyles = BorderStyleCustom.CustomColor 
    Private blnCustomChange As Boolean 
 
#Region "Properties and Enum" 
    'the enumeration for my new property 
    Enum CustomBorderStyles As Integer 
        None = 0 
        FixedSingle = 1 
        Fixed3D = 2 
        CustomColor = 3 
    End Enum 
 
    'New property. It will switch the textbox's borderstyle so it will be drawn 
correctly 
    <Category("Appearance"), Description("Type of border around the control")> _ 
    Public Property BorderStyleCustom() As CustomBorderStyles 
        Get 
            Return style 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As CustomBorderStyles) 
            style = value 
            blnCustomChange = True 
            If value = CustomBorderStyles.CustomColor Then 
                Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.FixedSingle 
            Else 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.Fixed3D Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.Fixed3D 
                End If 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.FixedSingle Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.FixedSingle 
                End If 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.None Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None 
                End If 
            End If 
            blnCustomChange = False 
        End Set 
    End Property 
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    'The color of the border (if selected) 
    <Category("Appearance"), Description("Color of the Single border if 
BorderStyles is CustomColor")> _ 
    Public Property BorderColor() As Color 
        Get 
            Return clrBorder 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Color) 
            clrBorder = value 
        End Set 
    End Property 
#End Region 
 
    'This is so the custom border isn't drawn when the textbox's original 
borderstyle is changed 
    'Note: I did it this way because I was having a few issues with overloading 
the 
    'textbox's original BorderStyle property 
    Private Sub TextboxCustBorder_BorderStyleChanged(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal 
e As System.EventArgs) Handles Me.BorderStyleChanged 
        If blnCustomChange = False Then 
            Dim int As Integer = CInt(Me.BorderStyle) 
            Me.BorderStyleCustom = CType(int, CustomBorderStyles) 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    'Invalidate the textbox so the border is redrawn 
    Private Sub TextboxCustBorder_TextChanged(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles Me.TextChanged 
        Me.Invalidate() 
    End Sub 
 
    Protected Overrides Sub WndProc(ByRef m As System.Windows.Forms.Message) 
        MyBase.WndProc(m) 
 
        'this is where the actually drawing occurs 
        If m.Msg = 15 And Me.BorderStyleCustom = CustomBorderStyles.CustomColor 
Then 
            Dim g As Graphics = Me.CreateGraphics 
            g.DrawRectangle(New Pen(clrBorder, 1), New Rectangle(0, 0, Me.Width - 
1, Me.Height - 1)) 
            g.Dispose() 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Imports PUVisLabComponents 
 
Public Class TrafficLight 
    Inherits ColourDefiner5Level 
 
    Public Overloads Function defineColour(min As Integer, value As Integer, max 
As Integer) As Color 
        Dim result As Color 
        result = Color.Red 
        Dim range As Integer 
        range = max - min 
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        Dim myVal As Integer 
        myVal = value - min 
        Dim perc As Double 
        perc = myVal / range 
        If perc >= 0.33D And perc < 0.66D Then 
            result = Color.Orange 
        ElseIf (perc > 0.66D) Then 
            result = Color.Green 
        End If 
    End Function 
 
End Class 
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 Fourth Wi-Fi interface software code. 
(Advanced interface with security meter (Design 2). 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Public network1 As Integer = 0 
    Public network2 As Integer = 0 
    Public network3 As Integer = 0 
    Public network4 As Integer = 0 
 
    Public startTime As DateTime 
    Public Records As FormClickRecord 
 
    Dim MyPanel1Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel2Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel3Clicked As Boolean = False 
    Dim MyPanel4Clicked As Boolean = False 
 
    Dim eduroam As Integer = 0 
    Dim BellacostaCafe As Integer = 0 
    Dim withPlymouth As Integer = 0 
    Dim eduroamhighspeed As Integer = 0 
 
    Public eduroamElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public withPlymouthElapsedTime As Double = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime As Double = 0 
 
    Public eduroamAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public BellacostaCafeAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public BellacostaCafeKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public withPlymouthAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public withPlymouthRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public withPlymouthKilled As Integer = 0 
 
    Public eduroamhighspeedAccepted As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedRejected As Integer = 0 
    Public eduroamhighspeedKilled As Integer = 0 
Dim clickRecords As List(Of FormClickRecord) = New List(Of FormClickRecord) 
 
    Private Sub Button1_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button1.Click 
 
        Dim win As Form6 = New Form6() 
 
        If Button1.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button1.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network1 = network1 + 1 
                eduroamAccepted = eduroamAccepted + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
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                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                eduroamRejected = eduroamRejected + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                eduroamKilled = eduroamKilled + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button1.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button1.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button2_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button2.Click 
 
        Dim win As Form7 = New Form7() 
 
        If Button2.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button2.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network2 = network2 + 1 
                BellacostaCafeAccepted = BellacostaCafeAccepted + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                BellacostaCafeRejected = BellacostaCafeRejected + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                BellacostaCafeKilled = BellacostaCafeKilled + 1 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button2.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button2.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Button3_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Button3.Click 
 
        Dim win As Form8 = New Form8() 
 
        If Button3.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button3.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network3 = network3 + 1 
                withPlymouthAccepted = withPlymouthAccepted + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                withPlymouthRejected = withPlymouthRejected + 1 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                withPlymouthKilled = withPlymouthKilled + 1 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
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            End If 
        ElseIf Button3.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button3.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
Private Sub Button4_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles Button4.Click 
 
        Dim win As Form9 = New Form9() 
 
        If Button4.Text = "Connect" Then 
            win.ShowDialog(Me) 
            If win.isAccepted Then 
                Button4.Text = "Disconnect" 
                network4 = network4 + 1 
                eduroamhighspeedAccepted = eduroamhighspeedAccepted + 1 
                Button1.Text = "Connect" 
                Button2.Text = "Connect" 
                Button3.Text = "Connect" 
            ElseIf win.isRejected Then 
                eduroamhighspeedRejected = eduroamhighspeedRejected + 1 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            Else 
                eduroamhighspeedKilled = eduroamhighspeedKilled + 1 
                Button4.Text = "Connect" 
            End If 
        ElseIf Button4.Text = "Disconnect" Then 
            Button4.Text = "Connect" 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Public Sub LinkLabel2_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel2.LinkClicked 
        eduroam = eduroam + 1 
        Dim form As Form2 
        form = New Form2(Me, "eduroam") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LinkLabel4_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel4.LinkClicked 
        BellacostaCafe = BellacostaCafe + 1 
        Dim form As Form3 
        form = New Form3(Me, "BellacostaCafe") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LinkLabel6_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel6.LinkClicked 
        withPlymouth = withPlymouth + 1 
        Dim form As Form4 
        form = New Form4(Me, "withPlymouth") 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub LinkLabel8_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel8.LinkClicked 
        eduroamhighspeed = eduroamhighspeed + 1 
        Dim form As Form5 
        form = New Form5(Me, "eduroamhighspeed") 
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        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseHover 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel1.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel1.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel1.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseHover 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel2.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel2.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel2.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseHover 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel3.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel3.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel3.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseHover 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.SkyBlue 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 2 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.AliceBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseLeave 
        MyPanel4.BorderColor = Color.White 
        MyPanel4.BorderWidth = 0 
        MyPanel4.BackColor = Color.White 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel1_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel1.MouseClick 
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        CheckBox1.Visible = True 
        Button1.Visible = True 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel2_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel2.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = True 
        Button2.Visible = True 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel3_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel3.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = True 
        Button3.Visible = True 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel4_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel4.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = True 
        Button4.Visible = True 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub MyPanel5_MouseClick(sender As Object, e As MouseEventArgs) Handles 
MyPanel5.MouseClick 
        CheckBox1.Visible = False 
        Button1.Visible = False 
        CheckBox2.Visible = False 
        Button2.Visible = False 
        CheckBox3.Visible = False 
        Button3.Visible = False 
        CheckBox4.Visible = False 
        Button4.Visible = False 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Form1_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        saveData() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
        startTime = DateTime.Now 
        Dim colourSetter As New Framework.Controls.FiveWayColourScheme() 
        SecurityLevelExcellent.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelFair.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelGood.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
        SecurityLevelPoor.ColorAlgorithm = colourSetter 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Function convertMsToMinSec(millsec As Long) As String 
        Dim result As String 
        result = "" 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = millsec 
        time = time / 1000 
        time = time / 60 
        Dim min As Integer 
        Dim sec As Double 
        min = Math.Truncate(time) 
        time = time - min 
        time = time * 60 
        sec = time 
        result = min.ToString() + ":" + sec.ToString() 
        convertMsToMinSec = result 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_2(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_3(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_4(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
    Public Sub storeClickRecord_5(aRecord As FormClickRecord) 
        clickRecords.Add(aRecord) 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub saveData() 
        Dim path As String = 
Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.Desktop) + "\MyTest3Group.csv" 
        Dim currTime As DateTime = DateTime.Now 
        Dim startMilliseconds As Long = CLng(startTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 
1, 1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim milliseconds = CLng(currTime.Subtract(New DateTime(1970, 1, 
1)).TotalMilliseconds) 
        Dim ellapsedTime As Long = milliseconds - startMilliseconds 
        Dim startDateString As String = startTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim startTimeString As String = startTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim endDateString As String = currTime.ToString("dd MM yyyy") 
        Dim endTimeString As String = currTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
        Dim frirst As Integer = 1 
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        If System.IO.File.Exists(path) = False Then 
            Dim header As String = 
                      "eduroam" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth" _ 
                    & ",eduroam highspeed" _ 
                    & ",StartMilliseconds" _ 
                    & ",Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",Start Date" _ 
                    & ",Start Time" _ 
                    & ",End Date" _ 
                    & ",End Time" _ 
                    & ",eduroamClicked" _ 
                    & ",eduroam Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",eduroamAccepted " _ 
                    & ",eduroamRejected " _ 
                    & ",eduroamKilled " _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe Clicked" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafe Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafeAccepted " _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafeRejected " _ 
                    & ",BellacostaCafeKilled " _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth Clicked" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouth Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",withPlymouthAccepted " _ 
                    & ",withPlymouthRejected " _ 
                    & ",withPlymouthKilled " _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeed Clicked" _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeed Elapsed Time" _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeedAccepted " _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeedRejected " _ 
                    & ",eduroamhighspeedKilled " & vbNewLine 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
        Else 
            Dim header As String = "NEW SESSION STARTED" & vbNewLine 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, header) 
        End If 
        For Each record As FormClickRecord In clickRecords 
 
            eduroam = 0 
            BellacostaCafe = 0 
            withPlymouth = 0 
            eduroamhighspeed = 0 
 
            eduroamElapsedTime = 0 
            BellacostaCafeElapsedTime = 0 
            withPlymouthElapsedTime = 0 
            eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime = 0 
 
            Select Case record.getNetwork 
                Case "eduroam" 
                    eduroam = 1 
                    eduroamElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "BellacostaCafe" 
                    BellacostaCafe = 1 
                    BellacostaCafeElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "withPlymouth" 
                    withPlymouth = 1 
                    withPlymouthElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
                Case "eduroamhighspeed" 
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                    eduroamhighspeed = 1 
                    eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime = record.ellapsedTime 
            End Select 
 
            startTimeString = record.getOpenTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
            endTimeString = record.getCloseTime.ToString("hh:mm:ss") 
            Dim CurrRec As String = network1 & "," _ 
                     & network2 & "," _ 
                     & network3 & "," _ 
                     & network4 & "," _ 
                     & startMilliseconds & "," _ 
                     & convertMsToMinSec(ellapsedTime) & "," _ 
                     & startDateString & "," _ 
                     & startTimeString & "," _ 
                     & endDateString & "," _ 
                     & endTimeString & "," _ 
                     & eduroam & "," _ 
                     & eduroamElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & eduroamAccepted & "," _ 
                     & eduroamRejected & "," _ 
                     & eduroamKilled & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafe & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeAccepted & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeRejected & "," _ 
                     & BellacostaCafeKilled & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouth & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthAccepted & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthRejected & "," _ 
                     & withPlymouthKilled & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeed & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedElapsedTime & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedAccepted & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedRejected & "," _ 
                     & eduroamhighspeedKilled & vbNewLine 
 
            System.IO.File.AppendAllText(path, CurrRec) 
        Next 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class Form2 
 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form2_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
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        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_2(record) 
    End Sub 
 
     
End Class 
Public Class Form3 
 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form3_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_3(record) 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form4 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form4_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_4(record) 
    End Sub 
 
    
End Class 
 
Public Class Form5 
    Dim record As FormClickRecord 
    Dim myOwner As Form1 
 
    Public Sub New(aParent As Form1, networkName As String) 
 
 
        InitializeComponent() 
        record = New FormClickRecord 
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        record.setNetwork(networkName) 
        myOwner = aParent 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Form5_FormClosing(sender As Object, e As FormClosingEventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.FormClosing 
        record.closeRecord() 
        myOwner.storeClickRecord_5(record) 
    End Sub 
End Class 
 
Public Class Form6 
 
    Private accepted As Boolean = False 
    Private rejected As Boolean = False 
    Public ReadOnly Property isAccepted As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return accepted 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isRejected As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return rejected 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnAccept_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnAccept.Click 
        accepted = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnReject_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnReject.Click 
        rejected = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form7 
 
    Private accepted As Boolean = False 
    Private rejected As Boolean = False 
    Public ReadOnly Property isAccepted As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return accepted 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isRejected As Boolean 
        Get 
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            Return rejected 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnAccept_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnAccept.Click 
        accepted = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnReject_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnReject.Click 
        rejected = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class Form8 
     
    Private accepted As Boolean = False 
    Private rejected As Boolean = False 
    Public ReadOnly Property isAccepted As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return accepted 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isRejected As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return rejected 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnAccept_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnAccept.Click 
        accepted = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnReject_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnReject.Click 
        rejected = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class Form9 
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    Private accepted As Boolean = False 
    Private rejected As Boolean = False 
    Public ReadOnly Property isAccepted As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return accepted 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Public ReadOnly Property isRejected As Boolean 
        Get 
            Return rejected 
        End Get 
    End Property 
 
    Private Sub closeWin() 
        Me.Close() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnAccept_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnAccept.Click 
        accepted = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnReject_Click(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
btnReject.Click 
        rejected = True 
        closeWin() 
    End Sub 
 
     
End Class 
Imports System 
Imports System.Collections 
Imports System.IO 
Imports System.Windows.Forms 
Imports System.Drawing 
Imports System.Drawing.Drawing2D 
Public Class CustomTextBox 
 
 
    Inherits TextBox 
 
#Region " Component Designer generated code " 
 
    Public Sub New(ByVal Container As System.ComponentModel.IContainer) 
        MyClass.New() 
 
        'Required for Windows.Forms Class Composition Designer support 
        Container.Add(Me) 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        MyBase.New() 
 
        'This call is required by the Component Designer. 
        InitializeComponent() 
 
        'Add any initialization after the InitializeComponent() call 
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    End Sub 
 
    'Component overrides dispose to clean up the component list. 
    Protected Overloads Overrides Sub Dispose(ByVal disposing As Boolean) 
        If disposing Then 
            If Not (components Is Nothing) Then 
                components.Dispose() 
            End If 
        End If 
        MyBase.Dispose(disposing) 
    End Sub 
 
    'Required by the Component Designer 
    Private components As System.ComponentModel.IContainer 
 
    'NOTE: The following procedure is required by the Component Designer 
    'It can be modified using the Component Designer. 
    'Do not modify it using the code editor. 
    <System.Diagnostics.DebuggerStepThrough()> Private Sub InitializeComponent() 
        components = New System.ComponentModel.Container() 
    End Sub 
 
#End Region 
 
 
 
    Protected Overrides Sub OnTextChanged(ByVal e As System.EventArgs) 
        If Not File.Exists(Me.Text) Then 
            Me.ForeColor = Color.Red 
        Else 
            Me.ForeColor = Color.Black 
        End If 
 
        MyBase.OnTextChanged(e) 
    End Sub 
End Class 
 
Public Class FormClickRecord 
 
    Private openTime As DateTime 
    Private closeTime As DateTime 
    Private network As String 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        openTime = Now 
        network = "" 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub New(name As String) 
        openTime = Now 
        network = name 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub closeRecord() 
        closeTime = Now 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Function getNetwork() As String 
        getNetwork = network 
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    End Function 
 
    Public Function ellapsedTime() As Double 
        Dim time As Double 
        time = -1 
        If (Not (IsDBNull(closeTime))) Then 
            time = closeTime.Ticks - openTime.Ticks 
            time = time / 10000000 
        End If 
        ellapsedTime = time 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub setNetwork(name As String) 
        network = name 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Function getOpenTime() As Date 
        getOpenTime = openTime 
    End Function 
 
    Public Function getCloseTime() As Date 
        getCloseTime = closeTime 
    End Function 
 
End Class 
 
Public Class MyPanel 
    Inherits System.Windows.Forms.Panel 
 
    Public Sub New() 
        Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None 
    End Sub 
 
    Private bWidth As Integer 
    Public Property BorderWidth() As Integer 
        Get 
            Return Me.bWidth 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Integer) 
            Me.bWidth = Math.Abs(value) 
            Me.Refresh() 
        End Set 
    End Property 
 
    Private bColor As Color 
    Public Property BorderColor() As Color 
        Get 
            Return Me.bColor 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Color) 
            Me.bColor = value 
            Me.Refresh() 
        End Set 
    End Property 
 
    Public Overridable Sub MyPanel_Paint(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.Windows.Forms.PaintEventArgs) Handles Me.Paint 
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        e.Graphics.DrawRectangle(New Pen(Me.bColor, Me.bWidth), 
Me.ClientRectangle) 
 
    End Sub 
End Class 
 
Option Explicit On 
Option Strict On 
 
Imports System.ComponentModel 
 
Public Class TextboxCustBorder 
 
    Inherits TextBox 
 
    Private clrBorder As Color = Color.Black 
    Private style As CustomBorderStyles = BorderStyleCustom.CustomColor 
    Private blnCustomChange As Boolean 
 
#Region "Properties and Enum" 
    'the enumeration for my new property 
    Enum CustomBorderStyles As Integer 
        None = 0 
        FixedSingle = 1 
        Fixed3D = 2 
        CustomColor = 3 
    End Enum 
 
    'New property. It will switch the textbox's borderstyle so it will be drawn 
correctly 
    <Category("Appearance"), Description("Type of border around the control")> _ 
    Public Property BorderStyleCustom() As CustomBorderStyles 
        Get 
            Return style 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As CustomBorderStyles) 
            style = value 
            blnCustomChange = True 
            If value = CustomBorderStyles.CustomColor Then 
                Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.FixedSingle 
            Else 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.Fixed3D Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.Fixed3D 
                End If 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.FixedSingle Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.FixedSingle 
                End If 
                If value = CustomBorderStyles.None Then 
                    Me.BorderStyle = Windows.Forms.BorderStyle.None 
                End If 
            End If 
            blnCustomChange = False 
        End Set 
    End Property 
 
    'The color of the border (if selected) 
    <Category("Appearance"), Description("Color of the Single border if 
BorderStyles is CustomColor")> _ 
    Public Property BorderColor() As Color 
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        Get 
            Return clrBorder 
        End Get 
        Set(ByVal value As Color) 
            clrBorder = value 
        End Set 
    End Property 
#End Region 
 
    'This is so the custom border isn't drawn when the textbox's original 
borderstyle is changed 
    'Note: I did it this way because I was having a few issues with overloading 
the 
    'textbox's original BorderStyle property 
    Private Sub TextboxCustBorder_BorderStyleChanged(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal 
e As System.EventArgs) Handles Me.BorderStyleChanged 
        If blnCustomChange = False Then 
            Dim int As Integer = CInt(Me.BorderStyle) 
            Me.BorderStyleCustom = CType(int, CustomBorderStyles) 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    'Invalidate the textbox so the border is redrawn 
    Private Sub TextboxCustBorder_TextChanged(ByVal sender As Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles Me.TextChanged 
        Me.Invalidate() 
    End Sub 
 
    Protected Overrides Sub WndProc(ByRef m As System.Windows.Forms.Message) 
        MyBase.WndProc(m) 
 
        'this is where the actually drawing occurs 
        If m.Msg = 15 And Me.BorderStyleCustom = CustomBorderStyles.CustomColor 
Then 
            Dim g As Graphics = Me.CreateGraphics 
            g.DrawRectangle(New Pen(clrBorder, 1), New Rectangle(0, 0, Me.Width - 
1, Me.Height - 1)) 
            g.Dispose() 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Imports PUVisLabComponents 
 
Public Class TrafficLight 
    Inherits ColourDefiner5Level 
 
    Public Overloads Function defineColour(min As Integer, value As Integer, max 
As Integer) As Color 
        Dim result As Color 
        result = Color.Red 
        Dim range As Integer 
        range = max - min 
        Dim myVal As Integer 
        myVal = value - min 
        Dim perc As Double 
        perc = myVal / range 
        If perc >= 0.33D And perc < 0.66D Then 
            result = Color.Orange 
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        ElseIf (perc > 0.66D) Then 
            result = Color.Green 
        End If 
    End Function 
 
 
End Class 
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Appendix E – Improved interfaces for MS Outlook for spotting phishing emails 
(software code) 
Requirement: To run the code and for the best experience, use Microsoft Visual Studio 
2015 or later version. 
 First interface software code. 
Proposed interface design for the warning message when a phishing email is detected. 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Dim form As Form2 
    Public Sub Form1() 
        Panel17.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.None 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub LinkLabel1_LinkClicked_1(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel1.LinkClicked 
        form = New Form2 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseHover 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseLeave 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseHover 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseLeave 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseHover 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseLeave 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseHover 
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        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseLeave 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseHover 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseLeave 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseHover 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseLeave 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseHover 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseLeave 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseHover 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseLeave 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseHover 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
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        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label16_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseHover 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label16_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseLeave 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseHover 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseLeave 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseHover 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseLeave 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseHover 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseLeave 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseHover 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
Appendices 
 
357 | Page 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseLeave 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseHover 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseLeave 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseHover 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseLeave 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseHover 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseHover 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseLeave 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseHover 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Panel23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseHover 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseLeave 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseHover 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseHover 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.DarkBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseLeave 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseHover 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseLeave 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form2 
    Private Sub LinkLabel3_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel3.LinkClicked 
        LinkLabel3.LinkBehavior = System.Windows.Forms.LinkBehavior.NeverUnderline 
        Process.Start("https://support.microsoft.com/en-ph/help/4033787/windows-
protect-yourself-from-phishing") 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
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 Second interface software code. 
Proposed interface design for the warning message when a suspected phishing email 
is detected. 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Dim form As Form2 
    Public Sub Form1() 
        Panel17.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.None 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub LinkLabel1_LinkClicked_1(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel1.LinkClicked 
        form = New Form2 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseHover 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseLeave 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseHover 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseLeave 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseHover 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseLeave 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseHover 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseLeave 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Panel26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseHover 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseLeave 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseHover 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseLeave 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseHover 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseLeave 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseHover 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseLeave 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseHover 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label16_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseHover 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
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        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label16_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseLeave 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseHover 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseLeave 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseHover 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseLeave 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseHover 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseLeave 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseHover 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseLeave 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseHover 
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        Label26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseLeave 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseHover 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseLeave 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseHover 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseHover 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseLeave 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseHover 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseHover 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseLeave 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseHover 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseHover 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.DarkBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseLeave 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseHover 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseLeave 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form2 
    Private Sub LinkLabel3_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel3.LinkClicked 
 
        Process.Start("https://support.microsoft.com/en-ph/help/4033787/windows-
protect-yourself-from-phishing") 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
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 Third interface software code. 
Proposed interface design for the warning message when a Spam email is detected. 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Dim form As Form2 
    Public Sub Form1() 
        Panel17.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.None 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub LinkLabel1_LinkClicked_1(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel1.LinkClicked 
        form = New Form2 
        form.Show() 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseHover 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseLeave 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseHover 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel18.MouseLeave 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseHover 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseLeave 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseHover 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseLeave 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseHover 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Panel26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseLeave 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseHover 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseLeave 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseHover 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseLeave 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseHover 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseLeave 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseHover 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label16_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseHover 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Label16_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label16.MouseLeave 
        Label16.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseHover 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseLeave 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseHover 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseLeave 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseHover 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseLeave 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseHover 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseLeave 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseHover 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Label26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseLeave 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseHover 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseLeave 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseHover 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseHover 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseLeave 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseHover 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseHover 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseLeave 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseHover 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
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        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseHover 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.DarkBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseLeave 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseHover 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseLeave 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
Public Class Form2 
    Private Sub LinkLabel3_LinkClicked(sender As Object, e As 
LinkLabelLinkClickedEventArgs) Handles LinkLabel3.LinkClicked 
 
        Process.Start("https://support.microsoft.com/en-ph/help/4033787/windows-
protect-yourself-from-phishing") 
    End Sub 
 
 
End Class 
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 Fourth interface software code. 
Proposed interface design for a notification message when receiving an email from 
trusted sender. 
Public Class Form1 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseHover 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel17.MouseLeave 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel19_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel19.MouseHover 
        Panel19.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel19_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel19.MouseLeave 
        Panel19.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseHover 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel24.MouseLeave 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseHover 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel25_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel25.MouseLeave 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseHover 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel26.MouseLeave 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseHover 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Panel20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel20.MouseLeave 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseHover 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel28_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel28.MouseLeave 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseHover 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label15_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label15.MouseLeave 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseHover 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox6_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox6.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox6.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Label15.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label17.MouseHover 
        Label17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel19.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label17.MouseLeave 
        Label17.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel19.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseHover 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Label22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label22.MouseLeave 
        Label22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseHover 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label23.MouseLeave 
        Label23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel25.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseHover 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label24_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label24.MouseLeave 
        Label24.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseHover 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label18.MouseLeave 
        Label18.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel20.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseHover 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label26_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label26.MouseLeave 
        Label26.BackColor = Color.Empty 
        Panel28.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel22_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseHover 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
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    Private Sub Panel22_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel22.MouseLeave 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseHover 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox18_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox18.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox18.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel22.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseHover 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel27_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel27.MouseLeave 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseHover 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox17_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox17.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox17.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel27.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseHover 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub Panel23_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel23.MouseLeave 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.Empty 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseHover 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub PictureBox20_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
PictureBox20.MouseLeave 
        PictureBox20.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
        Panel23.BackColor = Color.LightGray 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseHover 
Appendices 
 
373 | Page 
 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.DarkBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Panel35_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Panel35.MouseLeave 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseHover(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseHover 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.MidnightBlue 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub Label45_MouseLeave(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles 
Label45.MouseLeave 
        Label45.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
        Panel35.BackColor = Color.SteelBlue 
    End Sub 
 
End Class 
